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ABSTRACT 
Modeling Construction Competitive Bidding: An Agent-Based Approach 
Sadegh Asgari 
 
The construction industry is a complex, multi-level system that includes a large collection of 
independent, heterogeneous organizations and institutions and is associated with several economic 
sectors and markets. Because of its unique characteristics, the construction industry as one of the 
major economic sectors and contributors to the economic development of the nation needs its own 
specific and dedicated economics. The shortcomings of the existing methodologies call for the use 
of more sophisticated modeling tools that can capture more important aspects of the real world and 
its complexity in particular the interconnections among elements of the system, their idiosyncrasies, 
and emergent behavior. As a pioneer attempt in the exploration of a new theory of construction 
economics, this study aims to found the first building blocks of the comprehensive economic 
model of the construction industry. In this dissertation, an agent-based approach is applied to 
model the low-bid lump-sum construction competitive bidding by which most construction works 
are allocated. This model has several advantages over the previous analytical and empirical models 
including the capability of observing the bidding process dynamics, the interaction between the 
heterogeneous and learning agents, and the emergent bidding patterns arising from multiple 
scenarios of market conditions and contractors’ attributes. Then the model is used as a virtual 
laboratory for conducting a variety of experiments to answer several important research questions 
in the field of construction economics. The main research objectives of this study are to: (1) 
analyze the effectiveness of major quantitative methods in the bidding environment under a variety 
of market conditions (2) study the effect of contractors’ risk behavior, cost estimating and project 
management skills, and complexity of projects on contractors’ choice of optimal markup, long-
term financial growth and market share (3) investigate the impact of risk behavior and need for 
work on contractors’ performance. The results presented in this dissertation offer new 
understandings and insights on the construction bidding environment and recommendations for 
both owners and contractors’ competitive success, which are not available using conventional 
approaches. In particular, results suggest that (1) using Friedman model can result in considerably 
higher market share whereas using Gates model can result in higher profit per project, (2) the 
optimal policy for contractors is moderation in both dimensions of risk attitude and need for work, 
(3) the comparative performance of slightly and extremely risk averse contractors are depending 
on level of cost estimating accuracy and project execution skills of contractors as well as the level 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are 
certain, they do not refer to reality.” ~ Albert Einstein 
 
1.1. Overview 
The construction industry as one of the major economic sectors in any economy plays a significant 
role in the economic development. The construction industry can be best understood and analyzed 
as system-of-systems, a complex, multi-level system that includes a large collection of 
independent, heterogeneous organizations and institutions and is associated economic sectors and 
markets. While there are numerous modeling techniques available in the field of economics 
construction needs its own specific and dedicated economics because of several reasons including 
but not limited to the facts that: (1) the size of the industry is considerable and its contribution to 
the whole economy, employment, welfare, and development of other industries is significant; (2) 
the final product of the construction process is large, immobile, capital-intensive, and often unique; 
(3) construction markets are very diverse and fragmented; (4) demand for construction services 
and products is highly interdependent with the current and future state of the economy; and (5) 
mechanism for price determination is highly complex.  
Construction bidding environment is an important component of the industry since allocation of 
contracts and consequently the price of construction services are usually determined through some 
form of competitive bidding (Myers, 2013). Competitive bidding is a mechanism universally used 
by construction clients to allocate construction work to contractors and also establish the market 
price (D. S. Drew, 2010). Construction bidding is a challenging and risky process where competing 
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contractors of different types and sizes with various short-term and long-term goals and strategies, 
seek to win the offered project at the best value. There are a number of bidding methods (including 
the lowest bid, the average bid, the second lowest bid, and the best value bid) and selection criteria 
(including price, time, and quality) that are utilized by owners to choose the best contractor and 
ensure the project is delivered in accordance with its objectives (Gordon, 1994). Although 
construction bidding may be similar to auctions of manufactured products, airport slots and online 
advertisements (as known as AdWords) in terms of rules and procedures, its dynamics vary in 
many ways due to the nature and complexities of construction works (Runeson & Skitmore, 1999). 
1.2. Problem Statement 
The construction bidding environment is a perfect example of an interactive, dynamic and complex 
system of heterogeneous and autonomous agents (contractors and owners). Complexity of the 
construction bidding environment originates from a large number of actors with uncertain, 
heterogeneous but interdependent behavior interacting with themselves and construction projects. 
Researchers have investigated different aspects of construction bidding from both contractors’ and 
owners’ perspectives using analytical and empirical approaches. Accordingly, the literature can be 
divided into two main categories: (1) statistical models that have been applied to model and predict 
behavior of the market or price fluctuations, and (2) mathematical and game theoretic models that 
are built that on strong assumptions such as rational agents and linearity. These two categories of 
models usually fail to capture complexity and dynamics of bidding environment by disregarding 
interactions among players. Due to the methodological restrictions and limited applicability of 
previous research studies to address existing research questions, there is a need for developing a 
proper methodology that captures complexity of the construction bidding environment.  
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1.3. Research Objectives 
The primary goal of this study is to develop an agent-based model of the construction bidding 
environment and utilize it as a virtual laboratory to conduct a variety of simulation experiments to 
answer the following research questions:  
 What is the impact of the choice of learning mechanisms on contractors’ financial 
performance, success rate, and market share under a variety of market scenarios?  
 How do these learning mechanisms perform in competition against each other and 
irrational players? 
 How does the interaction among risk attitude, cost estimating accuracy and project 
management skills impact contractors’ performance in low and high risk markets?  
 Is there an optimal level of risk attitude by which contractors can improve their long-
term performance? 
 Should a markup discount be considered to account for need for work? If yes, to what 
degree?  
1.4. Research Significance 
Understanding of the construction industry as a system-of-systems can lead the way for further 
research in this discipline. This dissertation, as a part of this ambitious project, is an attempt to 
create the first fundamental building blocks of this economic model of the construction industry. 
Specifically, this dissertation focuses on modeling and analyzing the most prevailing form of 
market in the construction industry, the competitive bidding environment. The main research 
development of this study contribute to the advancement of current theory and practice of 
construction bidding. The developed virtual laboratory can serve as an experimental tool that can 
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be used by any potential user (owner or contractor) to evaluate and compare different bidding 
strategies and project tendering approaches. It can also serve as an educational tool in academic 
forums and classes to teach construction management students. 
1.5. Research Methodology 
 The complexity of the construction bidding environment can be captured only through a bottom-
up modeling approach that focuses on the interactions among the components of the system. Agent 
based modeling (ABM) is used to develop the simulation model. ABM provides a platform in 
which contributions of the previous studies can be used for defining and building elements of the 
model such as project attributes and contractors’ possible goals and behaviors as well as 
establishing relationships amongst those elements. To understand and analyze the construction 
bidding dynamics, ABM offers several advantages over other modeling and simulation methods: 
 ABM takes into account the bounded rationality and learning capability of agents. As 
opposed to mathematical and game theoretic modeling.  
 ABM allows consideration of heterogeneous agents that have different goals, behaviors 
and capabilities.  
 ABM provides modelers with the ability to conduct experiments under various scenarios 
with little effort.  
 ABM can be used for performing ex-ante analysis of complex systems. Dynamic game 
theoretic analysis uses backward induction.  
 ABM has shown great potential in dealing with emergent behaviors of complex systems.  
1.6. Thesis Organization 
The organization of this dissertation and its relation to the main research tasks are shown in 
Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1. Organization of the dissertation and list of tasks in order to accomplish the dissertation objectives  
Organization  Task # Task Description 
Chapter 1  Introduction to the dissertation  
Chapter 2 1 Overview of key concepts in the field of construction economics, 
agent-based modeling, and system-of-systems in order to form a solid 
point of departure for the present study 
Chapter 3 
 
2 A comprehensive review and categorization of scientific studies in the 
field of competitive construction bidding based on the methodological 
approach 
3 Identification of the need and proper methodology for developing a 
comprehensive model that captures the dynamics of bidding 
environment 




5 A review of major quantitative bidding models are identified in the 
literature 
6 Implementation of the selected quantitative bidding methods in the 
model 
7 Design and conduct of experiments for comparing of the effectiveness 
of these methods in the bidding environment under a variety of 
scenarios 
Chapter 5 8 An extensive review of  the literature to identify the key parameters 
involved in the bidding process  
9 Formulation and implementation of the complex interaction among 
contractors’ risk behavior, cost estimating and project management 
skills, and complexity of projects 
10 Design and conduct of experiments for analyzing the impact of risk 
attitude, cost estimating accuracy, project management skills, and 
project complexity on contractors’ performance and the market 
Chapter 6 11 An extensive review of  descriptive studies in the literature to build a 
rule-based markup decision model that replicates behavior of a typical 
contractor 
12 Formulation and implementation of the multi-criteria bidding methods 
in the model  
13 Design and conduct of experiments for studying impact of 
consideration of risk allowance and need for work on contractor’s 
financial success in a long run 
Chapter 7 14 Verification of the agent-based models 
15 Validation of the agent-based models 
Chapter 8 16 Conclusions  





CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
“No science thrives in the atmosphere of direct practical aim. We should still be without most of 
the conveniences of modern life if physicists had been as eager for immediate applications as most 
economists are and always have been.” J. Schumpeter  
 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to overview key concepts in the field of construction economics and system-of-
systems. This provides the foundation for understanding the main purpose of the dissertation, the 
methodology used in the dissertation, and the reason for this choice. The first section provides a 
brief overview on the construction industry. The “Construction Economics” section elaborates on 
the need for developing an economic understanding of the industry with respects to its unique 
characteristics. Then, agent-based modeling (ABM) is introduced as an advanced methodology 
used for economic modeling of complex systems and compared against other methodologies. In 
the next section, system-of-systems is introduced and recommended to facilitate applying any 
methodology to an economic or managerial problem in construction. System-of-systems serves as 
a lens to look at the industry so that the problem can be best defined, abstracted, and modeled using 
a variety of methodologies.  
2.2. Construction Industry: Overview  
The construction industry is a complex, multi-level system that includes a large collection of 
independent, heterogeneous organizations and institutions and is associated economic sectors and 
markets including but not limited to public clients, private developers, financiers, contractors, 
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architects, designers, consultants, suppliers, manufacturers, subcontractors, facility managers, 
professionals societies, regulatory agencies, and labor unions. As shown in Figure 2.1, the 
constituents of this system are interconnected with each other at different levels as well as other 
sectors and industries in the economy at local, regional, national, and global levels.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. A schematic representation of the construction industry as a complex, multi-level system 
 
The construction industry as one of the major economic sectors in any economy plays a significant 
role in the economic development. According to a Price-Waterhouse-Coopers (PwC)-sponsored 
report, the construction industry accounted for more than 11 percent of the global GDP in 2011 
and this share is projected to reach 13.2 percent by 2020 (Roumeliotis, 2011). The total value of 
public investment in construction will increase to $14.5 trillion in the U.S. by 2020, with growth 
averaging 7.8 percent per year over the next five years (Roumeliotis, 2011). Although, this 
investment in most developed countries is constrained due to large public deficits, austerity 
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programs, slow population growth and limited economic expansion, the United States will be the 
exception given its growing population. Besides its significant role in the whole economy, the 
construction industry has also many extensive linkages with other industries. For example, 
residential building is among the most labor-intensive activities; the construction industry has 
critical recruitment, training, skills and safety issues; and, acquisition of a house is almost 
considered as the largest investment most individuals can make (De Valence, 2010). Despite the 
important role in the economy and the interdependency with other industries, to my best 
knowledge most of the published research studies in construction related journals and conferences 
have concentrated on different aspects of construction projects and project management. 
Construction has been and will always be a project-based industry. However, modeling and 
analyzing projects and the dynamics among involved parties at project level is necessary but not 
enough to develop an understanding of the industry. There is a need to develop a comprehensive 
economic model of the industry using a systematic approach. This model can consider strategic 
behavior of firms, various forms of project delivery and contractor selection (known as allocation 
mechanism in economics), market structure, public policies, regulatory measures, and linkages 
with other industries through supply chains of materials, money, services, and labors.  
2.3. Construction Economics: Definition and Domain  
There is still lack of a consensus on definition, domain, and content of construction economics. 
However, the two most prevalent views on construction economics are:  
1. Construction economics is the application of economics to the study of the construction 
firm, the construction process, and the construction industry (Cooke, 1996; Hillebrandt, 
2000; Raftery, 1991).  
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2. Construction economics is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources (Gruneberg, 
1997; Myers, 2013; Ofori, 1990; Robbins, 2007).  
Construction economics has not yet developed to the point where it could be acknowledged as a 
distinct branch of general economics (Ofori, 1994). However, many scholars in both the academia 
and the industry argue that construction needs its own specific and dedicated economics because 
of several reasons including but not limited to the following (De Valence, 2010):  
 The size of the industry is considerable and its contribution to the whole economy, 
employment, welfare, and development of other industries is significant.  
 The final product of the construction process has unique characteristics; it is large, 
immobile, capital-intensive, and often one-off.  
 Construction markets are very diverse and fragmented; a large number of small 
geographically dispersed firms with diverse specialties dominate the industry. According 
to the US bureau of labor statistics about 80% of construction payroll establishments had 
1 to 9 employees. 
 Demand for construction services and products is highly dependent on the current and 
future state of the economy.  
 Mechanism for price determination is highly complex. The price of the final product is 
usually determined through a number of tendering processes.  
 The construction industry tends to be stable over the long term, while it is also remarkably 
unstable in the short term, in particular during periods of economic adjustment. The 
construction industry contracts earlier and more quickly than the whole economy when the 
economy contracts. On the other hand, despite its faster growth at the time of recovery, the 
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construction industry starts its recovery later than the economy. Construction works are 
very seasonal; most layoffs in the industry occur in the fourth quarter of each year.  
Consistent with the classic categorizations of economics, construction economics can be divided 
into three main branches: construction microeconomics, construction macroeconomics, and 
construction mesoeconomics. Table 2.1 presents definition and associated topics of each branch 
of construction economics.  
 
Table 2.1. Definition and topics of the three branches of construction economics 
Field Definition Topics 
Construction 
Microeconomics  
It studies the behavior of involved 
individuals and organizations 
through lifecycle of projects at 
different levels in making decisions 
on the allocation of their limited 
resources.  
Market analysis; Competitive 
bidding; Project delivery systems; 
Project evaluations; Cost analysis and 
management; Decision under 




It is an intermediate level between 
microeconomics and 
macroeconomics, dealing with the 
economies of the entire sector and 
focuses on the structure of the 
industry and interdependencies 
among constituents of the industry.  
A holistic approach towards the 




It focuses on the performance of the 
industry as a whole. It studies 
aggregated indicators of the 
construction industry such as 
construction spending and price 
indexes to understand how the whole 
economy functions.  
Construction output; Aggregate 
demand and supply of construction 
services; Construction 
unemployment; Inflation and 
deflation of prices; Global 
construction market.  
 
Through life cycle of a project, there can be a number of markets: a market for architecture and 
design services, a market for construction, and a market for operation and maintenance (See 
Figure 2.1). Each market has its own specific allocation mechanism. In construction markets, 
buyers (usually public and private clients) and sellers (usually contractors) meet to agree on a price 
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and a quantity for construction goods. Therefore, the term “market” has a narrower meaning than 
the term “industry” which can be defined as a branch of trade. Construction goods be they tangible 
(structures) or intangible (services) have a special feature; they can be characterized as contract 
goods (not as exchange goods). This is because when the contract is signed, the contractor agrees 
to produce and deliver the good without deficiencies as specified in the contract and the client 
agrees to pay right away. On the other hand, exchange goods are produced before procurement 
(Brockmann, 2010). Contractors compete for construction contracts through one of these three 
ways: (1) direct negotiation (2), competition, or (3) competition followed by negotiation (D. S. 
Drew, 2010). Thus, the construction market can take on any structure, from perfect competition 
through imperfect competition (monopolistic competition and oligopoly) and up to monopoly (De 
Valence, 2010).  
2.4. Conventional Economic Modeling Approaches  
Economic models as simplified representations of the real world are being developed to understand, 
explain and predict economic phenomenon (Myers, 2013). Modeling a market, an industry or the 
whole economy is of particular interest for policy makers due to the need to evaluate the impact 
of the envisaged policies on the system as well as for players involved to adopt the best strategy 
for achieving their goals. In economics, the two most prevalent, yet flawed, decision-making tools 
for economic policy analysis are (Farmer & Foley, 2009):  
1. Econometrics or empirical statistical models,  
2. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium / Game theoretic models.  
Statistical models use past data to predict future. They are valuable as long as the world in the 
future is similar to the world in the past and the relationship between the past and the present is 
constant. On the other hand, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium and game theoretic models 
12 
 
are built on strong assumptions such as rational agents and linearity that make the model unrealistic 
(Farmer & Foley, 2009). These two categories of models usually fail to capture complexity and 
interaction of the interconnected system constituents and are not reliable at times of radical change 
and crisis. One example is their failure to predict the financial crisis in 2008 (Buchanan, 2009) 
when a major change in one market had ripple effects on other related markets and the whole 
economy. These shortcomings of the conventional models call for the use of more sophisticated 
modeling tools that can capture more important aspects of the real world and its complexity in 
particular the interconnections among elements of the system, their idiosyncrasies, and emergent 
behavior. Complexity of the construction industry originates from a large number of actors with 
uncertain, heterogeneous but interdependent behavior interacting with themselves and other actors 
from other industries. Complexity at levels of project, firm, market, and the industry has been 
conceptualized and discussed in the literature (Baccarini, 1996; Bertelsen, 2003a, 2003b; Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002; Gidado, 1996; Wood & Gidado, 2008). However, a proper methodology to model 
complexity and systematic approach to its implementation for the construction industry have not 
been proposed yet.  
2.5. Agent-Based Modeling: A New Economic Modeling Approach 
Thanks to the advances in the field of computer science in particular object-oriented programming, 
a movement has been formed in economics with the aim of developing a new economic thinking 
and modeling. This resulted in the creation of agent-based computational economics, which is an 
attempt to explore the intersection of management science, evolutionary economics, and computer 
science.  
Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), as one of the central modeling and simulation tools in the field of 
computational economics, can offer solutions for the challenges that the conventional methods 
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have not been able to overcome. Increasing tendency to apply ABM is not only due to the 
developments in computer modeling and simulation techniques and increased computer 
capabilities but also because of a paradigm shift in understanding economic phenomenon. The 
main premise of ABM is that a system should be viewed as a group of components interacting 
with each other in a dynamic web of relationships and not just as the sum of its parts. With regard 
to this way of economic thinking, markets can be viewed as inherently dynamic rather than static 
systems.  
In ABM, the agents are computational objects interacting according to rules over space and time. 
They can represent individuals, organizations, biological entities, and/or physical systems. The 
rules are defined to model behaviors and social interactions based on incentives and information  
(Page, 2005). Agents can be designed to learn from other agents and the environment and to adapt 
to new situations. This evolutionary adaptation in one agent affects the evolution of another agent 
(known as coevolution in a system). ABM allows the modeler to make more realistic assumptions 
while the conventional approaches use mathematical proofs to model its theories. The conventional 
approaches usually fail to explain innovation and growth except as the result of random exogenous 
shocks from technology. According to (Tesfatsion, 2006), the ultimate scientific objective of ABM 
is to "test theoretical findings against real-world data in ways that permit empirically supported 
theories to cumulate over time, with each researcher’s work building appropriately on the work 
that has gone before".  




1. Bottom-up perspective: The properties of macro-dynamics of a system can be best 
understood as the outcome of micro-dynamics involving constituent entities (Tesfatsion, 
2002). 
2. Boundedly-rational agents: Agents should be assumed to behave as boundedly rational 
entities with adaptive expectations rather than hyper-rational entities with rational 
expectations.  
3. Networked direct interactions: Agents have direct interactions with each other since 
through adaptive expectations their current decisions directly depend on the past decisions 
and actions made by other agents in the environment.  
Due to its holistic approach and capability to deal with complex systems, ABM can be utilized for 
various research purposes including but not limited to prediction, proof, discovery, education and 
training (R. Axelrod, 1997). ABM has recently received a considerable amount of attention from 
researchers in several domains of social sciences, economics and engineering, and therefore its 
applications have largely increased over the last two decades. In particular, it has been extensively 
applied for modeling and analyzing competitive, interactive environments, and markets in several 
industries such as: 
 financial markets (S.-H. Chen & Yeh, 2001; Farmer et al., 2012; Howitt & Clower, 2000; 
Izumi & Ueda, 1998, 2001; LeBaron, 2000, 2001; X. Liu, Yang, & Tang, 2007; Palmer, 
Arthur, Holland, & LeBaron, 1999; Tay & Linn, 2001; H. Zhou, Jiang, & Zeng, 2010),  
 electricity markets (Bower & Bunn, 2001; Bunn & Oliveira, 2001; Fekete, Nikolovski, 
Puzak, Slipac, & Keko, 2008; Knežević, Fekete, & Nikolovski, 2010; Nicolaisen, Petrov, 
& Tesfatsion, 2001; Weidlich & Veit, 2008; Z. Zhou, Wang, & Botterud, 2011; Z. Zhou, 
Zhao, & Wang, 2011),  
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 trade networks of buyers and sellers (Albin & Foley, 1992; Kirman, 1997; Tesfatsion, 
1997a, 1997b; Vriend, 1995; Weisbuch, Kirman, & Herreiner, 1997, 2000; Wilhite, 2001),  
 labor networks (Neugart, 2008; Nicolaisen et al., 2001; Tassier & Menczer, 2001; 
Tesfatsion, 1998),  
 housing markets (Geanakoplos et al., 2012; Magliocca, Safirova, McConnell, & Walls, 
2011; Meen & Meen, 2003),  
 urban land markets (Filatova, Parker, & Van der Veen, 2009), and 
 online auctions (Mizuta & Steiglitz, 2000). 
A prime example of ABM application in large-scale is the Eurace@Unibi model, which has been 
under development since 2006 with the aim of building a comprehensive model of the European 
economy with integrating goods markets, labor markets, financial markets, and credit markets 
(Silvano Cincotti, Raberto, & Teglio, 2010; S Cincotti, Raberto, & Teglio, 2012; Dawid, Gemkow, 
Harting, Van der Hoog, & Neugart, 2012; Deissenberg, Van Der Hoog, & Dawid, 2008; Teglio, 
Raberto, & Cincotti, 2010).  
As for bidding in the construction industry, an evolutionary Monte-Carlo simulation model was 
developed to examine the effects of risk attitude on a contractor’s success and on the market 
structure (Kim & Reinschmidt, 2010). While this model considers contractors as individual agents 
competing with each other in a market, learning capability of contractors from each other and the 
environment has been ignored. Because the model does not cover the three ingredients mentioned 
above, it can hardly be considered as a true application of agent-based modeling. However, in civil 
engineering domain, ABM has been employed for various purposes such as infrastructure 
management (Bernhardt & McNeil, 2008), analysis  of financial innovation policies (Mostafavi, 
Abraham, & DeLaurentis, 2013), subcontractor selection (Unsal & Taylor, 2010), dispute 
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resolution (El-Adaway & Kandil, 2009) and sustainable design and management of the built 
environment (Azar & Menassa, 2011, 2013; J. Chen, Jain, & Taylor, 2013; Said et al., 2013).  
2.6. System-of-Systems  
There is still no consensus about the definition of system-of-systems (SoS). The term system-of-
systems became more common and used in the literature after the seminal works of (Berry, 1964) 
and (Ackoff, 1971). There are at least sixteen different definitions in the literature for SoS (Lane 
& Valerdi, 2007). Each definition suggests several characteristics that differentiate systems-of-
systems from legacy systems (Boardman & Sauser, 2006; Carlock & Fenton, 2001; Daniel 
DeLaurentis, 2005a; Jamshidi, 2008; Kotov, 1997; Lewis et al., 2008; Maier, 1996; Manthorpe, 
1996; Sage & Cuppan, 2001). The most referenced traits of the constituents of a SoS are: 
 Interoperability 
 Operational independence  
 Managerial independence 
 Heterogeneity 
 Evolving nature  
 Emergence  
Transportation systems, the Internet, integrated air defense networks, and enterprise information 
networks are examples of systems that match the system-of-systems traits (Haskins & Forsberg, 
2011; Maier, 1996).  
The system-of-systems approach for decomposing complex systems has been applied in several 
domains including but not limited to transportation systems (Datu B Agusdinata, Fry, & 
Delaurentis, 2011; Daniel DeLaurentis, 2005b; E. Han & DeLaurentis, 2006; M. Han, Fan, & Guo, 
2005; J.-H. Lewe & DeLaurentis, 2004; J. Lewe, DeLaurentis, & Mavris, 2004; Mansouri, Gorod, 
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Wakeman, & Sauser, 2010; Mansouri, Gorod, Wakeman, & Sauser, 2009), emergency 
management (S. Liu, 2011), policy making for civil infrastructure systems (Mostafavi, Abraham, 
& Lee, 2012), policy making for the energy sector (Datu Buyung Agusdinata & DeLaurentis, 
2008), electrical systems (Pruyt & Thissen, 2007), medical imaging systems (Chandrashekar, 
Gautam, Srinivas, & Vijayananda, 2007), telecommunication systems (Noam, 1994), healthcare 
systems (P.-C. DeLaurentis & DeLaurentis, 2010; Grigoroudis & Phillis, 2013; Rusu, Taggart, 
Desmond, & Lopez, 2013; Wickramasinghe, Chalasani, Boppana, & Madni, 2007; 
Wickramasinghe, Chalasani, & Koritala, 2012), and financial markets (Kilicay-Ergin & Dagli, 
2008; Osmundson, Langford, & Huynh, 2009). Review of the literature indicates that the system-
of-systems approach has not been utilized to develop macroeconomic and microeconomic models 
for complex systems with economic functions.  
With identifying its characteristics as a complex system in the former sections of this chapter and 
mapping them with the generic traits of system-of-systems, the construction industry can be best 
perceived and analyzed as a system-of-systems and not as a legacy monolithic system. The 
construction industry demonstrated all the standard traits of a system-of-systems. Its components 
are heterogeneous, operationally independent, and managerially independent while they are 
working together. Its markets have shown evolving nature (Kim & Reinschmidt, 2011) and 
emergent behaviors such as the hold-up problem (Unsal & Taylor, 2010) that cannot be captured 
analytically.  
2.7. Connecting the Dots: Where this Dissertation Locates  
The complete modeling of the construction industry and its relationship with the economy will 
require the analysis of a large number of intersystem interdependencies. This needs to be achieved 
whilst adopting a holistic approach that does not neglect the fact that the whole of the system is 
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more than its parts. Modeling the actors, components, economic environment, interactions, and 
complexity of the construction industry as a system-of-systems will advance the understanding of 
the overall economic behavior of the industry and the emergent behavior of its components. Since 
ABM is a bottom-up approach that derives the aggregate behavior of a system from micro-level 
interactions, it is an effective modeling tool for the implementation phase of the system-of-systems 
approach. This approach presents the required steps for the development of a high-fidelity 
economic model that replicates the economic behavior of the construction industry in the United 
States. This research study has unique academic and practical contributions. It advances the 
knowledge in the field and provides the US policy-makers with a decision support tool that has 
never existed. This dissertation, as a part of this ambitious study, is an attempt to create the first 
fundamental building blocks of this economic model of the construction industry. Specifically, 
this dissertation focuses on modeling and analyzing the most prevailing form of market in the 
construction industry, the competitive bidding environment.  
Understanding of the construction industry as a system-of-systems can lead the way for further 
research in this discipline. In order to achieve this objective, an understanding of the theoretic 
aspects of the construction industry as related to its composition and the characteristics of its 
components is required. Construction bidding environment is an important component of the 
industry. The next chapter is dedicated to the development of an agent-based model (ABM) of 




CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPMENT OF A VIRTUAL LABORATORY FOR ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTRUCTION COMPETITIVE BIDDING  
 
"A 'system' can be defined as a complex of elements standing in interaction. There are general 
principles holding for systems, irrespective of the nature of the component elements and the 
relations of forces between them. ...In modern science, dynamic interaction is the basic problem 
in all fields, and its general principles will have to be formulated in General Systems Theory." ~ 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Problems of Life  
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the construction industry, allocation of contracts and consequently the price of construction 
services are usually determined through some form of competitive bidding (Myers, 2013). 
Competitive bidding is a mechanism universally used by construction clients to allocate 
construction work to contractors and also establish the market price (D. S. Drew, 2010). Variations, 
such as negotiated contracts (cost-plus contract), comprise merely a small portion of the market 
because majority of the clients are more willing (and/or sometimes obliged in the case of public 
owners) to deliver their project through competition (Harris & McCaffer, 2013). It is worth 
mentioning that the two main categories of competitive bidding contracts are the lump-sum 
contract and the unit-price contract.  
Construction bidding is a challenging and risky process where competing contractors of different 
types and sizes with various short-term and long-term goals and strategies, seek to win the offered 
project at the best value. There are a number of bidding methods (including the lowest bid, the 
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average bid, the second lowest bid, and the best value bid) and selection criteria (including price, 
time, and quality) that are utilized by owners to choose the best contractor and ensure the project 
is delivered in accordance with its objectives (Gordon, 1994). Although construction bidding may 
be similar to auctions of manufactured products, airport slots and online advertisements (as known 
as AdWords) in terms of rules and procedures, its dynamics vary in many ways due to the nature 
and complexities of construction works (Runeson & Skitmore, 1999). Despite the involved risks 
and the limited available information, contractors have to make a number of simultaneous and 
interdependent decisions in a timely manner. They have to quote a price before the project starts 
when all the costs are not yet known. Therefore, the auction theory may not help analyze the 
construction bidding given that the private value is uncertain for the bidder (M. Skitmore, Runeson, 
& Chang, 2006). For owners, there is always uncertainty about whether or not the currently 
employed contractor selection method is optimal, can lead to a successful project, and can generate 
best value in the long run (Holt, 1998). Therefore, understanding the bidding environment is of 
significance for both sides of the construction market: owners as demanders and contractors as 
suppliers.  
Researchers have investigated different aspects of construction bidding from both contractors’ and 
owners’ perspectives using analytical and empirical approaches. Due to methodological 
restrictions and limited applicability of previous research studies, there is a need for developing a 
comprehensive model that helps understand the dynamics of bidding environment by considering 
interactions among players. In this chapter, agent based modeling (ABM) is used to develop such 
a model. ABM provides a platform in which contributions of the previous studies can be used for 
defining and building elements of the model such as project attributes and contractors’ possible 
goals and behaviors as well as establishing relationships amongst those elements. This chapter is 
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organized as follows: The “Construction Bidding Literature” section extensively reviews the 
literature on construction bidding by taking a new approach to categorize the previous studies. It 
also discusses their shortcomings compared to the applied methodology which is agent-based 
modeling. Next, the “Methodology” section describes the development of an agent-based model 
of construction bidding environment using a system-of-systems analysis approach that includes 
three phases of definition, abstraction, and implementation. Finally, the developed model in this 
chapter will be used for different experiments in next chapters in order to first verify the model 
and then investigate the proposed research questions in this thesis.  
3.2. Literature Review on Construction Bidding 
Based on the applied research methodologies, the literature of construction bidding can be 
classified into three main broad categories:  
 Deduction: the deriving of a conclusion by reasoning,  
 Induction: inference of a generalized conclusion from particular instances, and  
 Simulation: the imitative representation of the functioning of one system or process by 
means of another.  
3.2.1. Deduction 
A scientific inquiry based on deduction involves specifying a set of assumptions and reaching 
certain conclusions and theories in a logical and consecutive process (R. Axelrod, 1997). Under 
this category, several models (Ahmad & Minkarah, 1987; Carr, 1982; Friedman, 1956; Gates, 1967; 
King & Mercer, 1990; Morin & Clough, 1969; Park & Chapin, 1992; Wade & Harris, 1976) were 
proposed for optimal markup strategy, assuming that all contractors are seeking to maximize their 
expected profit while considering opponents’ bid history. Later, the assumption of maximizing the 
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expected monetary value as an objective function was replaced with its expected utility in order to 
incorporate the risk attitudes of contractors (Ibbs & Crandall, 1982; Willenbrock, 1973). Moreover, 
other possible determinant factors such as loss avoidance and work force continuity were taken 
into consideration for developing multi-attribute models of bidding strategy, more realistically 
reflecting contractors’ behaviors (Cagno, Caron, & Perego, 2001; Dozzi, AbouRizk, & Schroeder, 
1996; Marzouk & Moselhi, 2003; Seydel & Olson, 1990; Shen, Drew, & Zhang, 1999; M. 
Skitmore & Pemberton, 1994; Wang, Dzeng, & Lu, 2007). In order to develop appropriate bid 
compensation strategies for owners, game theory, that is based on rational choice paradigm, was 
applied to understand the impacts of bid compensation in projects with high bid preparation cost 
(Ho & Hsu, 2013; Ping Ho, 2005). It is noteworthy to mention that the developed decision models 
under this category are mostly prescriptive rather than descriptive, i.e., they provide prescriptions 
on ‘how a decision should be made rather than describing how decision is made’  (Bazerman & 
Moore, 2012) .   
3.2.2. Induction  
On the other hand, induction starts with specific observations, conducting surveys, and gathering 
empirical data. Through discovering patterns and regularities in the data, some tentative 
hypotheses are formulated for further investigation and finally some general conclusions or 
theories are developed (R. Axelrod, 1997). Under this category, there is a series of studies that 
conducted questionnaire surveys and interviews in order to reveal the underlying factors that 
characterize the bidding decision‐making process and contractor selection methods (Ahmad, 1990; 
Ahmad & Minkarah, 1988; Chua & Li, 2000; Dulaimi & Shan, 2002; Egemen & Mohamed, 2007; 
El-Mashaleh, 2012; S. H. Han & Diekmann, 2001; Hatush & Skitmore, 1997; Shash, 1993; Ye, 
Li, & Shen, 2012; Ye, Shen, Xia, & Li, 2014). Furthermore, artificial intelligence (Art 
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Chaovalitwongse, Wang, Williams, & Chaovalitwongse, 2011; Chao, 2007; Chua, Li, & Chan, 
2001; Fayek, 1998; M. Han et al., 2005; Hegazy & Moselhi, 1994; Heng Li & Love, 1999; H Li, 
Shen, & Love, 1999; M. Liu & Ling, 2003, 2005) and statistical analysis (Carr & Sandahl, 1978; 
D. Drew & Skitmore, 1997; Ngai, Drew, Lo, & Skitmore, 2002; M. Skitmore, 1991) were 
employed to use past data and develop bidding models to help contractors with the decisions of 
bid/no bid and optimal markup. 
3.2.3. Simulation  
While most previous research attempts took either inductive or deductive approaches, simulation 
has also received some attention in the construction bidding literature. According to (R. Axelrod, 
1997), simulation is the third way of conducting scientific research especially in social sciences. 
A research based on simulation begins with specifying a set of assumptions, similar to a deductive 
approach, and then analyzes the generated data using an inductive approach (R. Axelrod, 1997; R. 
M. Axelrod, 1997). Simulation provides researchers with appropriate tools for designing and 
running a wide range of controlled experiments.  
There are a number of simulation techniques that have been developed. Each one has its own 
strengths and limitations. In construction bidding literature, “live simulation” has been utilized to 
benefit from the industry practitioners’ and experts’ knowledge and experience to uncover possible 
behaviors and decisions of contractors in different situations. In one study, (de Neufville & King, 
1991) devised a bid simulation exercise to obtain valid utility functions for construction contractors. 
After conducting a statistical analysis, they concluded that the need for work and risk have 
substantial impact on contractors’ bid markups. In another study, involving experienced 
respondents in 60 simulated bidding games, (D. S. Drew & Skitmore, 2006) refuted Vickrey’s 
revenue equivalence principle (Krishna, 2010; Vickrey, 1961). They showed that in construction 
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bidding context, the amount that an owner has to pay the winning contractor in the long run will 
not be the same in the case of using second price auction instead of the conventional first price 
auction. In a series of studies involving managers of medium to large contractors from Hong Kong 
and Singapore, decision to bid and markup behaviors of contractors in different market conditions 
and firm situations were statistically analyzed using the data gathered from bidding experiments 
(Lan Oo, Lo, & Teck-Heng Lim, 2012; Oo, Drew, & Lo, 2008a, 2008b, 2010). Finally, (Unsal & 
Taylor, 2011) empirically examined the existence of hold-up problem in subcontracting process 
using an internet-based interactive bidding simulation. While live simulation appears promising, 
the need for having real people (often experienced experts) playing the role of individual decision 
makers, pressure on researchers for assuring that there are no mistakes in the experimental process, 
and limited time and resource for running a large enough number of experiments make it 
impractical in many cases.  
As explained in chapter 2, ABM has been recognized as a powerful tool for modeling and 
simulating the behaviors and interactions of autonomous agents with the intention of assessing 
their impacts on the system. To understand and analyze the construction bidding dynamics, ABM 
offers several advantages over other modeling and simulation methods:  
 ABM takes into account the bounded rationality and learning capability of agents. As 
opposed to game theoretic modeling, agents in ABM can adopt complex and adaptive 
strategies such as “exploration and exploitation” (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1991; 
Valluri, North, & Macal, 2009) by learning from the environment and other agents. While 
game theory has been recognized as a powerful tool for modeling and analyzing conflict 
and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers (Neumann & Morgenstern 
1947), its strong assumptions and inflexible structure make it less applicable to 
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construction problems. In order to analyze and solve a game (in particular a dynamic game 
which is more relevant to real interactions in construction than a static game), end outcomes 
of the game is needed to be known. A comprehensive review of game theory applications 
in construction management can be found in (Asgari, Afshar, & Madani, 2013). 
 ABM allows consideration of heterogeneous agents that have different goals, behaviors 
and capabilities. This is of special importance due to the heterogeneity of construction 
market players.  
 The ability of integrating contributions of the previous studies makes an ABM approach 
sufficiently robust and of great value for developing a virtual laboratory. Agent-based 
computational laboratory of financial markets (Farmer et al., 2012), housing markets 
(Geanakoplos et al., 2012; Magliocca et al., 2011), electricity markets (North et al., 2002) 
and the global energy system (Voudouris, Stasinopoulos, Rigby, & Di Maio, 2011) have 
been recently developed and have proven promising. Also, ABM can create a platform for 
incorporating other methodologies such as game theory (Unsal & Taylor, 2010) and 
benefiting from them.  
 Having a virtual laboratory of the system provides modelers with the ability to conduct 
experiments under various scenarios with little effort. Experimentation is the standard 
method of doing science particularly in management and social sciences where conducting 
experiments is impossible or undesirable (Gilbert, 2008). ABM as a scenario analysis tool 
provides owners and contractors with the ability to examine the possibilities as well as the 
probabilities of different conditions that could not be otherwise evaluated. With covering 
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a range of possibilities and examining consistency of the results across a variety of 
scenarios ABM helps ensure obtaining robust conclusions.  
 ABM can be used for performing ex-ante analysis of complex systems. Classical analysis 
tools such as statistical methods and game theoretic models have mostly failed addressing 
problems in which complexity and adaptation are core (Bankes, 2002).   
 Complex systems generally represent important phenomenon called “emergence”. In a 
complex system, agents’ behaviors may be simple, but the aggregate patterns at the system 
level arisen out of their interactions can be complex and irreducible to the system's 
constituent parts. While this property is difficult to capture through mathematical and 
analytical approaches, ABM has shown great potential in dealing with such phenomenon 
(Bonabeau, 2002). Therefore, aggregate properties of a complex system are interpreted as 
emerging due to repeated interactions among agents rather than from the consistency 
requirements of rationality and equilibrium imposed by the modeler (Dosi & Orsenigo, 
1994). 
The construction bidding environment is a perfect example of an interactive, dynamic and complex 
system of heterogeneous and autonomous agents (contractors and owners). The complexity of this 
environment can be captured through a bottom-up modeling approach that focuses on the 
interactions among the agents. In the following section, the methodology for modeling and 
analyzing construction bidding environment will be introduced and discussed.  
3.3. Methodology: A System-Of-Systems Approach  
As explained in the previous chapter, the construction industry is a multi-level complex system 
where a collection of autonomous and heterogeneous agents, including but not limited to policy 
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makers, public and private owners, developers, financiers, architects, designers, consultants, 
general contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers interact with each other at different levels. 
Construction bidding environment, where construction service suppliers meet the demanders, is a 
one of the major sub-systems of the construction industry system-of-systems.  
This sub-system also can be viewed as a system-of-systems because the traits of the construction 
bidding environment match the generic, principal traits of a system-of-systems. These traits 
include managerial independency, operational independency, geographic distribution, 
heterogeneity, multilevel network structure, evolutionary behavior, and emergent behavior (Daniel 
DeLaurentis, 2005a; D. A. DeLaurentis, Crossley, & Mane, 2011). Following a system-of-systems 
analysis approach, as introduced by (Daniel DeLaurentis, 2005a), the proposed methodology used 
in this chapter for modeling construction markets consists of three phases: (1) definition, (2) 
abstraction, and (3) implementation.  
3.3.1. Definition Phase  
This phase mainly includes identification of the domain and context of the modeling. This phase 
is basically a mental mapping activity of construction bidding environment as a system-of-systems. 
In defining the model, we intend to employ and build upon the “proto-method” initiated and 
detailed by (Dan DeLaurentis & Callaway, 2004) including the lexicon and taxonomy proposed 
therein. Table 3.1 elaborates on the three levels of the construction bidding environment in four 
dimensions of resources, operation, policy, and economics known as ROPE (Dan DeLaurentis & 
Callaway, 2004). This representation of construction bidding environment is more limited and less 
comprehensive than the one representing the construction industry. The problem that the model is 
trying to address is specific to the interaction among contractors and owners in the bidding 
environment and during execution of projects. When applying a system-of-systems framework to 
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the construction bidding environment, it is noteworthy to consider that construction project at the 
lowest level of the hierarchy is a temporary economic activity. Also, the collection of lower level 
entities (say construction projects at α level) and their connectivity determine the construct of an 
upper level network (a β-level network in this case). This is valid since construction firms are often 
called project-based organizations.  
 
Table 3.1. The ROPE of the Construction Bidding Environment 
Levels Resources Operation Policy Economics 
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The developed model for construction bidding environment covers three levels of the construction 
industry: project, organization, and market. However, the major focus is on decisions and 
behaviors of agents at β-level and their interactions at γ-level. These levels were highlighted in 
Table 3.1. The impacts of project elements (such as cost) on agents at organization level are 
considered but analyzing interactions at project and organization levels (such as interaction 
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between general contractors and subcontractors) is out of the scope of this model. The context of 
the modeling is to develop a bottom-up model of construction markets.  
3.3.2. Abstraction Phase 
The abstraction phase embraces the concept of object-oriented thinking, derived from the domain 
of computer programming. This phase facilitates transition from the definition phase to the 
implementation phase and subsequent validation and verification by encapsulating big-picture 
dynamics (Daniel DeLaurentis, 2005a). It includes identification of main classes of players, actions, 
and interrelationships within and across the levels of the model. There are basically two classes of 
players: owners (public and private) and contractors. It is assumed that contractors obtain their 
jobs from the demand available in the market by owners. According to (Rice & Heimbach, 2007), 
about 99% of the construction work by contractors is generated from owners in the industry. Table 
3.2 explains the players’ functions and goals in more details.  
 
Table 3.2. Players of the model 
Stakeholders  Descriptions Goals 
Owner Public having a pre-determined budget to 
initiate and manage new projects; 
being required to follow the 
governmental policies & regulations 
such as using low-bid system 
meeting public needs; 
being within budget   
 Private making new investments depending 
on the market conditions; having 
flexibility to use other bidding 
systems  
profit (long term/ short 
term); client’s 
satisfactions 
Contractor  selling services to owners; managing 
resources  
profit; market share; 
job continuity; etc.  
 
Each single player of any class has its own goals, priorities, decision rules, learning capabilities, 
and other attributes. According to (Russell & Norvig, 1995) agents can be grouped into five classes 
based on their degree of perceived intelligence and capability:  
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1. simple reflex agents, 
2. model-based reflex agents, 
3. goal-based agents, 
4. utility-based agents, and  
5. learning agents. 
Depending on the purpose and level of details needed for an experiment, an agent contractor can 
be designed and placed in one of these five classes.  
Because the focus of this study is on contractors’ interaction with each other and the market, an 
abstraction of a contractor in the bidding environment is presented in Figure 1. It is worth noting 
that the agent–environment boundary represents the limit of the agent’s absolute control, not of its 
knowledge. An agent contractor makes decisions based on the short-term and long-term goals as 
well as beliefs, knowledge and information obtained from the market and opponents. After 
implementing the decisions, the agent observes the outcomes, updates the information and refines 
knowledge and beliefs for further decisions to be made. Under certain conditions, beliefs, 
knowledge and information can change a contractor’s goals. For example, expecting a decline in 
construction demand may convince a contractor to change its objective from pure profit 





Figure 3.1. An abstraction of a contractor in the bidding environment 
 
3.3.3. Implementation phase  
AnyLogic 6.7.0 (XJTechnologies, 2011), a Java based ABM platform, is used to implement the 
conceptual model introduced in the previous phases and create a computational laboratory. 
Following the abstraction phase, the classes of agents in the model include owner and contractor, 
each of which is simulated in the model as an active object. The model also includes another active 
object class called project which has its own Statechart and Methods but has no decision making 
and learning ability, making it a passive agent, or a pseudo-agent. Object oriented programming 
enables us to have whatever number of active objects we need by defining them as replicated 
objects. Therefore, a desired experiment can be run and repeated with different number of owners, 
contractors, and projects. In the following subsections, the components of the model are explained 
in further detail.  
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3.3.3.1. The Big Picture of the Simulation  
The simulation model aims to reproduce the bidding environment with more focus on main 
decision points of contractors at organization level. Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of 
the simulation model. The mechanism of the simulation is that a set of heterogeneous contractors 
bid on a series of projects of different types and sizes randomly generated by various owners. 
Similar to a deductive approach, a set of axioms are assumed to build the model. However, these 
assumptions are more general and more flexible than strong assumptions used in the literature. For 
example, in contrast to the deductive category of the literature, in this model a variety of goals and 
behaviors can be defined for contractors. Finally, data from the simulation is gathered and can be 
analyzed using an inductive approach.  
This section is aimed to explain the details of the virtual laboratory to the degree that is necessary 
for understanding the big picture of the simulation. Indeed, further parameters, variables, methods, 





Figure 3.2. Network structure of the construction bidding environment 
 
3.3.3.2. Active object: Owner 
The main actions of an owner are to generate projects and choose their associated bidding systems. 
The experiment to be conducted in this study only considers owners who use a low bid system and 
lump-sum contracting method for delivering their projects. The number of projects generated by 
an owner in a time interval can take any distribution (e.g. Poisson Process). The rate of project 
generation can represent the current condition of construction demands; the higher the rate the 
more potential contracts.   
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3.3.3.3. Active object: Contractor 
Figure 3.3 presents agent contractor as an active object in AnyLogic platform. Each contractor has 
a number of attributes and parameters including initial bonding capacity, net worth, specialty, risk 
aversion coefficient, current work volume and the maximum number of projects a contractor can 
work on at one point in time, indicated as work in progress limit, general & administrative costs, 
etc. A contractor also has its own functions when it comes to decision or action points. Shall bid 
decision and markup decision are among the most vital decisions that a contractor has to make. 
Generally, a contractor decides whether to bid or not for a specific project depending on various 
internal and external factors. In this study, a function called “shallBid” was developed to simulate 
the decision to bid on a certain project by a contractor and which takes into account level of the 
project complexity, required specialization for the project, its current work volume, and its 
available bonding capacity. Since the project contracting method is lump-sum, the interested 
contractor uses a function for determining the estimated cost of the project. This function is called 
“costEstimation” and samples the cost estimate of a contractor from a distribution.  
One of the most important questions in construction bidding environment is how contractors 
choose their markup. As discussed in the background section, several markup decision models 
exist in the literature. The applied markup decision models in each simulation experiment will be 
explained in the related chapter. In general, the contractor’s “markup” function serves to find the 
markup that optimizes the contractor’s goal at that moment of the simulation. It can be either 
maximizing the expected utility of profit from a certain project or fulfilling some certain sub-goals 
such as need for work.  
There are other decisions that an agent contractor can make during the simulation including 
decisions for: 1) expanding the business which results in more resources for securing new projects 
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and higher indirect cost for the firm; 2) contracting which limits capability to have more projects 
at a time; 3) entering a new market; 4) quitting a market; 5) acquiring a new technology or specialty; 
and 6) changing risk attitude and organizational culture.  
Using “Collections” in AnyLogic, agent contractors can gather, update, and store data and 
feedbacks from the environment. These collections are referred in functions and Statecharts so that 
a contractor can use the latest information about other contractors and the environment. 
Different Statecharts can be defined and used for an agent contractor. With respect to the financial 
state, a contractor can be in one of the four Statecharts at any time during the simulation: 1) Normal 
State; 2) Panic State; 3) Desperate State; and 4) Bankrupt State. If a modeler finds it necessary, 
the markup function or other decision functions of contractors can be linked to their financial state 
(Mahdavi & Hastak, 2014).  
 
 




3.3.3.4. Active object: project 
Each project has a number of attributes including project type, estimated budget, estimated 
duration, and complexity level that are set once a project is generated (Figure 3.4).  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Project defined as an active object in AnyLogic 
 
Moreover, a project has a Statechart that simulates the major stages of its lifecycle. As shown in 
Figure 3.5, it consists of four states: InBidding, InProgress, Completed, and Canceled. A project 
is in the state “InBidding” once it is generated by its owner. Contractors observe the project and 
decide to bid or not based on their function “shallBid”. Then, interested contractors determine their 
bids based on their functions “costEstimation” and “markup”. If certain criteria such as minimum 
interested contractors are met, the winner is determined and the project gets started by going to the 
state “InProgress”. Otherwise, the project is canceled by the owner and goes to the state 
“Canceled”. In order to track and update the financial status of a contractor throughout the 
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simulation, we need to assign an actual cost value to any project he wins. Hence, a function was 
created under the project class, “actualCostDetermination”, which determines the actual cost of a 
project based on the project complexity and the winning contractor’s planning and managerial 
capabilities. The difference between the winning bid price and the actual project cost in addition 
to the general and administrative expenses, which is the profit/loss of the winning contractor in 
this project, gradually adds to the net worth of the contractor according to the project’s percentage 
of completion. The percent completion is determined following a rule of thumb S-curve that links 
cost expenditure with project timeline assuming one quarter of the cost spent at one third of the 
project time and three quarters of the cost incurred at two thirds of the time (Miller, 1962). Finally, 





Figure 3.5. Statechart used to define different stages of a project 
  
3.4. Assumptions and Boundaries of the Model 
This section presents all assumptions and boundaries of the model that are applied to all 
experiments in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 as it follows:  
 The agent-base model is specifically developed to simulate the low-bid lump-sum bidding 
process although it can be used for other types of bidding (such as A+B bidding method) 
with little modifications.  
 The model does not take into account behavior of the owner. It only assumes that owners 
use the low-bid lump-sum bidding method to allocate their projects.  
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 Projects are generated one at a time for 520 time units which is equal to 10 years (520 
weeks).  
 In this study, risk is defined as the possibility that the actual cost of a project will be higher 
than the estimated cost due to internal or external factors.  
 A more risk averse contractor means a contractor that considers and adds a higher 
allowance to the markup to cover the possible loss.  
 Contractors in the market will remain the same throughout the simulation in the 
experiments conducted in Chapter 4, 5, and 6.  
 The “costEstimation” function determines the estimated cost of a project for a contractor 
given the estimating accuracy of the contractor. This study assumes the estimated cost is 
triangularly distributed around the project budget and there are two levels of estimating 
accuracy: Normal and Improved. If the estimating accuracy is normal (or improved), the 
variation of estimated cost can be up to 10% (or 5%) of the project budget.  
if (estimatingAccuracy == "Normal") 
 {estimatedCost = pert(0.90, 1.10, 1.00)*p.marketBudget; 
 }    
else if (estimatingAccuracy == "Improved") 
 {estimatedCost = pert(0.95, 1.05, 1.00)*p.marketBudget; 
 } 
return estimatedCost * (1+GAPercentage); 
 The “actualCostDetermination” function determines the actual cost of a project for a 
contractor based on the project execution skills of the contractor and level of the project 
complexity. 
 
if (complexity == 3) 
{ if (c.projectExecution == "Normal") 
 {actualCost = triangular(1.05,1.15,1.1)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
 } 
  else if (c.projectExecution == "Improved")  
    {actualCost = triangular(1.025,1.125,1.075)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 





else if (complexity == 2) 
{ if (c.projectExecution == "Normal") 
 {actualCost = triangular(1.0,1.1,1.05)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
 } 
  else if (c.projectExecution == "Improved")  
    {actualCost = triangular(0.975,1.075,1.025)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
    } 
 } 
 
else if (complexity == 1) 
{ if (c.projectExecution == "Normal") 
 {actualCost = triangular(0.95,1.05,1.0)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
 } 
  else if (c.projectExecution == "Improved")  
    {actualCost = triangular(0.925,1.025,0.975)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
    } 
 } 
return actualCost; 
 The progress of a project follows a S-curve formulated by (Miller, 1962).  
 
3.5. Chapter Summary   
This chapter presented a comprehensive literature review of major scientific studies in the field of 
competitive construction bidding and categorized them into three main classes of induction, 
deduction, and simulation according to their methodological approach. After identifying the gap 
in the literature, using a System-of-Systems approach this chapter explained development of an 
agent-based model of the construction competitive bidding process where contractors with 
different characteristics and attitudes compete against each other over projects with different 
attributes, learn about each other, and make bidding decisions accordingly. This model has several 
advantages over the previous analytical and empirical models including the capability of observing 
the bidding process dynamics, the interaction between the heterogeneous and learning agents, and 
the emergent bidding patterns arising from multiple scenarios of market conditions and contractors’ 
attributes. This model can serve as an experimental laboratory that can be used by any potential 
user (owner or contractor) to evaluate and compare different bidding strategies and project 
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tendering approaches. The model capability to replicate the construction market can be enhanced 
further through adding necessary components. The developed laboratory can also serve as an 
educational tool in academic forums and classes to teach construction management students about 
the bidding process and all its complexities and to allow them to observe interesting dynamics and 







CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE BIDDING METHODS: TOWARDS 
HETEROGENEITY IN LEARNING AND UNCERTAINTY  
 
“Information is a source of learning. But unless it is organized, processed, and available to the 
right people in a format for decision making, it is a burden, not a benefit.” ~ William Pollard 
 
4.1. Introduction  
As explained in chapter 3 (development of the virtual laboratory), one of the major components of 
the developed virtual laboratory is the markup decision function. Among all, competition has been 
identified as one of the main decision criteria for construction contractors when bidding for a 
project (Hegazy & Moselhi, 1995). Real world contractors try to learn about their competitors’ 
bidding strategy so do the simulated contractors in the virtual laboratory. In the real world bidding 
environment, learning mechanisms vary from one construction contractor to another. Some are 
more inclined to use quantitative approaches while others rely on more rule-based or judgment-
based decision making tools.  
Regardless of the type of the learning mechanism and bidding decision making tool, the underlying 
assumption in all bidding calculation is that there exists a relationship between the bid sum and 
the probability of winning the project. The bid sum is the product of the estimated costs and the 
markup percentage. Therefore, there are two extreme points when determining the markup. The 
lower the markup, the higher chance of winning (or the lower profit) is. Conversely, the higher the 
markup, the lower chance of winning (or the higher profit) is.  
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There are several quantitative methods in the literature and the next section will present a review 
of the major studies in this area. Although quantitative methods have received a lot of attention in 
the literature, the debate over their validity and effectiveness, in particular Friedman and Gates 
models, have not reach a solid conclusion. This chapter will take a new approach to compare these 
methods. First, these methods are coded in the model as the markup decision function for agent 
contractors. In other words, they are the learning mechanisms of agents in an interactive 
environment. Then, using the developed virtual laboratory, these methods can be put in a 
competition against each other. The objective of this chapter is to compare the effectiveness of 
major quantitative methods in the bidding environment under a variety of scenarios including low 
to high level of uncertainty in the estimated cost and different types of market limitations. Previous 
studies in the literature that analyzed and compared these methods mostly take a retrospective 
approach. In other words, they compare these methods one by one in a vacuum using past bid data. 
However, thanks to the virtual laboratory, the possibility of comparing these methods actively and 
in a prospective manner exists. This study tries to address the lack of practical testing due to 
unwillingness of contractors to reveal their real bid information and costs.  
This chapter is organized as follows: the “Literature on Quantitative Bidding Methods” section 
reviews the major contributions in the area of quantitative bidding models. The “Methodology & 
Description of Experiments” explains the experiments that will be conducted in this chapter. The 
“Results” section will present the main observations on the experiments and discuss their root-
causes. Finally, the “Chapter Summary” section summarizes key findings of the study.  
4.2. Literature on Quantitative Bidding Methods   
A quantitative method tries to use competitors’ past bids to determine the optimal markup. The 
optimal markup is usually defined as the one that maximizes the expected profit of a contractor 
44 
 
from a given project. In other words, a contractor is facing the following optimization problem 
where he is trying to balance a great profit and a high probability of winning:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑥)| 𝑥, 𝑛] = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔| 𝑥, 𝑛)  × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑥)      (4.1) 
Where 𝑥: 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝 % is the decision variable of the problem and the expected profit, is the product 
of the probability of winning and the profit given a chosen markup. It is worth noting that the bid 
(B), estimated cost (ES), markup (x), and profit have the following relationships for a given project 
k: 
𝐵𝑘 = 𝐸𝑆𝑘(1 + 𝑥𝑘)      (4.2) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑘 = 𝐸𝑆𝑘. 𝑥𝑘       (4.3) 
Several quantitative methods exist in the literature. For any quantitative method there are at least 
three basic uncertain variables (estimated cost, actual cost, and the lowest competing bid) that need 
to be considered (Fuerst 1977). One of the first two (either variables estimated cost or actual cost) 
has to be fixed and selected as the reference point of modeling (Yuan 2011). The selected models 
in this chapter (Friedman, Gates and Fine) consider the estimated cost as the reference point and 
then the uncertainty of a competitor’s bidding behavior is characterized by the bid ratio. It is worth 
mentioning that transparency of the market transactions, knowing who the interested contractors 
in the bid shortlist are, level of access to the previous biddings information, and contractors’ 
willingness to collect and use the information are amongst underlying assumptions of all the three 
models. It is assumed that each interested contractor knows the other interested contractors in the 
bidding shortlist and knows their bids for those projects that both the opponent and the contractor 
previously participated in. 
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4.2.1. Friedman model 
In his seminal paper entitled “A competitive-bidding strategy”, (Friedman, 1956) proposed to use 
historical bid data and characterize a competitor’s bidding behavior with a probability distribution 
function of the bid ratio. The bid ratio (𝐵𝐶𝑘,𝑖) for a given project (k) is simply the ratio of the 




      (4.4) 
If competitor i and the contractor have enough bids where they both participated and the bid 
information is available, a stable distribution function (𝐹𝑋(𝑥)) of the bid ratio can be constructed. 
By calculating the mean and variance of the distribution, the probability of beating competitor i 
(𝑃𝑖) with a given markup (x) can be simply calculated using the following equation:  
 𝑃𝑖(𝑥) = Pr(𝑋 > 𝑥) = 1 − 𝐹𝑋(𝑥)      (4.5) 
Friedman then assumed the bid ratios of competitors are independent of each other. Therefore, the 
probability of winning the contract, which means beating all competitors, can be determined using 
the following equation:  
𝑃𝑤(𝑥) = ∏ 𝑃𝑖(𝑥)
𝑖∈𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
      (4.6) 
4.2.2. Gates model 
This model calculates the probability of beating a competitor exactly in the same way Friedman 
does. However, based on his experience as a principal estimator, (Gates, 1967) developed the 
following equation for determining the probability of winning the contract.  
𝑃𝑤(𝑥) =
1




      (4.7) 
Where 𝑃𝑖 is the probability of beating competitor i.  
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4.2.3. Fine model 
The main assumption of this model (also known as the low-competitor model) suggested by (Fine) 
in a series of unpublished works is that the only competitor the contractor is interested in beating 
is the lowest competitor (in other words, the winner). Therefore, this model is based on collecting 
the historical data of the lowest bid, the winner, in each competition participated.  
4.3. Methodology & Description of Experiments  
Agent-based modeling is a great tool for conducting experiments and analyzing research questions 
under a variety of scenarios. By applying the quantitative bidding methods in a series of 
consecutive bids, agent contractors in the virtual laboratory are taking a computational approach 
to learning from their interactions with others. Agent contractors are not instructed to choose a 
specific markup. Instead, they are using different learning mechanisms (here, the quantitative 
bidding methods) to choose the optimal markup. Each learning mechanism represents some 
specific learning characteristics. Comparing the performance of users of these mechanism helps 
understand their applicability and effectiveness in various situations. The virtual laboratory 
developed in the Chapter 3 is used in this chapter for investigating the following research questions: 
1- What is the impact of the choice of learning mechanisms on contractors’ financial 
performance, success rate, and market share under a variety of market scenarios?  
2- How do these learning mechanisms perform in markets with irrational, random, and 
unpredictable players? 
3- How do these learning mechanisms perform in competition against each other and 
irrational players? 
The six sets of experiments to be conducted in this chapter together address the above questions. 
Each experiment set contains several market scenarios.  
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Two main classes of objects in the simulation model are Projects and Contractors. Projects are 
passive agents and Contractors are active agents due to their ability to learn and make decisions. 
Projects are generated consecutively over a simulation period of ten years (520 simulated time 
units) and are assigned a set of characteristics such as the project budget chosen uniformly over 
the range [80, 120] M$ and the project duration also selected uniformly between 20 and 30 weeks. 
On the other hand, a set of contractors is produced in the market along with their learning 
mechanisms. Agent contractors are homogenous in all attributes except in their learning 
mechanisms. To ensure the consistency and reliability of the results each experiment has been run 
for 100 times. 
4.3.1. Experiment Set A 
The purpose of the first set of experiments is to find the impact of different learning mechanisms 
on the contractors’ performance under a variety of cost estimation and contingencies scenarios. 
There are nine contractors competing with each other in the market including three contractors 
using Friedman model, three contractor using Gates model, and three contractors using Fine model. 
Table 4.1 shows the learning mechanism assigned for each of the nine contractors. In the first set 
of experiments, projects are generated in the market one at a time unit under different scenarios. 
 
Table 4.1. Contractors' characteristics in experiment set A 
Contractor Learning Mechanism 
1, 2, and 3 Friedman 
4, 5, and 6 Gates 
7, 8, and 9 Fine (the low-competitor) 
 
Scenario A1 is a pure, non-limited competition among contractors. There is not a limitation on 
bonding; therefore, contractors can win and have as many as projects at a time they want. There 
are also no G&A costs as well as a low level of uncertainty on the estimated cost of projects (2.5% 
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inaccuracy). Contractors do not consider any contingencies in their estimated costs. Although the 
market conditions and settings seem unrealistic in this scenario, the result will be insightful and 
interesting to know.  
Everything under scenario A2 is similar to the scenario A1 except the fact that level of uncertainty 
on the estimated cost of projects will be high (5% inaccuracy).  
Scenario A3 takes the simulation one more step closer to the reality by adding contingencies to the 
process of cost estimation. It is assumed that contractors add enough contingencies for dealing 
with uncertainty in the estimated cost. Everything under this scenario is similar to the scenario A1 
except the fact that contractors consider contingencies when estimating their costs.  
Everything under scenario A4 is similar to scenario A2 except the fact that contractors consider 
contingencies when estimating their costs.  
4.3.2. Experiment Set B 
The purpose of the second set of experiments is to investigate the impact of different levels of 
bonding capacity on performance of contractors with different learning mechanisms. Setting of 
experiment set B is the same as experiment set A. In experiment set B, scenarios B1 to B7 will 
cover a range of limitations on the number of ongoing projects contractors are allowed to have at 
any time during the simulation. This limitation simulates the bonding capacity of contractors in 
the real world bidding environment. To maintain market competition, it is assumed that having a 
minimum number of two participants is required for a bid to be valid. Otherwise, it will be 
cancelled. Table 4.2 presents the number of ongoing projects allowed for contractors under 
scenarios B1 to B7.  
Table 4.2. Number of ongoing projects allowed for contractors under scenarios B1 to B7 
Scenario  B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 




4.3.3. Experiment Set C  
The purpose of the third set of experiments is to examine capability of different learning 
mechanisms dealing with unpredictable competitors. In the experiment set C, a learning 
mechanism is used by only one contractor competing with 8 other contractors that are choosing 
their markup randomly from uniform distribution of [0% - 10%]. These contractors are called 
“Random Contractors” hereafter. In order to be able to compare performance of different learning 
mechanisms, project budget is set to be M$100. Level of uncertainty on the estimated cost of 
projects is low (Scenario C1) and high (Scenario C2) and all contractors consider contingencies in 
their submitted price. There is no limitation on number of ongoing projects that a contractor can 
have.  
4.3.4. Experiment Set D  
The purpose of the fourth set of experiments is to examine capability of different learning 
mechanisms competing in a mixed market comprising of both learning contractors and random 
contractors for securing project with two levels of cost estimation uncertainty. In experiment set 
D, the market includes a mix of contractors using three main learning mechanisms and random 
markup. Table 4.3 presents markup function of each contractor. Similar to the experiment set C, 
level of uncertainty on the estimated cost of projects is low (Scenario D1) and high (Scenario D2).  
 
Table 4.3. Contractors' characteristics in experiment set D 
Contractor Learning Mechanism 
1 and 2 Friedman 
3 and 4 Gates 
5 and 6 Fine (the low-competitor) 




4.3.5. Experiment Set E  
The purpose of the fifth set of experiments is to investigate the impact of different levels of bonding 
capacity on performance of both learning contractors and random contractors. Table 4.4 presents 
the number of ongoing projects allowed for contractors under scenarios E1 to E9. Market consists 
of heterogeneous contractors as Table 4.3 and the uncertainty in cost estimation is high.  
 
Table 4.4. Number of ongoing projects allowed for contractors under scenarios B1 to B7 
Scenario  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Number of ongoing projects allowed 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
 
4.3.6. Experiment Set F  
The purpose of the sixth set of experiments is to investigate the impact of requiring minimum 
number of contractors participated in bidding on performance of contractors and the market. 
Imposing minimum number of contractors required in a bid is a strategy for clients to maintain a 
desirable level of competition. However, the impact of this requirement is not explored well.  
In this experiment set, it is assumed that contractors are allowed to have only five projects in 
progress at a time. As Table 4.5 presents, different values are assigned to the minimum number of 
bid participants required by the clients. Market settings and contractors characteristics are similar 
to experiment set E.  
 
Table 4.5. Minimum number of bid participants required in scenarios F1 to F5 
Scenario  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 




4.4. Results  
4.4.1. Results of Experiment Set A 
The results of scenario A1 are presented in Table 4.6. A significant separation is observed in the 
performance of the three groups of contractors (users of Friedman, Gates, and Fine models). One 
interesting observation is that the average of markup determined by contractors is very low (0.47%, 
0.86%, and 1.44% for Friedman users, Fine users, and Gates users respectively). This is mainly 
because of relatively high number of sophisticated, rational competitors in the market. Once a 
contractor brings down its price to win the next contract, its competitors observe this action and 
will reciprocate it with lowering their price. This tug of war will continue until the market reaches 
equilibrium. Markups of the contractors stayed almost constant after the first year of the simulated 
time (52 time units).  
Freidman users have shown higher bid success rates comparing to others, resulted in higher market 
shares. The order of contractors in terms of market share is: Friedman users > Fine users > Gates 
users. However, having a higher bid success rate did not result in a better financial performance.  
Under this scenario, all contractors have faced financial loss because of mainly two reasons: 1- 
none of the contractors had considered contingencies in their cost estimation. 2- the winner of a 
bid may not be just the most competitive one in terms of markup but also most probably the 
contractor with a very low estimated cost (in other words, the one who made the biggest mistake). 
The order of contractors in terms of working capital is: Gates users > Fine users > Friedman users. 
It is worth noting that in this scenario, the success rate was equal to the market share since all 





Table 4.6. Contractors' performance in scenario A1 
Contractor Working Capital (M$) Profit per Project (M$) Market Share 
1 (117) (1.33) 17% 
2 (152) (1.43) 20% 
3 (141) (1.34) 20% 
4 (14) (0.58) 5% 
5 (12) (0.71) 3% 
6 (10) (0.68) 3% 
7 (55) (1.03) 10% 
8 (62) (1.08) 11% 
9 (62) (1.11) 11% 
 
The results of scenario A2 are presented in Table 4.7. Orders and trends in the results of scenario 
#2 are similar to ones in scenario A1. However, the average markup determined by contractors in 
this scenario (0.85%, 1.51%, and 2.81% for users of Friedman, Fine, and Gates respectively) is 
higher than the ones in scenario A1. This can be because of higher uncertainty in the estimated 
costs that results in higher variance in the bid to cost ratio. Also, comparing working capital and 
profit per project in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, one minor difference between the scenarios A1 and 
A2 is that the size of loss for all contractors is larger under scenario A2 because of the higher 
uncertainty in cost estimation.  
 
Table 4.7. Contractors' performance in scenario A2 
Contractor Working Capital (M$) Profit per Project (M$) Market Share 
#1 (264) (2.87) 18% 
#2 (322) (3.06) 20% 
#3 (293) (2.81) 20% 
#4 (31) (1.49) 4% 
#5 (23) (1.43) 3% 
#6 (28) (1.39) 4% 
#7 (136) (2.44) 11% 
#8 (150) (2.50) 12% 




The historical volatilities of the market markup for all 10 years of the simulation under both 
scenarios (A1 and A2) were calculated and provided in Table 4.8. The historical volatility (HV) 
of a time series can be calculated by determining the average deviation from the average value of 
the variable in the given time period. HV is provided in two scales: one-week HV because the time 
unit in the simulation is one week and annualized HV because the performance of most firms are 
being evaluated on the basis of a year in the real world. One-week HV is in fact the standard 
deviation of the changes in the market markup (𝑦𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 52}). The change in market markup 
(y) can be calculated in the both following ways:  
𝑦𝑖 = ln (
𝑀𝑀𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑖−1





) − 1      (4.9) 
Where 𝑀𝑀𝑖 is the market markup in day i. The equations for calculating the annualized HV is 
simply: 
Annualized HV = (One − week HV) × √52      (4.10) 
As it can be easily seen in Table 4.8, one major difference between the scenarios #1 and #2 is the 
larger volatility of market markup under scenario #2 due to the higher uncertainty and inaccuracy 
in the estimated costs.  
Table 4.9 presents the results of the experiment set A3. As expected, the average markup 
determined by contractors in this scenario (0.85%, 1.51%, and 2.81% for users of Friedman, Fine, 
and Gates respectively) is very low (similar to scenario A1). Considering contingencies helps all 
contractors make profits from their won projects. Therefore, a higher bidding success rate and 
consequently market share can increase the working capital. However, Profit per project in this 
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scenario has still the same order as it does in scenario A1. Gates users do not win as often as 
Friedman users and Fine users but when they win, they earn a larger profit.  
 
Table 4.8. The historical volatilities of the market markup 
 Scenario A1 Scenario A2 
Year One-week HV Annualized HV One-week HV Annualized HV 
1 0.49% 3.52% 0.89% 6.41% 
2 0.54% 3.90% 0.99% 7.14% 
3 0.51% 3.66% 0.70% 5.03% 
4 0.31% 2.23% 0.60% 4.33% 
5 0.32% 2.30% 0.75% 5.38% 
6 0.52% 3.75% 0.91% 6.55% 
7 0.44% 3.14% 1.02% 7.37% 
8 0.47% 3.41% 0.96% 6.91% 
9 0.49% 3.55% 0.86% 6.21% 
10 0.48% 3.48% 0.97% 7.00% 
 
Table 4.9. Contractors' performance in scenario A3 
Contractor Working Capital (M$) Profit per Project 
(M$) 
Market Share 
1 103 1.02 19% 
2 119 1.21 19% 
3 124 1.16 21% 
4 30 2.02 3% 
5 45 1.89 5% 
6 33 1.86 4% 
7 70 1.49 9% 
8 86 1.51 11% 
9 70 1.30 10% 
 
Table 4.10 presents the results of scenario A4. Similarities and differences between this scenario 
and scenario A3 are consistent with the ones between scenarios A1 and A2. For example, the 
working capital and profit per project have increased for all contractors due to the higher 




Table 4.10. Contractors' performance in scenarios A4 
Contractor Working Capital (M$) Profit per Project (M$) Market Share 
1 184 1.95 18% 
2 223 2.10 20% 
3 225 2.28 19% 
4 68 3.58 4% 
5 70 3.67 4% 
6 53 3.53 3% 
7 121 2.16 11% 
8 146 2.70 10% 
9 159 2.70 11% 
 
4.4.2. Results of Experiment Set B 
Tables and figures in this section present different information and performance indicators of 
contractors and the market. Number of contractors participating in biddings is one of the main 
factors influencing the level of competition in construction biddings. The higher the number of 
participants the more fierce the competition will be. As Table 4.11 shows the average and 
minimum number of contractors in biddings has decreased from scenario B1 to scenario B7 due 
to imposing limitation of bonding capacity. This limitation has also caused cancelation of 42 and 
182 projects under scenarios B6 and B7 (respectively) where contractors have reached their quota 
and were not able to participate in some of the biddings, resulted in the cancelation.  
 
Table 4.11. Market information of scenarios B1 to B7 
Scenario  B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
Maximum number of ongoing projects allowed 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Average number of contractors participating in 
biddings 
8.9 8.7 8.2 7.6 6.1 3.4 2.1 
Minimum number of contractors participating in 
biddings 
7 7 6 5 3 1 1 




One interesting observation presented in Table 4.12 is that the average markup of all contractors 
and volatility of the markup market have increased from scenario B1 to scenario B7. The variance 
in the market markup basically resulted from the micro behavior of Friedman and Gates users. 
Submitted markup of Friedman and Gates users have increased partly due to the decrease in 
number of competitors in bids. However, submitted markup of Fine users is getting almost constant 
after several bids and has shown much less increase compared to the ones of Friedman and Gates. 
This is mainly due to the fact that Fine model is non-sensitive to any specific contractor’s behavior 
and number of contractors participating in the bid.  
 
Table 4.12. Average markup of contractors and volatility of the market in scenarios B1 to B7 
Scenario  B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
Average Markup of 
Friedman Users 
0.81% 0.83% 0.90% 0.96% 1.26% 2.59% 4.43% 
Average Markup of Gates 
Users 
2.56% 2.74% 2.71% 2.77% 2.80% 4.07% 5.76% 
Average Markup of Fine 
Users 
1.50% 1.43% 1.63% 1.55% 1.53% 1.80% 1.91% 
Average Markup of the 
Market 
1.62% 1.66% 1.75% 1.76% 1.86% 2.82% 4.03% 
One-Week Historical 
Volatility of Market Markup 
0.82% 0.85% 0.85% 0.88% 0.90% 1.06% 1.18% 
Annualized Historical 
Volatility of Market Markup 
5.91% 6.15% 6.13% 6.35% 6.45% 7.63% 8.48% 
 
Observing Figure 4.1, the increasing trend of profit per project for all contractors in the market 
under scenarios B1 to B7 suggests that abundance of projects caused inflation in contractors’ 
submitted markup and consequently their bids. While the usual order of contractors in terms of 
profit per project is Gates users > Fine users > Friedman users, this order is changed in case of 
scenario B6 and B7. One explanation for Friedman users outperforming Fine users on this indicator 
under scenario B6 and B7 is that Friedman model is influenced by number of contractors and the 
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bid history of each competitor whereas Fine model only take the market markup into consideration 
and ignores bid history of competitors. This consideration has made Friedman users more effective 
compared to Fine users, resulting in higher profit per project. For the same reason, it can be argued 
that the gap between average profit per projects of Gates users and Fine users has increased from 
scenario B1 to B7.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Project per profit of contractors in scenarios B1 to B7 
 
As shown in Figure 4.2, imposing the limitation of bonding capacity has decreased market share 
of Friedman users and ended their dominance to the extent that the market is divided almost equally 
among all contractors in scenario B7. The main reason for the increase in bid success rate and 
market share of Gates users is the fact that Friedman and Fine users are winning more projects in 
the beginning and once some of them reached their quota Gate users have higher chance to secure 
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Figure 4.2. Market Share of Contractors in scenarios B1 to B7 
 
The total value of the market in 10 years of the simulated time is almost the same in all scenarios. 
To better understand the impact of learning mechanisms, the sum of working capitals of the three 
contractors using each learning mechanism is calculated and considered in the analysis. For 
scenario B6 and B7, an adjustment is needed because there are cancelled projects so that the total 
profit comes from less number of projects. The first observation, which is aligned with the previous 
observation, is the increasing trend of adjusted profit of all contractors going from scenario B1 to 
scenario B7. The second observation on the following figure is the increase of Gates users’ 
working capital. To understand this increase and the change in order of contractors in terms of 
working capitals, profit per project and market share should be considered. While contractors have 
converged to equal division of the market through scenario B1 to B7, Gates users were able to gain 
higher profit per project. This has resulted in a new order of contractors in terms of working capital: 
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Figure 4.3. Working Capital of Contractors in Scenarios B1 to B7 
  
4.4.3. Results of Experiment Set C  
Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 present the results of all experiments in this sub-section. The main 
observation is that all Friedman, Gates, and Fine users have lost market share when uncertainty in 
cost estimation has increased. This suggests that the higher complexity and uncertainty of a project 
can enhance chance of an irrational contractor winning the project. Additionally, going from low 
to high uncertainty in cost estimation, the profit per project has increased for all Friedman, Gates, 
and Fine users. However, there is no consistent trend in terms of working capital; this is mainly 
because gaining higher profit per project is balanced off the loss in market share.  
As Table 4.13 shows, Fine users have shown better performance in terms of market share when 
competing against irrational contractors compared to Friedman users. This is because Fine model 
only deals with the lowest bid-to-cost ratios while Friedman model considers the whole bid history 
of competitors. This is more obvious in scenario C1 where the uncertainty in cost estimation is 
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markup (even less than Friedman users). By this choice, the Fine user has gained the lowest 
average profit per project not only compared to Friedman and Gates users but also compared to 
the irrational competitors in its experiment. Another interesting observation is that Gates model is 
not effective when competing against irrational competitors. The market shares that Gates users 
have gained in scenarios C1 and C2 are 16% and 14%, which are not considerably higher than the 
market share expected from an irrational, homogeneous contractor in a similar market (100% / 9 
≈11%).  
 
Table 4.13. Performance of Friedman, Gates, and Fine Users in Scenarios C1 and C2 
Learning Mechanism of the Contractor: Friedman Gates Fine 
Average Markup of the Contractor in Scenario 
#1 
1.48% 2.79% 0.94% 
Average Markup of the Contractor in Scenario 
#2 
1.55% 3.62% 1.64% 
Working Capital of the Contractor in Scenario 
#1 (M$) 
477 329 515 
Working Capital of the Contractor in Scenario 
#2 (M$) 
513 369 509 
Market Share of the Contractor in Scenario #1 33% 16% 38% 
Market Share of the Contractor in Scenario #2 26% 14% 28% 
 
Table 4.14. Profit per Project for All Contractors in Scenarios C1 and C2 
Learning Mechanism of the Contractor: Friedman Gates Fine 
Average Profit per Project for the Contractor in the 
Scenario #1 (M$) 
2.80 3.92 2.28 
Average Profit per Project for Other Contractors 
in the Scenario #1 (M$) 
2.46 2.62 2.34 
Range of Profit per Project for Other Contractors 







Average Profit per Project for the Contractor in the 
Scenario #2 (M$) 
3.80 5.12 3.49 
Average Profit per Project for Other Contractors 
in the Scenario #2 (M$) 
3.58 4.07 3.78 
Range of Profit per Project for Other Contractors 










4.4.4. Results of Experiment Set D  
Table 4.15 presents the results of scenarios D1 and D2. The order and trend in performance of 
contractors are consistent with the ones in scenarios A3 and A4 where Friedman users are more 
effective in gaining market share and working capital and Gates users are securing higher profit 
per project. Similar to experiment set C, Gates model does not perform effectively in terms of 
market share and working capital in mixed markets (markets that consist of both rational and 
irrational contractors). Another observation consistent with experiment set C is that irrational 
contractors have higher chance of securing contracts and profits in a market with more complex 
and cost-uncertain projects. However, in contrast to the results of experiment set C, Fine users are 
not outperforming others in terms of market share mainly due to existence of smart contractors 
that use learning mechanisms (Friedman and Gates users).  
 
Table 4.15. Performance of All Contractors in Scenarios D1 and D2 
Contractors 1 and 2 3 and 4 5 and 6 7 and 8 
Learning Mechanism of the Contractors Friedman Gates Fine - 
Average Markup of the Contractors in 
Scenario D1 
0.67% 1.56% 0.93% 4.92% 
Average Markup of the Contractors in 
Scenario D2 
1.09% 2.76% 1.56% 5.08% 
Working Capital of the Contractors in 
Scenario D1 (M$) 
339 180 288 50 
Working Capital of the Contractors in 
Scenario D2 (M$) 
621 263 462 158 
Average Profit per Project for the Contractors 
in the Scenario D1 (M$) 
1.44 2.16 1.73 1.44 
Average Profit per Project for the Contractors 
in the Scenario D2 (M$) 
2.70 3.78 2.85 2.62 
Market Share of the Contractors in Scenario 
D1 
45% 16% 32% 7% 
Market Share of the Contractors in Scenario 
D2 




4.4.5. Results of Experiment Set E  
Tables and figures in this subsection present different information and performance indicators of 
contractors and the market in scenarios E1 to E9. Trends and orders in these results are very 
consistent with the ones in the results of scenarios B1 to B7. As Table 4.16 shows, the average and 
minimum number of contractors in biddings has decreased from scenario E1 to scenario E9 due to 
imposing limitation of bonding capacity. This limitation has also caused cancelation of 85 and 219 
projects under scenarios E1 and E9 (respectively) where contractors have reached their quota and 
were not able to participate in some of the biddings, resulted in the cancelation.  
 
Table 4.16. Market information of scenarios E1 to E9 
 
As Table 4.17 shows the average markup of all contractors and volatility of the markup market 
have increased from scenario E1 to scenario E9. Submitted markup of Friedman and Gates users 
have increased partly due to the decrease in number of competitors in biddings. However, 
submitted markup of Fine users has been almost constant or has shown much less increase 
comparing to the ones of Friedman and Gates due to the fact that Fine model is non-sensitive to 
any specific contractor’s behavior and number of contractors participating in the bidding.  
 
Scenario  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Maximum number of ongoing 
projects allowed 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Average number of contractors 
participating in biddings 
7.96 7.92 7.79 7.62 7.22 6.25 4.57 2.84 1.88 
Minimum number of contractors 
participating in biddings 
7 7 6 6 5 3 2 1 1 
Number of cancelled project  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 219 
63 
 
Table 4.17. Average markup of contractors and volatility of the market in scenarios E1 to E9 
Scenario  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Average Markup of 
Friedman Users 
1.10% 1.12% 1.07% 1.15% 1.20% 1.46% 2.18% 3.44% 5.10% 
Average Markup of 
Gates Users 
2.83% 2.72% 2.79% 2.81% 2.94% 2.95% 3.27% 5.40% 7.87% 
Average Markup of 
Fine Users 
1.59% 1.55% 1.60% 1.59% 1.52% 1.64% 1.67% 2.04% 1.84% 
Average Markup of 
Random Users 
5.04% 4.98% 5.19% 4.93% 5.02% 4.93% 4.85% 4.35% 4.41% 
Average Markup of 
the Market 
1.56% 1.51% 1.52% 1.51% 1.64% 1.93% 2.38% 2.86% 2.93% 
One-Week 
Historical Volatility 
of Market Markup 
1.08% 0.94% 0.95% 0.97% 1.07% 1.17% 1.55% 1.48% 1.82% 
Annualized 
Historical Volatility 
of Market Markup 
7.76% 6.80% 6.88% 7.00% 7.68% 8.43% 11.18% 10.64% 13.13% 
 
According to Figure 4.4, Limiting number of projects a contractor can have has caused inflation 
in contractors’ submitted markup and consequently their bids regardless of contractors’ bidding 
methods. In other words, this limitation restricted the competition and lowered the market 
efficiency. One interesting observation is that with the increase in the limitation, Friedman users 
increasingly acquired higher profit per project compared to others and particularly they 
outperformed Fine users on this indicator under scenario E7, E8 and E9. The explanation for this 





Figure 4.4. Profit per project of contractors in scenarios E1 to E9 
 
Similar to experiment set B, imposing the limitation of bonding capacity has reduced market share 
of Friedman users. In scenario E9, the market is divided almost equally among all contractors as 
shown in Figure 4.5. 
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In this experiment set, there are a number of cancelled projects under scenario E8 and E9. 
Therefore, the profits of all contractors should be adjusted by multiplying “520 / (520 – Number 
of Cancelled Projects)”. The first observation on Figure 4.6 is aligned with the previous 
observations in this subsection as well as in experiment set B; there exists an increasing trend of 
adjusted profit of all contractors going from scenario E1 to scenario E9. The second observation 
on the following figure is the increase of Gates users’ working capital. To understand this increase 
and the change in order of contractors in terms of working capitals, profit per project and market 
share should be considered. While contractors have converged to equal division of the market in 
scenario E9, Gates users also were able to gain higher profit per project. The third observation is 
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4.4.6. Results of Experiment Set F  
Tables and figures in this subsection present different information and performance indicators of 
contractors and the market in scenarios F1 to F5. As Table 4.18 shows there are more cancelled 
projects in the market with the increase in minimum number of bid participants required from 
scenario F1 to F5.  Also, both the average and volatility of market markup has decreased, indicating 
the fact that the requirement has made the market more competitive and efficient.  
 
Table 4.18. Market information of scenarios F1 to F5 
Scenario  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 
Minimum number of bid participants 
required 
4 5 6 7 8 
Number of cancelled projects 0 16 47 151 250 
Average Markup of the Market 1.85% 1.77% 1.72% 1.65% 1.54% 
One-Week Historical Volatility of Market 
Markup 
1.16% 1.06% 1.08% 0.90% 0.84% 
Annualized Historical Volatility of Market 
Markup 
8.33% 7.62% 7.76% 6.49% 6.04% 
 
As Figure 4.7 shows the average profit per project has decreased for all contractors going from 
scenario F1 to F5 mainly because of the more fierce competition. This also caused the change in 
order of contractors in terms of profit per project. In particular, random contractors have suffered 





Figure 4.7. Profit per project of contractors in scenarios F1 to F5 
 
Figure 4.8 shows a very interesting phenomenon, which is the divergence in allocation of market 
among contractors. More effective learning contractors are able to secure higher market share in 
more competitive market scenarios. This results in a bigger gap between more effective and less 
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Figure 4.8. Market share of contractors in scenario F1 to F5 
 
Due to the increase in competition going from scenario F1 to F5, total profit created in the market 
has decreased and the gap between more effective and less effective contractors has increased as 
shown in Figure 4.9. The main reason Friedman users were able to maintain/increase their working 




Figure 4.9. Working capital of contractors in scenarios F1 to F5 
 
4.5. Chapter Summary 
The controversial subject of competitive bidding in construction has attracted research, analysis, 
and surveys by both the construction academia and industry. However, the results of all 
investigations and debates have been insightful to some extent but not conclusive yet. This study 
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methods in particular models introduced by Friedman and Gates. While the emphasis of the 
previous studies (Crowley, 2000; Fuerst, 1976; Ioannou, 1988; King & Mercer, 1985, 1987; 
Rosenshine, 1972; R. M. Skitmore, Pettitt, & McVinish, 2007; Stark, 1968) was on validity and 
reliability of those methods using mathematical arguments and retrospective approaches, this study 
put these methods in various scenarios to examine their applicability and effectiveness using a 
prospective approach, agent based modeling. The main research question in the literature was 
which of two models, Friedman or Gates, gives the correct probability of winning a competitive 
bid. For example, (Mitchell, 1977) tested both Friedman and Gates models and concluded 
Friedman model provides correct probabilities when there is no uncertainty involved in the cost 
estimates whereas Gates model provides correct winning probabilities when the distributions of 
both the contractor and its competitors have the same mean and variance. However, this chapter 
was more interested in answering which models can outperform others in a long run. The 
observations and results from the experiments conducted in this study were not limited to 
answering this question. It also shed lights on some characteristics of construction bidding 
environment raised from micro-behavior of its constituents: contractors and projects. The results 
offer new understandings and insights on quantitative bidding methods and recommendations for 
both owners and contractors’ competitive success, which are not available using conventional 
approaches.  
 Using Friedman model can result in considerably higher number of won projects (higher 
market share) whereas using Gates model can result in higher profit per project. This is 
because Gates model suggests relatively high probabilities of winning at high markups and 
does not encourage contractors to place low bid markups like Friedman model.  
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 In stable markets comprising rational competitors, the volatility in price of construction 
services can be due to uncertainty in cost estimation arising from factors such as the 
complexity of projects and incomplete contract specifications and information. 
Additionally, it can be concluded that inaccuracy and variance in cost estimation is one of 
the major factors in volatility of markup in the market.  
 When market consists of heterogeneous contractors in terms of their markup decision 
model, there is larger variance in the market markup. However, when all contractors are 
using the same model (like using only Friedman model), the markup equilibrium had a 
very low variance over the time and was almost fixed.  
 In all experiments, the profit margin of the winning contractors was less than 5% which is 
aligned with rate reported in the literature (AGC, 2000; Bashford, 1996; Leitch, 2000). It 
is worth mentioning that this rate is lower than the return of risk-free treasury bonds.  
 One factor contributing to the higher variance in the market is varying set of contractors 
participating in biddings. This is important for a newcomer to understand about a market 
because such a variance in a market suggests that the competitors carefully research and 
learn about each other and they adjust their markup according to their competitors and not 
just solely on the level of market competition (which is what Fine model operates based 
on).  
 Although Fine model has shown a good prospect specifically in competition against 
unpredictable contractors, the fact that it ignores bid history of specific competitors makes 
it unfavorable and unreliable in situations where market participants change regularly. A 
reliable learning mechanism considers bid history of competitors in biddings with varying 
participants. This is aligned with the conclusion by (Carr, 1983): contractors need to adjust 
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their markup from one project to the other depending on the change in the number or 
identity of competitors.  
 Comparing results of experiment sets B and E, it can be concluded that the with the increase 
in number of rational, sophisticated contractors the benefits unpredictable contractors can 
get from higher uncertainty in cost estimating will decrease.  
 Comparing those scenarios with low and high uncertainty in cost estimation (Scenarios C1, 
C2, D1, and D2) suggests that in many occasions choosing the optimal markup may not be 
what matters most. In other words, winning a contract is likely the combined outcome of a 
low markup and underestimation of the project value relative to the competitors. Therefore, 
when analyzing its performance and trying to find causes of success/failure in securing 
contracts in different markets, a contractor should consider characteristics, complexity, and 
cost uncertainty of projects.  
 A good decision model should lead to correct decisions for the correct reasons. Each 
bidding decision model has its own strengths and weaknesses. The choice of a firm’s 
bidding decision model for a specific project depends on many factors including the firm’s 
business strategy, the project characteristics, and the client. The quantitative bidding 
methods explained in this chapter can be used as a decision support tool. If gaining higher 
market share in long-term, dominating a market and establishing relationship with clients 
are of high priorities for a contractor, Friedman model can suggest a better markup aligned 
with these goals. 
 In markets where there is limitation on number of projects a contractor can secure and the 
bid preparation cost is insignificant (therefore contractors are able to bid on as many 
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projects as they want), the choice of bidding decision model is not a major distinguishing 
factor.  
 Imposing the limitation of bonding capacity can make market less efficient; it decreases 
the gap between more effective and less effective contractors and increase average profit 
per project across the market.  
 Requiring a specific number of bid participants will make the market more efficient, lower 
the average and volatility of market markup, decrease the average profit per project, 
increase the gap between market share of more effective and less effective contractors, and 
reduce the total profit created for contractors in the market.  
 Comparing results of experiment sets B, E, and F shows the contrasting impacts of two 
different market limitations, namely limitation of bonding capacity and minimum number 
of bid participants required, on performance of contractors and the market. 
 The results of the experiments in this study have implications for clients too. Clients who 
are interested in achieving the most efficient and cost effective bids should consider 
announcing their projects when there is enough number of qualified contractors. 
Sophisticated contractors take the number of competitors into account when choosing their 
markup; therefore, they have higher a chance for winning the contract. This results in lower 





CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF INTERACTION AMONG COST ESTIMATING, 
MARKUP DETERMINATION, AND PROJECT EXECUTION AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTORS  
  
“Scientific views end in awe and mystery, lost at the edge in uncertainty, but they appear to be so 
deep and so impressive that the theory that it is all arranged as a stage for God to watch man's 
struggle for good and evil seems inadequate”. ~ Richard P. Feynman 
 
5.1. Introduction  
Construction contractors are project-based organizations. Usually a department or unit in the 
organization called “Business Development & Marketing” is in charge for market research, 
establishing relationships with the clients, and identifying opportunities. After a prospective 
project is introduced to the organization, major decision/action phases in a contractor business 
model can be:  
1. Bid/No Bid  
2. Cost Estimating  
3. Pricing (or Markup Determination)  
4. Project Execution 
Different departments/units in the organization are responsible for each of the above phases. In 
cost-based competition, all competing contractors have access to a large collection of drawings 
and specifications (L. Liu & Zhu, 2007). Based on those inputs, contractors first come up with an 
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estimate of their costs for completing the project. Then, they add a markup, usually calculated as 
a percentage of the estimated cost, in order to cover profit and/or firm overhead (Hegazy & 
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Figure 5.1. Components of construction project costs adapted from Yuan (2011) 
 
Due to its vital importance to the business success of contractors, there is usually a separate 
department in the contractor organization for cost estimating. An estimate is a prediction and 
substitutes for an actual measurement that is not economical or possible (Harris & McCaffer, 2013). 
The aim of cost estimating is to provide information for a reliable bid decision-making. Therefore, 
in theory the cost that the estimating department produces is the most likely cost to the firm if they 
win the contract. While the general belief is that estimating is an experience-based process but 
technology and management systems can help estimators have a more accurate prediction. 
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Studying the literature suggests that contractors can improve their cost estimating accuracy using 
new technology or management systems.  
One key organizational element involved in the bid preparation process is risk attitude. A 
construction project involves a variety of risks and uncertainties. According to the Project 
Management Institute's PMBOK, project risk is defined as an uncertain event or condition that, if 
it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a project’s objectives. In this study, risk is defined as 
the possibility that the actual cost of a project will be higher than the estimated cost due to internal 
or external factors. Contractors need to consider project risks, uncertainties and complexities when 
deciding to bid on a project and determining the bid price. Contractor usually manage and mitigate 
risks through subcontracting some portions of their work, enhancing their cost estimating and 
management skills, tailoring contract conditions,  sharing risks with other parties involved, and 
relying on claims after winning the project (Laryea & Hughes, 2010) because they want to limit 
inflating their bid prices and maintain their competitiveness. Nevertheless, there still remains some 
residual risk that cannot be, identified, predicted, and quantified even after applying all risk 
management strategies. A rich body of literature has been created on identification of risks at levels 
of construction projects and firms, current risk management practices in the industry, and strategies 
for improving risk management. However, the impact of risk attitude on bidding performance and 
its interaction with other bidding parameters have not been explored yet. This study is an attempt 
to address the following research questions using an agent-based approach:  
1. How does the interaction among risk attitude, cost estimating accuracy and project 
management skills affect contractors’ performance in low and high risk markets?  




Answering the above questions helps managers of construction firms understand the impact of 
their organizational culture on long-term performance of the firm. The approach taken in this study 
can be used for formulating and exploring impacts of an organizational element on a firm’s 
performance in a competitive environment.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows: The next section extensively reviews the literature 
on risk attitude, cost estimating, and actual cost of construction projects, in particular, in the 
bidding context. The “Methodology & Description of Experiments” section presents the main 
features of the simulation model and the features it adds to the virtual laboratory developed in 
Chapter 3. Then, this section describes the experiments to be conducted in this study. The “Results 
and Discussion” section presents and discusses main observations and results of the experiments. 
Finally, the “Conclusion” section summarizes the key insights and findings of the study.  
5.2. Literature Review on Risk, Cost Estimating, and Actual Cost Determination  
Generally, construction risks are defined as events that influence project objectives of cost, time 
and quality. The risk attitude of a contractor affects the way it perceives the inherent risk in a 
project and the impact it can have on the firm’s decisions and strategies. There are several formal 
techniques practiced in the industry (Bing, Tiong, Fan, & Chew, 1999; Kartam & Kartam, 2001; 
Lyons & Skitmore, 2004; Smith & Bohn, 1999) as well as newly developed models for risk 
management that can enhance contractors’ profit. For example, (Al-Bahar & Crandall, 1990) 
developed a systematic approach for identifying, analyzing, and managing project risks. A number 
of methods were developed specifically for managing various risks for international construction 
projects (Baloi & Price, 2003; Hastak & Shaked, 2000; Zhi, 1995). Conducting a survey of the top 
100 large U.S. contractors, (Kangari, 1995) studied the current attitude of large U.S. construction 
firms toward risk and risk management practice, compared his survey results with a risk survey 
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conducted by ASCE, and showed that contractors have been more ready to assume specific risks 
either partially or totally. Based on a questionnaire survey of general contractors to evaluate project 
management practices, (A. S. Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997) concluded that risk analysis and 
management depend largely on intuition, judgement and experience for many contractors.  
Numerous studies in the literature studied current cost estimating practices in the industry or 
proposed new methodologies for improving cost estimating process for both owners and 
contractors. (A. Akintoye, 2000) conducted a comparative study of 84 UK contractors to identify 
the factors influencing contractors' cost estimating practice. (A. Akintoye & Fitzgerald, 2000) 
documented current cost estimating practices and identified main causes of inaccuracy in cost 
estimating through a questionnaire survey of UK contractors. In another study by (Ogunlana & 
Thorpe, 1991), factors affecting estimating accuracy were identified through opinion survey of 
eight offices and empirical data from 51 road construction projects. Analyzing data from 56 
projects and from a postal questionnaire survey of 102 quantity-surveying firms, (Aibinu & Pasco, 
2008) investigated key project characteristics influencing the accuracy of cost estimates and 
recommended strategies for improving the accuracy of estimates. (An, Kim, & Kang, 2007) 
proposed a case-based reasoning model that integrates experience from previous cases in all 
processes of construction cost estimating using the analytic hierarchy process. Integrating 
experiential learning theory with feedback and self-monitoring systems, (Lowe & Skitmore, 1994) 
proposed a mechanism to improve the accuracy of pre-tender estimates.  
With respect to actual cost determination, there are many studies trying to identify key factors 
influencing the actual cost of projects. Interviewing 450 selected private residential project owners 
and developers in Kuwait, (Koushki, Al‐Rashid, & Kartam, 2005) identified contractor-related 
problems, material-related problems and, owners' financial constraints as the three main causes for 
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cost overruns private residential projects and recommended strategies for mitigating their impacts. 
(Attalla & Hegazy, 2003), also, identified 36 factors that have direct impact on the cost 
performance of reconstruction projects through a survey of construction professionals and applied 
statistical analysis and artificial neural networks to develop models for forecasting cost deviation 
in reconstruction projects. (R. M. Skitmore & Ng, 2003) analyzed 93 Australian construction 
projects in order to develop a regression model for predicting the actual construction cost. Finally, 
studying 258 projects in 20 countries worth more than US$90 billion suggested that cost escalation 
in transport infrastructure projects is a global phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, & Buhl, 
2003).  
5.3. Methodology & Description of Experiments   
As explained in the previous sections, this chapter is aims to study the interaction among key 
parameters involved in the processes of cost estimating, markup determination, and project 
execution. The main focus is on the impact of risk attitude on pricing and financial performance 
of contractors in the bidding environment. The methodology used in this investigation is agent-
based modeling.  
5.3.1. Simulation Model 
The general attributes and characteristics of contractors and projects are based on the original 
template of the virtual laboratory developed in Chapter 3. Projects are generated sequentially over 
a simulation period of ten years. Time unit of the simulation is set to be equal to a week in reality. 
Experiments in all scenarios are repeated 100 times to ensure consistency in the results.  
Specifically in this study, a contractor uses two functions when it comes to decision or action 
points. The function “costEstimation” samples the cost estimate of a contractor from a normal 
distribution with mean equal to the project’s estimated budget and a variance that is determined 
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based on the contractor’s estimation skills, previous similar experiences, the project’s complexity, 
and completeness of the project documents.  
In this chapter, a “markup” function is developed that combines utility theory and Friedman model 
(Friedman, 1956). Utility theory captures the risk attitude of contractors in the bidding process and 
Friedman model approximates the probability of winning of a contractor against its competitors. 
This combined model is aimed to find the optimal markup that maximizes profit utility of a 
contractor instead of its profit value.  
Because of the uncertainty in the actual cost, a contractor is facing a lottery with different outcomes 
given winning the project. In utility theory, a certainty equivalent value, CE[V], is the value at 
which the an individual is indifferent between receiving or facing the risk of the profit lottery, V. 
In other words, the utility of certainty equivalent is equal to the expected utility of the lottery. 
Translating this concept to the bidding context, the certainty equivalent value is the value a risk-
averse contractor would require to take on a risky project. The concept of certainty equivalent 
helps replacing the set of uncertain profit lottery outcomes with its certainty equivalent value. 
Therefore, a contractor is solving the following optimization problem that is trying maximize the 
product of the probability of winning against opponents given a certain markup x and n opponents 
and the utility of the certain equivalent (𝐶𝐸[𝑉]) of the corresponding profit lottery: 
max 𝐸[𝑈(𝑉)| 𝑥, 𝑛]  = max 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔| 𝑥, 𝑛)  ×  𝑈[𝐶𝐸(𝑉)]      (5.1) 
To have the closed-form expression of 𝐶𝐸[𝑉] , it is assumed that a profit utility function is 
exponential and the profit outcomes follow a normal distribution. As shown in the following 
equation, an exponential utility function is used that depends solely on one parameter that is the 
contractor’s risk aversion coefficient, γ: 
𝑈(𝑉)  =  1 − 𝑒–𝛾𝑉       (5.2) 
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Where V is the expected profit realized in a certain project and 𝑈(𝑉) is the profit utility.  
Risk aversion coefficient, γ, represents risk behavior of contractors. The higher this coefficient is, 
the more risk averse a contractor will be in the process of markup determination. The risk aversion 
coefficient can be different from one contractor to another. Considering these two assumptions, 
𝐶𝐸[𝑉] can be determined using the following equation (Clemen and Reilly 2014):  
𝐶𝐸[𝑉] =  𝑀𝑉  –  0.5 𝛾. 𝑉𝑉       (5.3) 
Where 𝑀𝑉 and 𝑉𝑉 are the mean and variance of the expected profit realized at project completion, 
respectively. These two variables depend on the actual cost of the project, which will be realized 
at the end of the project. For this study, the actual cost is assumed to follow a normal distribution 
with the mean set at the estimated cost of the project as determined by the contractor’s function 
“costEstimation” and the variance chosen according to the project complexity level as perceived 
by the contractor. The following equation summarizes a contractor’s optimization problem in the 
simulation:  
max 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔| 𝑥, 𝑛) . (1 − 𝑒−𝛾 ((𝑥−1) 𝑀𝑉– 0.5 𝛾.𝑉𝑉)))     (5.4) 
To serve the educational purpose of this dissertation, the algorithm and actual codes (in Java) of 
the function “markup” used in this chapter are provided in the appendices section of the 
dissertation. This equation helps integrate internal and external parameters involved in cost 
estimating, markup decision, project complexity, and actual cost. The following figure shows an 





Figure 5.2. An abstract representation of the interaction among key parameters in bidding  
 
5.3.2. Description of Experiments  
This section describes the purpose and details of experiments conducted in this chapter. Under 
scenario A1 to A6, ten contractors have exactly the same initial attributes including bonding 
capacity, firm size, work specialty, working capital, workload limit, cost estimating accuracy and 
project execution capability, but different attitudes towards risk. Contractor 1 and Contractor 10 
are assigned the lowest and highest risk-aversion coefficients, respectively. All projects are created 
of the same type matching the already set specialty for all contractors. Table 5.1 presents the 
conditions adopted for each scenario in the experiment set A. For example, the first scenario 
assigns poor cost estimation and project management skills to all contractors at the start of the 
simulation and defines a low complexity for all generated projects. The conditions under the 
second scenario are the same as the former one but with all projects having a high complexity level.  
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The purpose of the first four scenarios is to analyze the interaction among cost estimating accuracy, 
level of uncertainty of projects, contractors’ risk attitude, and project management skills and assess 
their impact on performance of contractors and the market. The optimal markup decision of 
contractors, their financial performance over time and the markup market are among outputs of 
interest. Comparing scenario A1 and A2 with A3 and A4 helps investigate the sensitivity of the 
markup decision made by contractors with varying risk attitude to high uncertainty in project cost 
estimation and to low/high project risk levels.  
Scenario A5 and A6 are trying to replicate a more realistic version of construction markets where 
there is a mix of projects with low to high complexity levels. The purpose of scenarios A5 and A6 
is to find the level of risk attitude that optimizes a contractor’s financial success in a long run.  
 
Table 5.1. Characteristics of projects and contractors under scenarios A1 to A6 
Scenario  Project 
Complexity  
Cost Estimating Accuracy and Project 
Execution Skills of Contractors  
A1 Low Normal 
A2 Low Improved 
A3 High Normal 
A4 High Improved 
A5 Mixed Normal 
A6 Mixed Improved 
 
5.4. Results 
This section presents and discusses the results that were obtained in six experiments described in 
the previous section. As Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4  show, market share and total working capital 
created in the market under scenario A1 and A2 are almost evenly distributed among all contractors 
since their standard deviations are insignificant. The almost equal allocation of market share and 
working capital is mainly due to low level of project complexity that results in lower variance 
between the actual cost and the estimated cost. The small variance among contractors’ working 
83 
 
capital in different runs can be attributed to the normal level of cost estimating accuracy and project 
execution skills. This variance is less in Scenario A2 because of the improved level of cost 
estimating accuracy and project execution skills. However, the distribution of market share is 
slightly skewed towards slightly risk averse contractors while the distribution of working capital 
is slightly skewed towards extremely risk averse contractors. 
Observing the working capital of scenario A1 and A2 suggests that when level of project 
uncertainty and complexity is low, risk attitude has an insignificant impact on contractor’s 
performance and it does not separate the slightly, moderately, and extremely risk averse 
contractors from each other. In addition, comparing the results of scenario A1 with scenario A2 
suggests that improving cost estimating accuracy and project execution skills causes a considerable 
increase in contractors’ working capital (total profit) although the average market markup has 
decreased by almost 33% (which is (3.3%-2.21% / 3.3%) ) as shown in Table 5.2. This table also 
shows that as the contractor’s risk aversion coefficient increases, its optimal markup increases for 
almost every tendered project over the simulated five years.  
Comparing performance of contractors in markets with low risk projects (scenarios A1 and A2) 
with markets with high risk projects (scenarios A3 and A4) suggests that as the project uncertainty 
and inherent risk increases, the risk attitude of the contractor exerts a higher impact on its optimal 
markup decision. Another interesting observation on this comparison is the considerable increase 
in working capital of all contractors and higher dispersion of market share among contractors.  
Comparing the results of scenario A3 with scenario A4 suggests that improving cost estimating 
accuracy and project execution skills causes a considerable increase in contractors’ working capital 
of most contractors. The only exception is the decline in working capital of extremely risk averse 
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contractors in markets with high-risk projects compared to their working capital in markets with 
low-risk projects due to the considerable drop in their market share.   
 
 
Figure 5.3. Market share of contractors under scenarios A1-A4 
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Average Market Share of Moderately Risk Averse Contractors (4, 5, 6 & 7)


































Average Working Capital of Slightly Risk Averse Contractors (1, 2 & 3)
Average Working Capital of Moderately Risk Averse Contractors (4, 5, 6 & 7)
Average Working Capital of Extremely Risk Averse Contractors (8, 9 & 10)
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Table 5.2. Average markup of contractors under scenarios A1-A4 
 Scenario 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 
Average Markup of Slightly Risk Averse 
Contractors (1, 2 & 3) 
2.99% 1.84% 13.27% 12.61% 
Average Markup of Moderately Risk Averse 
Contractors (4, 5, 6 & 7) 
3.51% 2.35% 21.53% 20.36% 
Average Markup of Extremely Risk Averse 
Contractors (8, 9 & 10) 
3.79% 2.87% 30.12% 29.04% 
Average Market Markup 3.30% 2.21% 16.79% 15.79% 
 
Figure 5.5 presents the market share of contractors for scenarios A5 and A6. The first observation 
is the fact that risk attitude has direct impact on market share. The less risk averse a contractor acts 
when bidding, the higher share of the market they can secure in a long run. In other words, slightly 
risk averse contractors have obtained larger market share in both scenarios. The main reason for 
this order of market share distribution is the impact of risk attitude on markup determination. The 
second observation is the considerable impact of improving cost estimating accuracy and project 
execution skills on the market share of contractors. With this improvement, slightly risk averse 
contractors increased their market share compared to the scenario under which all contractors have 
normal cost estimating accuracy and project execution skills. Under scenario 2, moderately risk 
averse contractors have almost managed to keep their market shares in scenario 1. However 
extremely risk averse contractors have lost around 25% (which is (7.3% - 5.5%) / 7.3%).   
Figure 5.6 presents the working capital of contractors, which is the accumulated gross profit over 
the simulation period. Moderately risk averse contractors have outperformed others in both 
scenarios A5 and A6 although they have not obtained the highest market shares in the market. This 
is mainly due to the facts that moderately risk averse contractors have better adjusted their markup 
so that they can make more profit per project compared to slightly risk averse contractors and that 
they can have much higher market share compared to extremely risk averse contractors. Another 
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important observation is the change in order of contractors’ financial performance from scenario 
A5 to scenario A6. Under scenario A5, the extremely risk averse contractors have been more 
successful than slightly risk averse contractors. However, this is not the case under scenario A6. 
The slightly risk averse contractors have gained more working capital compared to the extremely 
risk averse contractors. This suggests that a contractor can take more risk when determining the 
markup if its cost estimating accuracy and project execution skills are well improved.  
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Figure 5.6. Working capital under scenarios A5 & A6 
 
5.5. Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, six simulation experiments were designed and conducted to study the effect of 
contractors’ risk behavior, cost estimating and project management skills, and complexity of 
projects on contractors’ choice of optimal markup, long-term financial growth and market share. 
The results of this study show: 
 There is a significant impact of a contractor’s risk behavior on its optimal markup and this 
impact is most in markets where projects are of high complexity and uncertainty. In other 
words, when project complexity is low, the markup is usually hardly influenced by risk 
attitude.  
 This study shows that moderately risk averse contractors can financially outperform others 
in a long run. Also, the comparative performance of slightly and extremely risk averse 
contractors depends on level of cost estimating accuracy and project execution skills of 
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Reinschmidt, 2010, 2011) which used Monte Carlo simulation to model the decision of 
bid/no bid for contractors with varying risk attitude and concluded that risk tolerant 
contractors tend to bid more often and at lower prices than risk averse ones. 
 The contractor’s good financial performance and market survival depends on his own 
characteristics, the market conditions and projects’ attributes. In particular, risk attitude in 
markets with medium to high risk projects has considerable impact on contractors’ survival 
and financial status. Results strongly suggests that moderately risk averse contractors tend 
to perform better and generate more profit than other contractors. Also, results indicate a 
better accuracy in the cost estimation of projects and more controlled management of the 
construction process generate higher profits for most contractors even when their markups 
decrease.  
 The inherent risk level of a project is at the core of the markup decision and may result in 
significant inflation of bid prices in the market. All conducted experiments showed an 
average observed increase of 10 percent in markups moving from low to high risk projects 
for a given scenario with all other parameters being equal. This matches the 5-10 % margin 
for risk allowance in bids confirmed in the review study conducted by (Laryea & Hughes, 








CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS OF INTERACTION AMONG COMPETITION, RISK, AND 
WORK CONTINUITY IN A DESCRIPTIVE BIDDING METHOD 
 
“Human beings, viewed as behaving systems, are quite simple. The apparent complexity of our 
behavior over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which we find 
ourselves.” ~ Herbert Simon 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Descriptive (positive) and prescriptive (normative) decision theories are two schools of thought in 
decision sciences. Descriptive decision models mainly explain how decision is made whereas 
prescriptive decision models recommend how a decision should be made (Bazerman & Moore, 
2012). According to Simon’s Nobel Prize winning works (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1965) 
decision making can be better understood by describing and explaining actual decisions, rather 
than by focusing solely on prescriptive decision analysis. In the previous chapters, profit was the 
only objective a contractor was trying to maximize in the simulation and prescriptive decision 
models such as models introduced by (Friedman, 1956) and (Gates, 1967) were used in the markup 
function of agent contractors. Although profit maximization in a competitive context is recognized 
as the most frequently used bidding objective (Boughton, 1987), many researchers argue that it is 
not always and should not be considered the sole criterion in markup decision making process. 
There are several deductive studies in the construction bidding literature that reveal the underlying 
factors characterizing the bidding decision making behavior of contractors through conducting 
questionnaire surveys and interviews. Findings of those deductive studies can be used to build a 
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descriptive decision model that replicates decision-making behavior of a typical contractor in the 
construction competitive bidding. With identifying major decision criteria in construction bidding 
for a typical contractor, behavioral rules of agents can be defined in a simple and reasonable 
manner (Metcalfe & Foster, 2007). The significance of agent-based modeling is in its ability to 
capture the complexity that arises from the interaction of agents even-though their behaviors seem 
simple. This study aims to understand the interaction among major markup components and their 
influence on the contractors’ performance. In particular, two main objectives of this chapter are:  
1. observing the impact of a contractor’s risk attitude on his markup decision taking into 
account its need for work and the market competition,  
2. assessing if and to what extent considering need for work in the markup decision affects 
the financial growth of a contractor and its market share.  
To address these questions, this chapter is organized as follows: The “Background” section 
reviews main works in the literature of construction bidding that have taken a descriptive approach 
through the study. Using findings of those studies, a multi-attribute markup decision model is 
conceptualized and developed. The “Methodology & Description of Experiments” section 
describes implementation of the multi-attribute markup decision model as the markup function of 
contractors in the virtual laboratory. Then, several simulation experiments are conducted to 
address research questions outlined in the “Introduction” section. The “Results and Discussion” 
section presents results of the experiments and discuss major observations. Finally, the 
“Conclusion and Future Works” section summarizes key findings and insights and outlines 
directions for future research in this area. 
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6.2. Literature Review on Descriptive Studies of Construction Biddings  
As explained in Chapter 3, the literature of construction bidding can be classified into three 
categories based on the methodological approaches: Induction, deduction, and simulation. The 
following table presents major deductive studies in the literature. All these studies that aimed to 
identify key factors that contractors consider when making bidding decisions stressed the multi-
attribute nature of markup decision making  and the fact that a contractor’s internal conditions 
(including need for work, risk behavior, current workload, financial capacity, firm size and others) 
are equally and sometimes even more important than project attributes and market characteristics.  
To define the behavioral rules, this chapter focuses on three of the most influential bidding factors 
identified in the literature namely, the market competition, the risk behavior and the need for work. 
This choice is supported by the literature. (Ahmad & Minkarah, 1988; Chua & Li, 2000; Shash, 
1993) identified need for work was as one of the most influential factor in making a contractor 
take any measures to win the job. Based on their internal characteristics, organizational culture, 
and risk attitude, contractors have varying perceptions about market conditions and projects’ 
uncertainties (Oo et al., 2010). At the time of bidding, a construction project can be seen as a lottery 
with different profit outcomes and with a level of uncertainty resulting from the expected variance 
in the final cost of the project. Depending on their risk attitudes, the value of this lottery and its 
appeal varies from one contractor to another. In an empirical study, (de Neufville & King, 1991) 
showed that each of the two components, risk and need for work, causes independently and 
additively a rough increase of 3% in the bid price of a contracting firm. Besides competition, risk, 
and work continuity, there are some other less important factors affecting the optimal markup 
decision identified in the literature such as type of project and inherent complexity, client character 
and record of payment, reliability of subcontractors, and degree of uncertainty in cost estimates. 
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While the former studies identified the major markup defining components, they failed to consider 
and discuss the interaction among them and the relative dominance of one on the other within a 
market of heterogeneous contractors exhibiting different bidding behavior and strategies. This 
study aims to address this gap.  
 
Table 6.1. Review of Major Descriptive Studies in the Literature Construction Bidding 
Author(s)/Year Description of the study Contribution of the study 
Ahmad and 
Minkara (1988) 
A survey for identifying main 
factors for US contractors when 
making bid/no bid and markup 
decisions 
Need for work, type of job, degree of 
hazard, economic conditions, competition, 
degree of uncertainty in cost estimate, and 
reliability of subcontractors are key factors 
in determining the markup.  
DeNeufville 
and King (1991)  
An empirical investigation on 
the bidding decisions of 30 
selected contractors in Boston, 
USA 
Risk and need for work were identified as 
two influential factors in a contractor’s 
bidding behavior. Different profit markup 
utility functions were developed for 
different possible combinations of these two 
factors.  
Shash (1993)  A survey to find the most 
significant factors influencing 
the markup decision for 85 top 
UK contractors   
Degree of difficulty, risk involved, current 
workload and need for work were identified 
are the most influential factors.  
Hegazy and 
Moselhi (1995)  
A survey condocted among 78 
general contractors in Canada 
and the US to identify key 
factors influencing a 
contractor’ bidding decisions  
23 factors were grouped into four 
categories: 1- job uncertainty (owner 
attitude and project location), 2- job 
complexity (project size and the level of 
technology needed), 3- market condition 
(economic growth and expected 
competition), and 4- the firm’s ability and 
need for work (expertise in similar projects 
and how desperately the work was needed). 
Chua and Li 
(2000) 
Interviews with competitive 
bidding experts and top 
contractors in Singapore for 
identifying key considerations 
in bidding decisions  
The potential level of competition, the 
inherent project risk, the contract type, the 
company’s bidding position and its need for 
the job are key factors.  
Dulaimi and 
Shan (2002) 
A survey to find factors that 
medium and large size 
contractors in Singapore 
consider when making their bid 
markup decision  
40 factors were identified and classified into 
project characteristics, company’s 
attributes, bidding situation, economic 
environment, and project documentation.   
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Ye et al. (2013)  A survey to find key factors 
contractors in China consider 
when determining bid prices 
for public projects 
Major factors were identified, ranked, and 
classified into different categories including 
construction cost, contractor heterogeneity, 
payment terms, potential competitors, client 
requirements, market conditions, and third-
party stakeholders.  
 
6.3. Methodology & Description of Experiments 
Similar to the experiments in the previous chapters, two main classes of objects are Projects and 
Contractors. Projects are generated sequentially over a simulation period of ten years and are 
assigned a set of characteristics such as the project budget chosen uniformly over the range [$80M, 
$120M], the project duration also selected uniformly between 20 and 30 weeks, the project 
complexity (low or high), and its actual cost based on the inherent uncertainty. On the other hand, 
a set of contractors is created in the market along with their attributes including their attitude 
towards risk, expertise, cost estimation skills, bidding competitiveness, financial status, work 
backlog and need for work, in addition to their decision making rules with respect to bidding on 
projects and markup choice. It is assumed that all contractors can estimate a project cost with the 
same level of accuracy and have the same level of management capability and expertise although 
there are uncertainties over the actual cost at which a project is completed given different level of 
project complexities. Note that the actual cost is set to follow a triangular distribution with a mean 
equal to the project’s market budget. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the bidding 
process simulation and reflects the interaction among the different agents over time within one 
competitive environment. It is worth noting that the agent–environment boundary represents the 





Figure 6.1. An abstraction of a contractor in the bidding environment and the network structure of the market 
 
6.3.1. Multi-Attribute Markup Function 
This study assumes that a typical contractor considers three independent criteria when trying to 
determine the markup for a certain project, which are the market competition, the inherent risk, 
and the need for work. Based on the descriptive studies in the literature, and to maintain behavioral 
rules simple and rule of thumb-like, an additive markup function was developed in this study 
consisting of three components described in the following subsections: 
6.3.1.1. Competition Component 
Competition has been identified as one of the main decision criteria for construction contractors 
when determining their bid price for a project (Hegazy & Moselhi, 1995; Smith & Bohn, 1999). 
To increase their chance of winning a contract, a contractor needs to adjust its markup with respect 
to the quality and quantity of competition demonstrated by their competitors (Carr, 1983). Bid 
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competitiveness ratio expression introduced by (Oo et al., 2010) is used in this study to measure 




      (6.1) 
Where BCRip is the bid competitiveness ratio for opponent i on project p, Bip is the bid price 
submitted by opponent i for project p, and Blp is the lowest submitted bid for project p. This ratio 
calculates the gap between an opponent’s bid and the lowest bid submitted for a project divided 
by the lowest bid. This ratio reflects how close a competitor’s bid was to the lowest bid for a 
previous project and therefore the smaller this ratio is, the more competitive a competitor is. During 
each bidding cycle, a contractor determines the average bid competitiveness ratios for his potential 
opponents over the last ten projects tendered in the market using the following code excerpt from 
the developed model: 
//This piece of code shows how the BCRip of each contractor i is computed and archived after 
determining the winning bid for every past project p// 
 
for (Contractor c : get_Main().allContractors) 
{  




//This piece of code shows how the average BCRip over the last ten projects, named 
bidCompetitivenessTen, is computed for each potential opponent i on the current project p// 
 
for (Contractor c : Opponents) 
{ 
sum=0; 
 for(int n = 0; n < c.bidCompetitivenessDataset.size() ; n++) 
{sum += c.bidCompetitivenessDataset.getY(n);}  
 c.bidCompetitivenessTen = sum / c.bidCompetitivenessDataset.size(); 
 } 
Then, once the average bid competitiveness ratios of potential opponents are determined, the 
contractor will be able to compare and rank himself among his competitors and hence evaluate the 
96 
 
percentage of opponents who have been more competitive than him in the recent past projects. The 
lower this percentage is, the higher markup a contractor can afford to use in his bid price for the 
current project and thus the higher the competition component will be assigned in the developed 
additive markup function.  
At the time of bid preparation, each contractor considers the past ten projects tendered in the 
market, determines the corresponding average competitiveness ratios for potential competitors and 
decides on the competition component of its markup value accordingly. The reason for limiting to 
just the past ten project is to consider the most recent behavior of competitors rather than their 
whole bid history.  
6.3.1.2. Risk Component 
As explained in the previous chapter, one key organizational element involved in the bid 
preparation process is risk attitude. Contractors consider a risk allowance in the bid price that is 
usually added to the markup as a percentage of total cost. The range for residual risk allowance 
percentage in bids is in the order of [0-3] % which is also adopted in this simulation (de Neufville 
& King, 1991; Laryea & Hughes, 2010; Smith & Bohn, 1999). The risk attitude of a contractor 
affects the way it perceives the inherent risk in a project and the impact it can have on the firm’s 
bid price. In this chapter, there are three types of contractors with respect to risk attitude (Slightly 
Risk Averse, Moderately Risk Averse, Extremely Risk Averse) and two degrees of project risk 
(low and high) which are the main two factors defining the risk allowance component in the 
markup function:  
if (riskAversion == mild) 
{ 
 if (project.riskLevel == low) 
 riskcontingency = 0.00; 
 if (project.riskLevel == high) 




else if (riskAversion == moderate) 
{ 
 if (project.riskLevel == low) 
 riskcontingency = 0.01; 
 if (project.riskLevel == high) 
 riskcontingency = 0.02; 
 } 
else  (riskAversion == extreme) 
{ 
 if (project.riskLevel == low) 
 riskcontingency = 0.02; 
 if (project.riskLevel == high) 
 riskcontingency = 0.03; 
 } 
6.3.1.3. Need for Work Component 
Contractors need to maintain a certain work backlog so that they can cover their general and 
administrative costs and retain skilled personnel. In this simulation, the parameter Work-in-
Progress Limit is defined as the average annual workload a contractor can have during a year given 
its size and capabilities. Accordingly, the need for work ratio (NWR) for a contractor i is 
determined through the following equation:  
𝑁𝑊𝑅𝑖 = 1 − (
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 − 𝑖𝑛 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
)      (6.2) 
The closer this ratio is to 1, the higher the need for work and the lower the markup is expected to 
be; and the closer this ratio is to 0, the lower is the contractor’s need for work and the higher 
markup it can afford. Through surveying contractors in the market, (de Neufville & King, 1991) 
showed that a high need for work could roughly decrease the bid price by 3%. The need for work 
component in this study is selected within the range [0-4] % and its specific value is chosen based 
on two variables namely the financial status of the contractor and the previously defined need for 
work ratio. The financial situation of a contractor is assessed through the positive or negative 
change to its initial working capital.  
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6.3.2. Description of the Experiments  
This subsection explains the details of three sets of simulation experiments conducted in this study. 
Nine contractors are defined in the market and are set to have the same value for initial working 
capital, work limit, cost estimation and project management skills. Each contractor can 
simultaneously work on four projects at most. Given the number of contractors in the market and 
their work limit, the market is considered very competitive in all sets of experiments. Each 
experiment set has been run for 100 times in order to ensure the consistency of the results. Table 6.2 
presents a summary of the experiments sets and their purposes. 
The purpose of the first set of experiments (A) is to examine what level of risk attitude results in 
the contractor’s best financial performance on the long run. The result will be compared with 
findings in the literature in order to check and verify capability of the simulation model. There are 
nine contractors competing with each other in the market including three slightly risk averse 
contractors, three moderately risk averse contractors, and three extremely risk averse contractors. 
Table 6.3 shows the risk attitude assigned for each of the nine contractors. In the first set of 
experiments, projects are generated in the market one at a time unit under three different scenarios. 
Under scenario A.1, all projects have low level of complexity and uncertainty. Under scenario A.2, 
the market comprises a mix of projects with low and high level of complexity and uncertainty. In 
this case, always the next project has high (or low) level of complexity and uncertainty with a 
probability of 50%. As for scenario A.3, all projects have high level of complexity and uncertainty. 
These three scenarios are considered only in the first set of experiments in order to analyze the 






Table 6.2. Summary of the experiment set A, B, and C 
Experiment Set Purpose  Experiment Conditions  
A Finding the optimal level of 
risk attitude for contractors  
Scenario 1: the market comprises only projects 
with low level of complexity.  
Scenario 2: the market comprises a mix of 
projects with low and high level of complexity. 
Scenario 3: the market comprises only projects 
with high level of complexity. 
B Finding whether 
considering “Need for 
Work” impacts business 
success of contractors 
The market comprises a mix of projects with 
low and high level of complexity.  
All contractors are moderately risk averse.  
C Finding to what degree a 
markup discount should be 
considered to account for 
need for work 
The market comprises a mix of projects with 
low and high level of complexity.  
All contractors are moderately risk averse. 
 
The second set of simulation experiments (B) investigates the importance of the component “Need 
for Work”. It aims at assessing whether considering “Need for Work” impacts business success of 
contractors on the long-term or not. If the answer is yes, the purpose of the third set of simulation 
experiments (C) is to find to what degree a markup discount should be considered to account for 
need for work.  
In experiment set B, there are two types of contractors with ten contractors in total. As Table 6.3 
shows there are five contractors who do not consider “Need for Work” and five other contractors 
who consider it and accordingly discount their markup up to 2%. Financial performance of the two 
sets of contractors is observed and compared in order to evaluate the effect of considering “Need 
for Work” in markup decision.  
In experiment set C, there are five types of contractors with ten contractors in total, and these five 
types differ by the discount level at which they take the component “Need for Work” into 
consideration when determining their markup. Table 6.3 shows the varying levels of “Need for 
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Work” consideration in the markup function of the ten defined contractors. It is worth mentioning 
that the second and third sets of experiments were conducted under three levels of risk attitude 
separately in order to ensure that results are consistent regardless of the risk attitude of contractors. 
Also, the market consisted of a mix of low and high risk projects (similar to the scenario A2 under 
the first set of experiments) in both sets.  
 
Table 6.3. Contractors' characteristics in the experiment set A, B, and C 
Contractor Risk Attitude  
in the experiment set A 
Need For Work 
in the experiment set B 
Need For Work 
in the experiment set C 
#1 Slightly Risk Averse Ignored Ignored 
#2 Slightly Risk Averse Ignored Ignored 
#3 Slightly Risk Averse Ignored Discounted up to 1% 
#4 Moderately Risk Averse Ignored Discounted up to 1% 
#5 Moderately Risk Averse Ignored Discounted up to 2% 
#6 Moderately Risk Averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 2% 
#7 Extremely Risk Averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 3% 
#8 Extremely Risk Averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 3% 
#9 Extremely Risk Averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 4% 
#10 N.A.  Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 4% 
 
6.4. Results  
This section presents and discusses the results that were obtained in the three sets of experiments 
described in the previous section.  
6.4.1. Results of Experiment Set A  
Table 6.4, Table 6.5, Figures 6.2 to 6.5 present the results obtained for the first experiment set. To 
be more specific, Figures 6.2 to 6.4 show the progress of the average working capital for the three 
levels of risk aversion versus the project ID under the three different described scenarios which 
exhibit varying degrees of project risk. As shown in each of these figures, moderately risk averse 
contractors financially outperform others in highly competitive markets in the long run. This result 
is consistent across all scenarios and is aligned with the result obtained in the literature and in 
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Chapter 5 of this dissertation (Kim & Reinschmidt, 2010, 2011). Also, slightly risk averse 
outperform extremely risk averse contractors in all scenarios. One of the methods for validating 
simulation models is comparing obtained results with real-world observations or findings from 
literature. In this case, results of this experiment set can be considered as a validation tool of the 
simulation model.  
Comparing Figures 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, it is observed that slightly risk averse contractors can do 
better in riskier markets. Slightly risk averse contractors, on average, have the highest difference 
with moderately risk averse contractors in terms of working capital when the market comprises 
low risk projects (Scenario A1). This difference decreases when moving from low risk to high risk 
market; namely, from scenario A1 to scenario A2 and then scenario A3. This can be due to the fact 
that when facing high uncertainty in projects, the more risk averse a contractor is, the higher the 
allocated contingency (risk allowance) in his bid which reduces his competitiveness. This gives a 
winning edge to slightly risk averse contractors over moderate ones, and thus the gap between the 
growing working capitals for both decreases from scenario A1 to scenario A3. Another observation 
about Figures 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 is that, given a certain risk aversion level, the generated working 
capital representing an accumulation of actual project profits over time has increased from low to 
high risk market because all contractors will consider higher risk allowance in their markup to 





Figure 6.2. Financial performance of contractors in the experiment set A under scenario A1 
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Figure 6.4. Financial performance of contractors in the experiment set A under scenario A3 
 
Table 6.4 presents the working capital of contractors in the three scenarios. It also compares each 
contractor’s performance with the best performance in the market in terms of working capital. As 
Table 6.4 suggests, the average working capital of contractors have increased from Scenario 1 to 
3. In other words, in riskier markets, contractors increased their markup to cover the risk and thus 
could manage a higher profit. It is also observed that moderate risk averse contractors had the 
smallest average gap (Δ%) with the best performer in the market in all scenarios which again 
indicates that moderation in risk attitude is the optimal strategy regardless of the project risk level. 
Note contractors #5 and #6 exhibited the best financial performance in all three scenarios (Δ=0%). 
Another important observation that was emphasized earlier is that slightly risk averse contractors 
performed significantly better under scenario 3 where the average Δ% dropped from -41% in 
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Table 6.4. Contractors' working capital in the experiment set A under scenarios A1, A2, and A3 
 Working Capital ($M) 
  Scenario 
A1 










Δ% with the 
best 
performance 
Contractor 1 237 -25% 170 -54% 294 -28% 
Contractor 2 90 -72% 292 -22% 299 -27% 
Contractor 3 155 -51% 198 -47% 345 -16% 
Average of 
Contractor 1, 2, 3 
161 -49% 220 -41% 313 -24% 
Contractor 4 260 -18% 346 -7% 321 -21% 
Contractor 5 318 0% 271 -27% 382 -6% 
Contractor 6 269 -15% 372 0% 408 0% 
Average of 
Contractor 4, 5, 6 
283 -11% 330 -11% 371 -9% 
Contractor 7 163 -49% 207 -44% 202 -50% 
Contractor 8 167 -47% 158 -58% 234 -43% 
Contractor 9 112 -65% 194 -48% 224 -45% 
Average of 
Contractor 7, 8, 9 
147 -54% 186 -50% 220 -46% 
 
Table 6.5 presents market share of the nine contractors under the three different scenarios. Please 
note that the market share of each contractor is defined to be the number of won projects over the 
number of tendered projects in the market: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 =
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑖
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
∗ 100      (6.3) 
This table supports again the conclusion that moderately risk averse contractors, on average, have 
a better performance under all market scenarios through having the highest share of projects among 






Table 6.5. Contractors' market share in the experiment set A under scenarios A1, A2, and A3 
 Market Share 
 Scenario A1 Scenario A2 Scenario A3 
Contractor 1 12.3% 10.6% 10.9% 
Contractor 2 9.0% 11.9% 10.9% 
Contractor 3 10.9% 10.9% 12.3% 
Average of Contractor 1, 2, 3 10.7% 11.1% 11.4% 
Contractor 4 12.9% 12.3% 11.9% 
Contractor 5 13.1% 12.1% 13.1% 
Contractor 6 12.9% 13.4% 12.3% 
Average of Contractor 4, 5, 6 13.0% 12.6% 12.4% 
Contractor 7 9.6% 9.8% 9.6% 
Contractor 8 10.2% 9.2% 9.4% 
Contractor 9 9.0% 9.6% 9.4% 
Average of Contractor 7, 8, 9 9.6% 9.5% 9.5% 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the success rate of contractors throughout the simulation period. The success rate 
of a contractor is defined to be the number of won projects over the total number of projects the 
contractor has bid on:  
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  
# of won projects by 𝑖
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑖 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑜𝑛
      (6.4) 
This figure confirms that moderately risk averse contractors, on average, outperform other 
contractors. Moreover, it show that contractors tend to converge to a somehow constant success 
rate after 2-3 years (in the simulation time scale). It is worth noting that the result in Figure 6.5 is 





Figure 6.5. Contractors' success rate under scenario A2 
 
6.4.2. Results of Experiment Set B 
The results of the second set of experiments, as reflected in Figure 6.6, show that contractors 6, 7, 
8, 9 and 10 who considered “Need For Work” as one of the criteria for determining their markup 
have a better financial performance compared to the contractors who did not (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).  
This is because these contractors lower their markup strategically depending on their need for work 
and financial situation, which allows them to, possibly, acquire new projects when they have their 
resources idle, even though it might come at the expense of a lower expected profit. Specifically, 
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competition is intense. It is worth noting that this experiment set is conducted with the same risk 
aversion degree for all contractors in order to isolate the “Need for Work” effect on contractors’ 
growing capital. Figure 6.6 shows the results obtained for moderate risk aversion level, however, 
the simulation was repeated another two times, once with mild risk aversion condition for all 
contractors and the other with extreme risk attitude. Both scenarios showed similar results.  
 
 


























Contractor 1 Working Capital Contractor 2 Working Capital
Contractor 3 Working Capital Contractor 4 Working Capital
Contractor 5 Working Capital Contractor 6 Working Capital
Contractor 7 Working Capital Contractor 8 Working Capital
Contractor 9 Working Capital Contractor 10 Working Capital
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6.4.3. Experiment Set C 
While considering “Need for Work” is a reasonable strategy for contractors, the extent to which 
this consideration should be accounted for in the markup percentage has not been studied in the 
literature. The experiment set presented in this section addresses this gap through having five 
different groups of contractors in the market who perceive the importance of “Need for Work” 
consideration differently and thus allocate different boundaries to this criterion in their markup 
functions. Figure 6.7 shows the experiment results where the growing capitals for the five groups 
of contractors are presented versus the project ID. It is observed that contractors 1 and 2 who do 
not take their need for work into consideration in their markup decisions are performing the worst, 
whereas, contractors 7 and 8 who are adopting a need for work upper margin of 3 % have the best 
financial performance. Contractors 5 and 6 come in the second rank with using an upper limit of 
2%. As for contractors 9 and 10, who are discounting up to 4%, they are increasing their chance 
of winning the project while decreasing the profit margin radically. On the other hand, contractors 
3 and 4 who are discounting up to 1% are not able to immediately secure a contract when they 
need it. Based on the aforementioned, it can be concluded that considering “Need for Work” 
strategically and discounting the markup up to 2-3% is the optimal policy for contractors in a 
competitive market on the long run. All contractors whose working capitals are shown in 
Figure 6.7 were assigned a moderate risk aversion degree. It should be noted again that this 
experiment was conducted under different contractors’ risk behavior (slightly and extremely risk 





Figure 6.7. Working capital of moderately risk averse contractors in experiment set C 
  
6.5. Chapter Summary  
Markup decision can massively impact a contractor’s financial performance because the major 
channel of securing work in the construction industry is still through a variety of competitive 
bidding mechanisms. The presented study used agent-based modeling as an appropriate framework 
for analyzing and investigating the impact of risk behavior and need for work on construction 
contractors’ performance in a competitive bidding environment.  
Prior to applying agent-based modeling in this study, an extensive literature review was conducted 
in order to build a rule-based and descriptive markup decision model that replicates behavior of 
contractors. Then, different experiments were designed and implemented under a variety of 
scenarios. Obtained results suggest that consideration of risk allowance and need for work has 
significant impact on contractor’s financial success in competitive bidding environments. In 
particular, it was shown that moderately risk averse contractors consistently outperform other 
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discount to account for “Need for Work” component in the markup selection led to higher 
contractors’ chance of financial growth. Therefore, the optimal policy can be concluded to be 
moderation in both dimensions of risk attitude and need for work. At the limit, not considering 
need for work and being extremely risk averse appeared to be the least effective strategy a 
contractor can adopt.  
Another main finding of this study is that that the higher the projects’ risk and uncertainty within 
the market, the more competitive slightly risk averse contractors are compared to moderately risk 
averse contractors. This emergent behavior is not intuitive. Finally, the results obtained from all 
sets of experiments converge towards the conclusion that construction market reaches equilibrium 







CHAPTER 7. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THE MODELS 
 
“Knowledge is an unending adventure at the edge of uncertainty”. ~ Jacob Bronowski 
 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter explains all the steps taken for verifying and validating the models and results 
presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6. Verification is the process of 
determining whether the programming implementation of the abstract model is correct whereas 
validation is the process of determining whether the conceptual model is a reasonably true 
representation of the real world for the purpose of answering the research questions (Sargent, 2013). 
In other words, verification is concerned with solving the problem right while validation is 
concerned with solving the right problem (Xiang, Kennedy, Madey, & Cabaniss, 2005).  
7.2. Verification 
The agent-based simulation platform used in this study, AnyLogic, allows the user to breakdown 
the model into several computation steps and verify the programming component of each step due 
to its capability of collecting information on any parameter or process at any time through the 
simulation. For some specific bidding cycles in several simulation runs, the corresponding 
calculations of all the process steps were computed manually, compared and verified with the 
model calculation.  
7.3. Validation 
The validation task is one of the key challenges in the development of agent-based models where 
emergent patterns at the aggregate level might not be directly traceable to the individual agents’ 
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micro behavior at the bottom level (Crooks, Castle, & Batty, 2008). There are numerous methods 
with different level of rigor for verification and validation of simulation models, particularly agent-
based models. Depending on the type of the model and available data, a method may be applicable 
for verification and validation; a model should be verified and validated to the degree needed for 
the model’s intended purpose or application (Sargent, 2013).   
One of the most prevalent validation methods is “model-to-model comparison” where the results 
of the simulation are compared with previous studies on the subject. For this purpose, results of 
the experiments conducted in the previous chapters were compared with the previous studies in 
the literature.  As mentioned previously, one main result of experiments conducted in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6 were aligned with the literature; moderately risk averse contractors outperform other 
contractors in competitive markets in a long run. 
Another validation method used in this study was parameter variability (sensitivity analysis) where 
we closely examined how uncertainty in the values of the key input parameters can impact the 
model output and whether the outcomes are within a reasonable and expected range (Grimm et al., 
2010). Considering the capability of the virtual laboratory, different distributions were used for 
project budget, estimated duration, actual cost, and actual duration in addition to the fact that all 
experiments are conducted under different scenarios in order to make sure results are consistent. 
For example, experiment sets B and C in Chapter 6 were conducted with three different contractors’ 
risk attitudes and the result remained consistent.  
Robustness analysis or extreme condition test can be performed in order to observe the response 
of the model to drastic changes such as complete failure in securing a project for a long period of 
the simulation or unexpected success in early bids.  
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Structural or conceptual validation ensures that the conceptual model the 
mathematical/logical/verbal representation (mimic) of the problem entity developed for a 
particular study (Sargent, 2013). In this study, the bidding process used in the simulation model 
imitates the actual bidding process happening in reality. For example, one main feature of price-
based competitive bidding in the construction industry is that there exists a large input (in the form 
of requirements, details, drawings and specifications) provided equally for all contractors. 
Therefore, all contractors bid on the same information as it is in the simulation model.  
One important assumption was that contractors have access to other contractors’ bidding history. 
With respect to validation of model assumptions, it is worth mentioning that many contractors 
have a specific unit in their business development or R&D department that is in charge of 
collecting market information, tracking and analyzing their competitors. On the other hand, it was 
assumed that all contractors have the same size, initial working capital, cost estimation accuracy, 
construction management skills, expertise, and G&A costs in the purpose of removing any possible 
impact of these factors on the results. With respect to structural validation of the simulation, the 
bidding process used in the simulation model imitates the actual bidding process happening in 
reality. 
In addition to the above validation techniques, validation of the model through expert judgment is 
still crucial (Bonabeau, 2002). As part of future work, the simulation models presented in this 
dissertation can be validated by comparing their results with real case studies or by presenting it 
to and getting feedback from practitioners and professionals in the field of construction bidding. 
This is a difficult task especially in the construction business where contractors are most of the 





CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
“I can live with doubt and uncertainty and not knowing. I think it is much more interesting to live 
not knowing than to have answers that might be wrong. If we will only allow that, as we progress, 
we remain unsure, we will leave opportunities for alternatives. We will not become enthusiastic 
for the fact, the knowledge, the absolute truth of the day, but remain always uncertain … In order 
to make progress, one must leave the door to the unknown ajar.” ~ Richard Feynman 
 
8.1. Conclusions 
This dissertation focused on modeling and analyzing the low-bid lump-sum competitive bidding 
in the construction industry. The important subject of competitive bidding in construction has 
attracted research, analysis, and surveys by both the construction academia and industry. A virtual 
laboratory was developed using agent-based modeling and then it was used in the following 
chapters:  
 to analyze the effectiveness of major quantitative methods in the bidding environment 
under a variety of scenarios,  
 to study the effect of contractors’ risk behavior, cost estimating and project management 
skills, and complexity of projects on contractors’ choice of optimal markup, long-term 
financial growth and market share, and  
 to investigate the impact of risk behavior and need for work on contractors’ performance.  
First, Chapter 3 conducted an extensive review of scientific studies in the field of competitive 
construction bidding and then categorized the literature into three classes of induction, deduction, 
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and simulation according to their methodological approach. Although previous studies have 
investigated different aspects of construction bidding from both contractors’ and owners’ 
perspectives using analytical and empirical approaches, they failed to understand the dynamics of 
bidding environment by considering interactions among players. The need for developing a 
comprehensive model that addresses methodological restrictions and limited applicability of 
previous research studies was identified. Using a System-of-Systems approach, an agent-based 
model of the low-bid lump-sum competitive bidding process was developed on a Java-based 
platform. The model has several advantages over the previous analytical and empirical models 
including the capability of observing the bidding process dynamics, the interaction between the 
heterogeneous and learning agents, and the emergent bidding patterns arising from multiple 
scenarios of market conditions and contractors’ attributes. This model can serve as an experimental 
laboratory that can be used by any potential user (owner or contractor) to evaluate and compare 
different bidding strategies and project tendering approaches. It can also serve as an educational 
tool in academic forums and classes to teach construction management students about the bidding 
process and all its complexities and to allow them to observe interesting dynamics and interactions 
between the different market constituents from an outsider’s perspective.  
Second, Chapter 4 introduced a new approach for evaluating the effectiveness of quantitative 
bidding methods in particular Friedman model and Gates model. While the emphasis of the 
previous studies was on validity and reliability of those methods using mathematical arguments 
and retrospective approaches, this study examine their applicability and effectiveness under 
various scenarios using a prospective approach, agent based modeling. The observations and 
results from the experiments conducted in this study were not limited to the above question. It also 
shed some light on the main characteristics of construction bidding environments as observed from 
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micro-behavior of its constituents: contractors and projects. The key conclusions of Chapter 4 are 
the following: 
 Using Friedman model can result in considerably higher number of won projects (higher 
market share) whereas using Gates model can result in higher profit per project. 
 In stable markets comprising rational competitors, the volatility in price of construction 
services can be due to uncertainty in cost estimating arising from factors such as the 
complexity of projects and incomplete contract specifications and information. 
 One factor contributing to the higher variance in the market is varying set of contractors 
participating in biddings. 
 Although the Fine model has shown a good prospect specifically in competition against 
unpredictable contractors, the fact that it ignores bid history of specific competitors makes 
it unfavorable and unreliable in situations where market participants change regularly. 
 With the increase in number of rational, sophisticated contractors the benefits 
unpredictable contractors can get from higher uncertainty in cost estimating will decrease. 
 In markets where there is limitation on number of projects a contractor can secure and the 
bid preparation cost is insignificant (therefore contractors are able to bid on as many 
projects as they want), the choice of bidding decision model is not a major distinguishing 
factor. 
 Imposing the limitation on bonding capacity can make the market less efficient; it decreases 
the gap between more effective and less effective contractors and increase average profit 
per project across the market.  
 Requiring a specific number of bid participants will make the market more efficient, lower 
the average and volatility of market markup, decrease the average profit per project, 
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increase the gap between market share of more effective and less effective contractors, and 
reduce the total profit created for contractors in the market. 
Third, Chapter 5 formulated the complex interaction among contractors’ risk behavior, cost 
estimating and project management skills, and complexity of projects and then investigated their 
impact on contractors’ choice of optimal markup, long-term financial growth and market share. 
The results of this study show: 
 There is a significant impact of a contractor’s risk behavior on its optimal markup and this 
impact is most significant in markets where projects are of high complexity and uncertainty.  
 The inherent risk level of a project is at the core of the markup decision and may result in 
significant inflation of bid prices in the market.  
 Moderately risk averse contractors can financially outperform others in a long run.  
 The comparative performance of slightly and extremely risk averse contractors depend on 
level of cost estimating accuracy and project execution skills of contractors. 
 The contractor’s good financial performance and market survival depends on his own 
characteristics, the market conditions and project attributes.  
 A better accuracy in the cost estimating of projects and more controlled management of 
the construction process generate higher profits for most contractors even when their 
markups decrease.  
 Fourth, Chapter 6 conducted an extensive literature review in order to build a rule-based and 
descriptive markup decision model that replicates behavior of contractors. Then, different 




 Consideration of risk allowance and need for work has significant impact on contractor’s 
financial success in competitive bidding environments.  
 Moderately risk averse contractors consistently outperform other contractors in all market 
conditions including all levels of project risk.  
 Considering up to 2% to 3% discount to account for “Need for Work” component in the 
markup selection led to higher contractors’ chance of financial growth.  
 The optimal policy can be concluded to be moderation in both dimensions of risk attitude 
and need for work.  
 At the limit, not considering need for work and being extremely risk averse appeared to be 
the least effective strategy a contractor can adopt.  
 The higher the projects’ risk and uncertainty within the market, the more competitive 
slightly risk averse contractors are compared to moderately risk averse contractors.  
 Construction market reaches equilibrium where all contractors have gained enough 
information about their competitors. 
The results presented in this dissertation offer new understandings and insights on the construction 
bidding environment and recommendations for both owners and contractors’ competitive success, 
which are not available using conventional approaches. 
8.2. Future works 
Although the current research study was able to fully accomplish its research objectives, a number 
of additional research directions have been identified. The first four suggested future studies are 
in continuation of the developed agent-based models in this dissertation. The last two suggested 
future studies are research problems that I found and formulated when taking a system-of-systems 
approach to understand construction industry.  
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8.2.1. Applying Other Markup Models  
One of main assumptions of the simulation experiments in this study is that contractors are 
interested in the long-term expected profit. Although many characteristics of the simulated market 
is close to the reality of construction markets (for example, markup rates of agent contractors that 
determined by the quantitative methods are very close to the reported markup rate in the real 
construction market), the assumption of the long-term expected profit may not apply to all 
contractors in all situations. Future works can expand on this direction with considering other 
major quantitative methods including (Carr, 1982, 1987; M. Skitmore & Pemberton, 1994) models. 
This needs some considerations because Carr and Skitmore-Pemberton models take the true 
project cost as the reference point and calculate the uncertainties in cost estimation and competitors’ 
bids separately. Components other than mere competition such as opportunity costs (Carr, 1987) 
can be also taken into consideration.  
8.2.2. Adaptive Risk Attitude  
In this dissertation, I conclude that moderately risk averse contractors can outperform others in the 
long run. This is mainly due to their capability in creating a balance between two conflicting 
paradigms: pursuit of market share and profitability. This study assumes that risk attitude of 
contractors are fixed regardless of their financial status or market conditions. While the assumption 
is relevant and valid for investigating the long-term impact of risk attitude on contractors’ 
performance, future studies can relax this assumption. In particular, future works can focus on 
adaptive risk attitude in two main directions. The first step is to study contractors’ organizational 
culture and risk behavior in order to find out whether and when contractors change their risk 
attitude. This would help identifying what information and signals contractors look for in the 
market or their organization in order to act more or less risk averse. Second, new methodologies 
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such as reinforcement learning can be used to help contractors design the optimal dynamic strategy 
according to their organization, competition, and market conditions. This strategy can be later 
experimented and compared against other strategies in the virtual laboratory designed and 
developed in chapter 3. 
8.2.3. Dynamic Market  
The simulation model developed for the study assumed that the demand for construction works is 
constant and there is a constant stream of projects. By formulating and developing a market where 
the demand for construction works is fluctuating, future studies can investigate the following 
research questions. (1) What would be the optimal risk attitude for a contractor in a market where 
the demand is fluctuating? (2) Do contractors revise and modify their attitude towards risk? What 
are their key criteria for this decision? How often do they usually go through this process? (3) Do 
risk adaptive contractors perform better in constant and fluctuating market conditions? 
8.2.4. New Features for Contractors  
In all experiments conducted in this study, the number of contractors in the market was kept fixed 
and there was no newcomer or quitter from the market. Also, the size of a contracting firm was 
considered constant throughout the simulation while it is not always the case in reality. In future 
studies, new behaviors for contractors such as entry, exit, expansion, contraction, alliance, and 
merging can be defined and added to the model if they are aligned with the purpose of the research.  
8.2.5. Assessment of the Impact of Public Spending on Macroeconomics of the American 
Construction Industry 
Using advance econometric methods, this study aims to assess the impact of public spending, 
perceived as a policy tool, on different macroeconomic indicators of the American construction 
industry including but not limited to construction cost, construction employment, and private 
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investment in construction. To better capture the dynamics of construction economics at macro 
level, multi-equation time series models such as VAR and VEC will be constructed among more 
than two variables. Impact assessment of public spending using econometric methods has been 
received attention from researchers in various disciplines such as economics (Fatás & Mihov, 2001; 
Ghali, 1998; Mittnik & Neumann, 2001; Mountford & Uhlig, 2009; Pang & Herrera, 2005; 
Primiceri, 2005), public health (Filmer & Pritchett, 1999), and education (Mandl, Dierx, & 
Ilzkovitz, 2008; Poterba, 1996). While public spending in construction, mostly on infrastructures, 
has been perceived as an effective means for policy makers to regulate or enhance the overall 
economy or specific sectors (Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1992), its impact on macroeconomics of 
the construction industry both in short-term and long-term is not well understood. For example, it 
is not clear yet how construction public spending encourages or discourages private investments 
and whether the government plays a role of a competitor for private developers. Using econometric 
analysis and based on empirical evidences, those scenarios under which construction public 
spending influences the construction industry both positively and negatively will be determined. 
Furthermore, by a closer look at the effects of different types and timing of construction public 
spending, the criteria for the optimal policy will be developed.  
8.2.6. Understanding Complex Interdependencies between the Construction Industry and 
Commodity Markets 
Construction materials constitute a considerable portion of a construction project value and have 
impact on the overall performance of the construction industry. Although there is a rich literature 
on the importance of construction materials management and its impact on construction projects 
and project stakeholders (Gallagher & Riggs, 2006; Thomas, Sanvido, & Sanders, 1989; Wambeke, 
Hsiang, & Liu, 2011), their interdependencies with their production cost components and 
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macroeconomics of the construction industry have been disregarded. It is believed that there is 
dynamic linkages between the construction industry and associated manufacturing industries and 
commodity markets. When most construction materials like concrete and structural steel have 
significant commodity and energy components, understanding the above mentioned 
interdependencies becomes more vital considering the possibility of global impacts through 
commodity markets. Robust econometric methods can be utilized to discern the different types of 
interdependencies (linearity or non-linearity, one-way or two-way linkage, and correlation or 
causality) between construction materials and markets of their commodity and energy components. 
Along with investigating these bilateral relations, one step further can be taken with analyzing how 
macroeconomics of construction industry impacts and/or get impacted by commodity markets such 






LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Ackoff, R. L. (1971). Towards a system of systems concepts. Management science, 17(11), 661-
671.   
AGC, D. T. a. (2000). Insights in Construction.   
Agusdinata, D. B., & DeLaurentis, D. (2008). Specification of system-of-systems for 
policymaking in the energy sector. Integrated Assessment, 8(2).   
Agusdinata, D. B., Fry, D. N., & Delaurentis, D. A. (2011). Policies to deal with multimodal 
transport emissions: a system-of-systems approach. Transportation Planning and 
Technology, 34(2), 109-123.   
Ahmad, I. (1990). Decision-support system for modeling bid/no-bid decision problem. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 116(4), 595-608.   
Ahmad, I., & Minkarah, I. (1988). Questionnaire survey on bidding in construction. Journal of 
Management in Engineering, 4(3), 229-243.  
Ahmad, I., & Minkarah, I. A. (1987). Optimum mark-up for bidding: a preference-uncertainty 
trade off approach. Civil Engineering Systems, 4(4), 170-174.   
Aibinu, A. A., & Pasco, T. (2008). The accuracy of pre‐tender building cost estimates in Australia. 
Construction Management and Economics, 26(12), 1257-1269.   
Akintoye, A. (2000). Analysis of factors influencing project cost estimating practice. Construction 
Management & Economics, 18(1), 77-89.   
Akintoye, A., & Fitzgerald, E. (2000). A survey of current cost estimating practices in the UK. 
Construction Management & Economics, 18(2), 161-172.   
124 
 
Akintoye, A. S., & MacLeod, M. J. (1997). Risk analysis and management in construction. 
International journal of project management, 15(1), 31-38.  
Al-Bahar, J. F., & Crandall, K. C. (1990). Systematic risk management approach for construction 
projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 116(3), 533-546.   
Albin, P., & Foley, D. K. (1992). Decentralized, dispersed exchange without an auctioneer: A 
simulation study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 18(1), 27-51.   
An, S.-H., Kim, G.-H., & Kang, K.-I. (2007). A case-based reasoning cost estimating model using 
experience by analytic hierarchy process. Building and Environment, 42(7), 2573-2579.   
Art Chaovalitwongse, W., Wang, W., Williams, T. P., & Chaovalitwongse, P. (2011). Data mining 
framework to optimize the bid selection policy for competitively bid highway construction 
projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 138(2), 277-286.   
Aschauer, D. A. (1989). Is public expenditure productive? Journal of monetary economics, 23(2), 
177-200.   
Asgari, S., Afshar, A., & Madani, K. (2013). Cooperative Game Theoretic Framework for Joint 
Resource Management in Construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management.   
Attalla, M., & Hegazy, T. (2003). Predicting cost deviation in reconstruction projects: Artificial 
neural networks versus regression. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
129(4), 405-411.   
Axelrod, R. (1997). Advancing the art of simulation in the social sciences Simulating social 
phenomena (pp. 21-40): Springer. 
Axelrod, R. M. (1997). The complexity of cooperation: Agent-based models of competition and 
collaboration: Princeton University Press. 
125 
 
Azar, E., & Menassa, C. C. (2011). Agent-based modeling of occupants and their impact on energy 
use in commercial buildings. Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering.   
Azar, E., & Menassa, C. C. (2013). Framework to Evaluate Energy-Saving Potential from 
Occupancy Interventions in Typical Commercial Buildings in the United States. Journal 
of Computing in Civil Engineering, 28(1), 63-78.   
Baccarini, D. (1996). The concept of project complexity—a review. International Journal of 
Project Management, 14(4), 201-204.   
Baloi, D., & Price, A. D. (2003). Modelling global risk factors affecting construction cost 
performance. International journal of project management, 21(4), 261-269.   
Bankes, S. C. (2002). Tools and techniques for developing policies for complex and uncertain 
systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99(suppl 3), 7263-7266.   
Bashford, H. H. (1996). Small business in the construction industry. Practice Periodical on 
Structural Design and Construction, 1(3), 71-73.   
Bazerman, M., & Moore, D. A. (2012). Judgment in managerial decision making.  
Bernhardt, K. S., & McNeil, S. (2008). Agent-based modeling: approach for improving 
infrastructure management. Journal of Infrastructure Systems.   
Berry, B. J. (1964). Cities as systems within systems of cities. Papers in Regional Science, 13(1), 
147-163.   
Bertelsen, S. (2003a). Complexity–Construction in a new Perspective. IGLC-11, Blacksburg, 
Virginia.   




Bing, L., Tiong, R. L.-K., Fan, W. W., & Chew, D. A.-S. (1999). Risk management in international 
construction joint ventures. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 125(4), 
277-284.   
Boardman, J., & Sauser, B. (2006). System of Systems-the meaning of of. Paper presented at the 
System of Systems Engineering, 2006 IEEE/SMC International Conference on. 
Bonabeau, E. (2002). Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for simulating human 
systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99(suppl 3), 7280-7287.   
Boughton, P. D. (1987). The competitive bidding process: beyond probability models. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 16(2), 87-94.   
Bower, J., & Bunn, D. (2001). Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus 
discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 25(3), 561-592.   
Brockmann, C. (2010). 3 Collusion and corruption in the construction sector. Modern Construction 
Economics: Theory and Application, 29.   
Buchanan, M. (2009). Economics: meltdown modelling. Nature, 460(7256), 680-682.   
Bunn, D. W., & Oliveira, F. S. (2001). Agent-based simulation-an application to the new electricity 
trading arrangements of England and Wales. Evolutionary Computation, IEEE 
Transactions on, 5(5), 493-503.   
Cagno, E., Caron, F., & Perego, A. (2001). Multi-criteria assessment of the probability of winning 
in the competitive bidding process. International Journal of Project Management, 19(6), 
313-324.   
Carlock, P. G., & Fenton, R. E. (2001). System of systems (SoS) enterprise systems engineering 
for information‐intensive organizations. Systems Engineering, 4(4), 242-261.   
127 
 
Carr, R. I. (1982). General bidding model. Journal of the Construction Division, 108(4), 639-650.  
Carr, R. I. (1983). Impact of number of bidders on competition. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 109(1), 61-73.   
Carr, R. I. (1987). Competitive bidding and opportunity costs. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 113(1), 151-165.   
Carr, R. I., & Sandahl, J. W. (1978). Bidding strategy using multiple regression. Journal of the 
Construction Division, 104(1), 15-26.   
Chandrashekar, N., Gautam, S., Srinivas, K., & Vijayananda, J. (2007). Realizing a generic 
medical image repository for system of systems. Paper presented at the Commercial-off-
the-Shelf (COTS)-Based Software Systems, 2007. ICCBSS'07. Sixth International IEEE 
Conference on. 
Chao, L. C. (2007). Fuzzy logic model for determining minimum bid markup. Computer‐Aided 
Civil and Infrastructure Engineering, 22(6), 449-460.   
Chen, J., Jain, R. K., & Taylor, J. E. (2013). Block Configuration Modeling: A novel simulation 
model to emulate building occupant peer networks and their impact on building energy 
consumption. Applied Energy, 105, 358-368.   
Chen, S.-H., & Yeh, C.-H. (2001). Evolving traders and the business school with genetic 
programming: A new architecture of the agent-based artificial stock market. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(3), 363-393.   
Chua, D., & Li, D. (2000). Key factors in bid reasoning model. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 126(5), 349-357.   
Chua, D., Li, D., & Chan, W. (2001). Case-based reasoning approach in bid decision making. 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 127(1), 35-45.   
128 
 
Cincotti, S., Raberto, M., & Teglio, A. (2010). Credit money and macroeconomic instability in the 
agent-based model and simulator Eurace. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment 
E-Journal, 4.   
Cincotti, S., Raberto, M., & Teglio, A. (2012). The Eurace macroeconomic model and simulator. 
Paper presented at the Agent-based Dynamics, Norms, and Corporate Governance. The 
proceedings of the 16-th World Congress of the International Economic Association, 
Palgrave. 
Cooke, A. J. (1996). Economics and construction: Macmillan London. 
Crooks, A., Castle, C., & Batty, M. (2008). Key challenges in agent-based modelling for geo-
spatial simulation. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 32(6), 417-430.   
Crowley, L. G. (2000). Friedman and Gates-Another Look. Journal of Construction Engineering 
and Management, 126(4), 306-312.   
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2.   
Dawid, H., Gemkow, S., Harting, P., Van der Hoog, S., & Neugart, M. (2012). The eurace@ unibi 
model: An agent-based macroeconomic model for economic policy analysis.   
de Neufville, R., & King, D. (1991). Risk and need-for-work premiums in contractor bidding. 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 117(4), 659-673.   
De Valence, G. (2010). Modern Construction Economics: Theory and Application: Routledge. 
Deissenberg, C., Van Der Hoog, S., & Dawid, H. (2008). EURACE: A massively parallel agent-
based model of the European economy. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 204(2), 
541-552.   
129 
 
DeLaurentis, D. (2005a). A taxonomy-based perspective for systems of systems design methods. 
Paper presented at the Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2005 IEEE International Conference 
on. 
DeLaurentis, D. (2005b). Understanding transportation as a system-of-systems design problem. 
Paper presented at the 43rd AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit. 
DeLaurentis, D., & Callaway, R. K. (2004). A system‐of‐systems perspective for public policy 
decisions. Review of Policy Research, 21(6), 829-837.   
DeLaurentis, D. A., Crossley, W. A., & Mane, M. (2011). Taxonomy to guide systems-of-systems 
decision-making in air transportation problems. Journal of Aircraft, 48(3), 760-770.   
DeLaurentis, P.-C., & DeLaurentis, D. (2010). Consideration of system of systems and service 
systems as complimentary approaches for healthcare problems. Paper presented at the 
System of Systems Engineering (SoSE), 2010 5th International Conference on. 
Dosi, G., & Orsenigo, L. (1994). Macrodynamics and microfoundations: an evolutionary 
perspective. Economics of Technology//Amsterdam: North-Holland, 91-123.   
Dozzi, S. P., AbouRizk, S., & Schroeder, S. (1996). Utility-theory model for bid markup decisions. 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 122(2), 119-124.   
Drew, D., & Skitmore, M. (1997). The effect of contract type and size on competitiveness in 
bidding. Construction Management & Economics, 15(5), 469-489.   
Drew, D. S. (2010). 4 Competing in construction auctions. Modern Construction Economics: 
Theory and Application, 63.   
Drew, D. S., & Skitmore, M. (2006). Testing Vickery’s revenue equivalence theory in construction 
auctions. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 132(4), 425-428.   
130 
 
Dubois, A., & Gadde, L.-E. (2002). The construction industry as a loosely coupled system: 
implications for productivity and innovation. Construction Management & Economics, 
20(7), 621-631.   
Dulaimi, M. F., & Shan, H. G. (2002). The factors influencing bid mark-up decisions of large-and 
medium-size contractors in Singapore. Construction Management & Economics, 20(7), 
601-610.   
Egemen, M., & Mohamed, A. N. (2007). A framework for contractors to reach strategically correct 
bid/no bid and mark-up size decisions. Building and Environment, 42(3), 1373-1385.   
El-Adaway, I. H., & Kandil, A. A. (2009). Multiagent system for construction dispute resolution 
(MAS-COR). Journal of Construction Engineering and Management.   
El-Mashaleh, M. S. (2012). Empirical framework for making the bid/no-bid decision. Journal of 
Management in Engineering, 29(3), 200-205.   
Farmer, J. D., & Foley, D. (2009). The economy needs agent-based modelling. Nature, 460(7256), 
685-686.   
Farmer, J. D., Gallegati, M., Hommes, C., Kirman, A., Ormerod, P., Cincotti, S., . . . Helbing, D. 
(2012). A complex systems approach to constructing better models for managing financial 
markets and the economy. The European Physical Journal Special Topics, 214(1), 295-
324.   
Fatás, A., & Mihov, I. (2001). The effects of fiscal policy on consumption and employment: theory 
and evidence (Vol. 2760): Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Fayek, A. (1998). Competitive bidding strategy model and software system for bid preparation. 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 124(1), 1-10.   
131 
 
Fekete, K., Nikolovski, S., Puzak, D., Slipac, G., & Keko, H. (2008). Agent-based modelling 
application possibilities for Croatian electricity market simulation. Paper presented at the 
Electricity Market, 2008. EEM 2008. 5th International Conference on European. 
Filatova, T., Parker, D., & Van der Veen, A. (2009). Agent-based urban land markets: agent's 
pricing behavior, land prices and urban land use change. Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation, 12(1), 3.   
Filmer, D., & Pritchett, L. (1999). The impact of public spending on health: does money matter? 
Social science & medicine, 49(10), 1309-1323.   
Fine, B. Various unpublished papers based on work of the Costain OR Group.   
Flyvbjerg, B., Skamris Holm, M. K., & Buhl, S. L. (2003). How common and how large are cost 
overruns in transport infrastructure projects? Transport reviews, 23(1), 71-88.   
Friedman, L. (1956). A competitive-bidding strategy. Operations research, 4(1), 104-112.   
Fuerst, M. (1976). Bidding models: truths and comments. Journal of the Construction Division, 
102(1), 169-177.   
Gallagher, J., & Riggs, F. (2006). Material price escalation: Allocating the risks. Construction 
Briefings(2006-12).   
Gates, M. (1967). Bidding strategies and probabilities. Journal of the Construction Engrg. Division, 
93(1), 75-110.  
Geanakoplos, J., Axtell, R., Farmer, D. J., Howitt, P., Conlee, B., Goldstein, J., . . . Yang, C.-Y. 
(2012). Getting at systemic risk via an agent-based model of the housing market. The 
American Economic Review, 102(3), 53-58.   
Ghali, K. H. (1998). Public investment and private capital formation in a vector error-correction 
model of growth. Applied Economics, 30(6), 837-844.   
132 
 
Gidado, K. (1996). Project complexity: The focal point of construction production planning. 
Construction Management & Economics, 14(3), 213-225.   
Gilbert, G. N. (2008). Agent-based models: Sage. 
Gordon, C. M. (1994). Choosing appropriate construction contracting method. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management.   
Grigoroudis, E., & Phillis, Y. (2013). Modeling healthcare system-of-systems: a mathematical 
programming approach. Systems Journal, IEEE, 7(4), 571-580.   
Grimm, V., Berger, U., DeAngelis, D. L., Polhill, J. G., Giske, J., & Railsback, S. F. (2010). The 
ODD protocol: a review and first update. Ecological modelling, 221(23), 2760-2768.   
Gruneberg, S. L. (1997). Construction economics: an introduction: Macmillan London. 
Han, E., & DeLaurentis, D. (2006). A network theory-based approach for modeling a system-of-
systems. Paper presented at the 11th AIAA/ISSMO Multidisciplinary Analysis and 
optimization conference. 
Han, M., Fan, Y., & Guo, W. (2005). A modified neural network based on subtractive clustering 
for bidding system. Paper presented at the Neural Networks and Brain, 2005. ICNN&B'05. 
International Conference on. 
Han, S. H., & Diekmann, J. E. (2001). Making a risk-based bid decision for overseas construction 
projects. Construction Management & Economics, 19(8), 765-776.   
Harris, F., & McCaffer, R. (2013). Modern construction management: John Wiley & Sons. 
Haskins, C., & Forsberg, K. (2011). International Council on Systems Engineering. Systems 
Engineering Handbook: A Guide for System Life Cycle Processes and Activities.   
Hastak, M., & Shaked, A. (2000). ICRAM-1: Model for international construction risk assessment. 
Journal of Management in Engineering, 16(1), 59-69.   
133 
 
Hatush, Z., & Skitmore, M. (1997). Criteria for contractor selection. Construction Management & 
Economics, 15(1), 19-38.   
Hegazy, T., & Moselhi, O. (1994). Analogy-based solution to markup estimation problem. Journal 
of Computing in Civil Engineering, 8(1), 72-87.   
Hegazy, T., & Moselhi, O. (1995). Elements of cost estimation: a survey in Canada and the United 
States. Cost Engineering-Morgantown, 37(5), 27-34.   
Hillebrandt, P. M. (2000). Economic theory and the construction industry: Macmillan London. 
Ho, S. P., & Hsu, Y. (2013). Bid compensation theory and strategies for projects with 
heterogeneous bidders: A game theoretic analysis. Journal of Management in Engineering, 
30(5), 04014022.   
Holt, G. D. (1998). Which contractor selection methodology? International Journal of project 
management, 16(3), 153-164.   
Howitt, P., & Clower, R. (2000). The emergence of economic organization. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 41(1), 55-84.   
Ibbs, C. W., & Crandall, K. C. (1982). Construction Risk: Multivariate Approach. Journal of the 
Construction Division, 108(2), 187-200.   
Ioannou, P. G. (1988). Bidding models-symmetry and state of information. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 114(2), 214-232.   
Izumi, K., & Ueda, K. (1998). Emergent phenomena in a foreign exchange market: analysis based 
on an artificial market approach. Paper presented at the Artificial Life VI. 
Izumi, K., & Ueda, K. (2001). Phase transition in a foreign exchange market-analysis based on an 
artificial market approach. Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on, 5(5), 456-
470.   
134 
 
Jamshidi, M. (2008). System of systems engineering-New challenges for the 21st century. 
Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine, IEEE, 23(5), 4-19.   
Kangari, R. (1995). Risk management perceptions and trends of US construction. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 121(4), 422-429.   
Kartam, N. A., & Kartam, S. A. (2001). Risk and its management in the Kuwaiti construction 
industry: a contractors’ perspective. International journal of project management, 19(6), 
325-335.   
Kilicay-Ergin, N., & Dagli, C. (2008). Executable modeling for system of systems architecting: An 
artificial life framework. Paper presented at the Systems Conference, 2008 2nd Annual 
IEEE. 
Kim, H.-J., & Reinschmidt, K. F. (2010). Effects of contractors’ risk attitude on competition in 
construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 137(4), 275-283.   
Kim, H.-J., & Reinschmidt, K. F. (2011). Market structure and organizational performance of 
construction organizations. Journal of Management in Engineering.   
King, M., & Mercer, A. (1985). Problems in determining bidding strategies. Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 915-923.   
King, M., & Mercer, A. (1987). Note on a conflict of assumptions in bidding models. European 
journal of operational research, 32(3), 462-466.   
King, M., & Mercer, A. (1990). The optimum markup when bidding with uncertain costs. 
European journal of operational research, 47(3), 348-363.   
Kirman, A. P. (1997). The economy as an interactive system. Paper presented at the SANTA FE 




Knežević, G., Fekete, K., & Nikolovski, S. (2010). Applying agent-based modeling to electricity 
market simulation. Paper presented at the MIPRO, 2010 Proceedings of the 33rd 
International Convention. 
Kotov, V. (1997). Systems of systems as communicating structures. Object-oriented technology 
and computing systems re-engineering, 141-154.   
Koushki, P., Al‐Rashid, K., & Kartam, N. (2005). Delays and cost increases in the construction 
of private residential projects in Kuwait. Construction Management and Economics, 23(3), 
285-294.   
Krishna, V. (2010). Auction theory 2nd ed: Academic Press. 
Lan Oo, B., Lo, H.-P., & Teck-Heng Lim, B. (2012). The effect of bidding success in construction 
bidding. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 19(1), 25-39.   
Lane, J. A., & Valerdi, R. (2007). Synthesizing SoS concepts for use in cost modeling. Systems 
Engineering, 10(4), 297-308.  
Laryea, S., & Hughes, W. (2010). Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management.   
LeBaron, B. (2000). Agent-based computational finance: Suggested readings and early research. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24(5), 679-702.   
LeBaron, B. (2001). Empirical regularities from interacting long-and short-memory investors in 
an agent-based stock market. Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on, 5(5), 442-
455.   
Leitch, J. (2000). Profits up- share prices down. Contract Journal, 12, 17-18.   
136 
 
Lewe, J.-H., & DeLaurentis, D. A. (2004). Entity-centric abstraction and modeling of future 
transportation architectures. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 45th Transportation 
Research Forum, Evanston, IL, Paper 2C-4. 
Lewe, J., DeLaurentis, D. A., & Mavris, D. N. (2004). Foundation for study of future 
transportation systems through agent-based simulation. Paper presented at the 24th 
International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences. 
Lewis, G., Morris, E., Place, P., Simanta, S., Smith, D., & Wrage, L. (2008). Engineering systems 
of systems. Paper presented at the Systems Conference, 2008 2nd Annual IEEE. 
Li, H., & Love, P. E. (1999). Combining rule-based expert systems and artificial neural networks 
for mark-up estimation. Construction Management & Economics, 17(2), 169-176.   
Li, H., Shen, L., & Love, P. (1999). ANN-based mark-up estimation system with self-explanatory 
capacities. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 125(3), 185-189.   
Liu, L., & Zhu, K. (2007). Improving cost estimates of construction projects using phased cost 
factors. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 133(1), 91-95.   
Liu, M., & Ling, Y. Y. (2003). Using fuzzy neural network approach to estimate contractors’ 
markup. Building and Environment, 38(11), 1303-1308.   
Liu, M., & Ling, Y. Y. (2005). Modeling a contractor’s markup estimation. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 131(4), 391-399.   
Liu, S. (2011). Employing system of systems engineering in China's emergency management. 
Systems Journal, IEEE, 5(2), 298-308.   
Liu, X., Yang, J., & Tang, B. (2007). A new agent-based artificial stock market with short-term 
dynamics. Paper presented at the Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile 
Computing, 2007. WiCom 2007. International Conference on. 
137 
 
Lowe, D., & Skitmore, M. (1994). Experiential learning in cost estimating. Construction 
Management and Economics, 12(5), 423-431.   
Lyons, T., & Skitmore, M. (2004). Project risk management in the Queensland engineering 
construction industry: a survey. International journal of project management, 22(1), 51-
61.   
Magliocca, N., Safirova, E., McConnell, V., & Walls, M. (2011). An economic agent-based model 
of coupled housing and land markets (CHALMS). Computers, Environment and Urban 
Systems, 35(3), 183-191.   
Mahdavi, A., & Hastak, M. (2014). Quantitative Analysis of bidding strategies: a hybrid agent 
based–system dynamics approach. Constr. res. congr, 1129-1138.   
Maier, M. W. (1996). Architecting principles for systems‐of‐systems. Paper presented at the 
INCOSE International Symposium. 
Mandl, U., Dierx, A., & Ilzkovitz, F. (2008). The effectiveness and efficiency of public spending: 
Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission. 
Mansouri, M., Gorod, A., Wakeman, T., & Sauser, B. (2010). System of systems approach to 
maritime transportation governance. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the 
Transportation Research Board(2166), 66-73.   
Mansouri, M., Gorod, A., Wakeman, T. H., & Sauser, B. (2009). Maritime transportation system 
of systems management framework: a system of systems engineering approach. 
International Journal of Ocean Systems Management, 1(2), 200-226.   
Manthorpe, W. H. (1996). The emerging joint system of systems: A systems engineering challenge 
and opportunity for APL. Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, 17(3), 305.   
138 
 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization science, 
2(1), 71-87.   
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations.   
Marzouk, M., & Moselhi, O. (2003). A decision support tool for construction bidding. 
Construction Innovation, 3(2), 111-124.   
Meen, D., & Meen, G. (2003). Social behaviour as a basis for modelling the urban housing market: 
a review. Urban Studies, 40(5-6), 917-935.   
Metcalfe, J. S., & Foster, J. (2007). Evolution and economic complexity: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Miller, L. C. (1962). Successful management for contractors: McGraw-Hill. 
Mitchell, M. (1977). The probability of being the lowest bidder. Applied Statistics, 191-194.   
Mittnik, S., & Neumann, T. (2001). Dynamic effects of public investment: vector autoregressive 
evidence from six industrialized countries. Empirical Economics, 26(2), 429-446.   
Mizuta, H., & Steiglitz, K. (2000). Agent-based simulation of dynamic online auctions. Paper 
presented at the Simulation Conference, 2000. Proceedings. Winter. 
Morin, T. L., & Clough, R. H. (1969). OPBID: Competitive bidding strategy model. Journal of 
the Construction Division.   
Mostafavi, A., Abraham, D., & DeLaurentis, D. (2013). Ex-ante policy analysis in civil 
infrastructure systems. Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering.   
Mostafavi, A., Abraham, D. M., & Lee, J. (2012). System-of-systems approach for assessment of 
financial innovations in infrastructure. Built Environment Project and Asset Management, 
2(2), 250-265.  
Mountford, A., & Uhlig, H. (2009). What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks? Journal of applied 
econometrics, 24(6), 960-992.   
139 
 
Munnell, A. H. (1992). Policy watch: infrastructure investment and economic growth. The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 189-198.   
Myers, D. (2013). Construction economics: A new approach: Routledge. 
Neugart, M. (2008). Labor market policy evaluation with ACE. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 67(2), 418-430.   
Ngai, S. C., Drew, D. S., Lo, H. P., & Skitmore, M. (2002). A theoretical framework for 
determining the minimum number of bidders in construction bidding competitions. 
Construction Management & Economics, 20(6), 473-482.   
Nicolaisen, J., Petrov, V., & Tesfatsion, L. (2001). Market power and efficiency in a computational 
electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing. Evolutionary Computation, 
IEEE Transactions on, 5(5), 504-523.   
Noam, E. M. (1994). Beyond liberalization: From the network of networks to the system of 
systems. Telecommunications Policy, 18(4), 286-294.   
North, M., Conzelmann, G., Koritarov, V., Macal, C., Thimmapuram, P., & Veselka, T. (2002). 
E-laboratories: agent-based modeling of electricity markets. Paper presented at the 2002 
American Power Conference. 
Ofori, G. (1990). The construction industry: aspects of its economics and management: NUS Press. 
Ofori, G. (1994). Establishing construction economics as an academic discipline. Construction 
Management and Economics, 12(4), 295-306.   
Ogunlana, S., & Thorpe, A. (1991). The nature of estimating accuracy: Developing correct 
associations. Building and Environment, 26(2), 77-86.   
140 
 
Oo, B.-L., Drew, D. S., & Lo, H.-P. (2008a). A comparison of contractors’ decision to bid 
behaviour according to different market environments. International Journal of project 
management, 26(4), 439-447.   
Oo, B.-L., Drew, D. S., & Lo, H.-P. (2008b). Heterogeneous approach to modeling contractors' 
decision-to-bid strategies. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 134(10), 
766-775.   
Oo, B.-L., Drew, D. S., & Lo, H.-P. (2010). Modeling the heterogeneity in contractors’ mark-up 
behavior. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 136(7), 720-729.   
Osmundson, J. S., Langford, G. O., & Huynh, T. V. (2009). Emergent Behavior in an Unregulated 
Financial System of Systems: Economic Meltdown. Paper presented at the INCOSE 
International Symposium. 
Page, S. E. (2005). Agent based models. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York.   
Palmer, R., Arthur, W. B., Holland, J. H., & LeBaron, B. (1999). An artificial stock market. 
Artificial Life and Robotics, 3(1), 27-31.   
Pang, G., & Herrera, S. (2005). Efficiency of public spending in developing countries: an 
efficiency frontier approach. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper(3645).   
Park, W. R., & Chapin, W. B. (1992). Construction bidding: Strategic pricing for profit (Vol. 74): 
Wiley-Interscience. 
Ping Ho, S. (2005). Bid compensation decision model for projects with costly bid preparation. 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 131(2), 151-159.   
Poterba, J. M. (1996). Demographic structure and the political economy of public education: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
141 
 
Primiceri, G. E. (2005). Time varying structural vector autoregressions and monetary policy. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 72(3), 821-852.   
Pruyt, E., & Thissen, W. (2007). Transition of the european electricity system and system of 
systems concepts. Paper presented at the System of Systems Engineering, 2007. SoSE'07. 
IEEE International Conference on. 
Raftery, J. (1991). Principles of building economics: an introduction: BSP Professional Books. 
Rice, H., & Heimbach, A. (2007). Why contractors fail: a causal analysis of large contractor 
bankruptcies. FMI Quarterly, 2, 52-74.   
Robbins, L. (2007). An essay on the nature and significance of economic science: Ludwig von 
Mises Institute. 
Rosenshine, M. (1972). Bidding Models: Resolution of a Controversey. Journal of the 
Construction Engrg. Division, 98(1), 143-148.   
Roumeliotis, G. (2011). Global construction growth to outpace GDP this decade. Reuters. 
Runeson, G., & Skitmore, M. (1999). Tendering theory revisited. Construction Management & 
Economics, 17(3), 285-296.   
Russell, S., & Norvig, P. (1995). Artificial intelligence: a modern approach.   
Rusu, A., Taggart, D., Desmond, K., & Lopez, H. (2013). Intelligent and defensive framework for 
decision-making systems-of-systems with applications to healthcare. Paper presented at the 
Systems Conference (SysCon), 2013 IEEE International. 
Sage, A. P., & Cuppan, C. D. (2001). On the systems engineering and management of systems of 
systems and federations of systems. Information, Knowledge, Systems Management, 2(4), 
325-345.   
142 
 
Said, H., Kandil, A., Nookala, S. B. S., Cai, H., El-Gafy, M., Senouci, A., & Al-Derham, H. (2013). 
Modeling of the sustainability goal and objective setting process in the predesign phase of 
green institutional building projects. Journal of Architectural Engineering.   
Sargent, R. G. (2013). Verification and validation of simulation models. Journal of Simulation, 
7(1), 12-24.   
Seydel, J., & Olson, D. L. (1990). Bids considering multiple criteria. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 116(4), 609-623.   
Shash, A. A. (1993). Factors considered in tendering decisions by top UK contractors. 
Construction management and economics, 11(2), 111-118.   
Shen, L., Drew, D., & Zhang, Z. (1999). Optimal bid model for price-time biparameter 
construction contracts. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 125(3), 
204-209.   
Simon, H. A. (1965). Administrative behavior (Vol. 4): Cambridge Univ Press. 
Skitmore, M. (1991). The construction contract bidder homogeneity assumption: An empirical test. 
Construction management and economics, 9(5), 403-429.   
Skitmore, M., & Pemberton, J. (1994). A multivariate approach to construction contract bidding 
mark-up strategies. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1263-1272.   
Skitmore, M., Runeson, G., & Chang, X. (2006). Construction price formation: full‐cost pricing 
or neoclassical microeconomic theory? Construction management and economics, 24(7), 
773-783.   
Skitmore, R. M., & Ng, S. T. (2003). Forecast models for actual construction time and cost. 
Building and Environment, 38(8), 1075-1083.   
143 
 
Skitmore, R. M., Pettitt, A. N., & McVinish, R. (2007). Gates’ bidding model. Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 133(11), 855-863.   
Smith, G. R., & Bohn, C. M. (1999). Small to medium contractor contingency and assumption of 
risk. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 125(2), 101-108.   
Stark, R. M. (1968). Unbalanced bidding models-theory. Journal of the Construction Engrg. 
Division, 94(2), 197-210.   
Tassier, T., & Menczer, F. (2001). Emerging small-world referral networks in evolutionary labor 
markets. Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on, 5(5), 482-492.   
Tay, N. S., & Linn, S. C. (2001). Fuzzy inductive reasoning, expectation formation and the 
behavior of security prices. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(3), 321-361.   
Teglio, A., Raberto, M., & Cincotti, S. (2010). Endogenous credit dynamics as source of business 
cycles in the EURACE model Progress in Artificial Economics (pp. 203-214): Springer. 
Tesfatsion, L. (1997a). HOW ECONOMISTS CAN GET ALIFE1.   
Tesfatsion, L. (1997b). A trade network game with endogenous partner selection: Springer. 
Tesfatsion, L. (1998). Preferential partner selection in evolutionary labor markets: A study in 
agent-based computational economics. Paper presented at the Evolutionary programming 
VII. 
Tesfatsion, L. (2002). Agent-based computational economics: Growing economies from the 
bottom up. Artificial life, 8(1), 55-82.   
Tesfatsion, L. (2006). Agent-based computational economics: A constructive approach to 
economic theory. Handbook of computational economics, 2, 831-880.   
144 
 
Thomas, H. R., Sanvido, V. E., & Sanders, S. R. (1989). Impact of material management on 
productivity-A case study. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 115(3), 
370-384.   
Unsal, H. I., & Taylor, J. E. (2010). Modeling interfirm dependency: Game theoretic simulation 
to examine the holdup problem in project networks. Journal of Construction Engineering 
and Management, 137(4), 284-293.   
Unsal, H. I., & Taylor, J. E. (2011). An empirical investigation of opportunistic behaviour in 
project networks and its impact on market efficiency. The Engineering Project 
Organization Journal, 1(2), 95-106.   
Valluri, A., North, M. J., & Macal, C. M. (2009). Reinforcement learning in supply chains. 
International journal of neural systems, 19(05), 331-344.   
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of 
finance, 16(1), 8-37.   
Voudouris, V., Stasinopoulos, D., Rigby, R., & Di Maio, C. (2011). The ACEGES laboratory for 
energy policy: exploring the production of crude oil. Energy Policy, 39(9), 5480-5489.   
Vriend, N. J. (1995). Self-organization of markets: An example of a computational approach. 
Computational Economics, 8(3), 205-231.   
Wade, R. L., & Harris, R. B. (1976). LOMARK: a bidding strategy. Journal of the Construction 
Division, 102(1), 197-211.   
Wambeke, B. W., Hsiang, S. M., & Liu, M. (2011). Causes of variation in construction project 
task starting times and duration. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
137(9), 663-677.   
145 
 
Wang, W. C., Dzeng, R. J., & Lu, Y. H. (2007). Integration of simulation‐based cost model and 
multi‐criteria evaluation model for bid price decisions. Computer‐Aided Civil and 
Infrastructure Engineering, 22(3), 223-235.   
Weidlich, A., & Veit, D. (2008). A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market 
models. Energy Economics, 30(4), 1728-1759.   
Weisbuch, G., Kirman, A., & Herreiner, D. (1997). Market organisation: Springer. 
Weisbuch, G., Kirman, A., & Herreiner, D. (2000). Market organisation and trading relationships. 
The economic journal, 110(463), 411-436.   
Wickramasinghe, N., Chalasani, S., Boppana, R. V., & Madni, A. M. (2007). Healthcare system 
of systems. Paper presented at the System of Systems Engineering, 2007. SoSE'07. IEEE 
International Conference on. 
Wickramasinghe, N., Chalasani, S., & Koritala, S. (2012). The role of healthcare system of systems 
and collaborative technologies in providing superior healthcare delivery to native 
american patients. Paper presented at the System Science (HICSS), 2012 45th Hawaii 
International Conference on. 
Wilhite, A. (2001). Bilateral trade and ‘small-world’networks. Computational Economics, 18(1), 
49-64.   
Willenbrock, J. H. (1973). Utility function determination for bidding models. Journal of the 
Construction Division, 99(1), 133-153.   
Windrum, P., Fagiolo, G., & Moneta, A. (2007). Empirical validation of agent-based models: 
Alternatives and prospects. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 10(2), 8. 
146 
 
Wood, H. L., & Gidado, K. (2008). An overview of complexity theory and its application the 
construction industry. Paper presented at the 24th Annual ARCOM Conference. Cardiff, 
UK, Association of Researchers in Construction Management. 
Xiang, X., Kennedy, R., Madey, G., & Cabaniss, S. (2005). Verification and validation of agent-
based scientific simulation models. Paper presented at the Agent-Directed Simulation 
Conference. 
XJTechnologies. (2011). Anylogic overview.   
Ye, K., Li, B., & Shen, L. (2012). Key factors considered in compiling tender prices for China’s 
public works projects. Journal of Management in Engineering, 29(3), 206-215.   
Ye, K., Shen, L., Xia, B., & Li, B. (2014). Key attributes underpinning different markup decision 
between public and private projects: A China study. International Journal of Project 
Management, 32(3), 461-472.   
Zhi, H. (1995). Risk management for overseas construction projects. International journal of 
project management, 13(4), 231-237.   
Zhou, H., Jiang, J., & Zeng, W. (2010). An agent-based finance market model with the continuous 
double auction mechanism. Paper presented at the Intelligent Systems (GCIS), 2010 
Second WRI Global Congress on. 
Zhou, Z., Wang, J., & Botterud, A. (2011). Agent-based electricity market simulation with plug-
in hybrid electric vehicle penetration. Paper presented at the Power and Energy Society 
General Meeting, 2011 IEEE. 
Zhou, Z., Zhao, F., & Wang, J. (2011). Agent-based electricity market simulation with demand 






Appendix 1 - Algorithm of Friedman markup function in Chapter 4 
1- Find competitors of a contractor for a given project 
Place the related codes here!  
2- Find common projects of the contractor and each of the competitors  
3- Calculate the bid-to-cost ratio for all common projects  
4- Determining the mean and variance of bid-to-cost ratios of the common projects for each 
contractor 
5- Add those means and variances to the collection of “Means” and “Variances” 
6- Find the probability of winning using Friedman model  
7- Find the optimal markup; the one that maximizes the expected profit.   
 
Appendix 2 - Java codes of Friedman markup function in Chapter 4 






if( inBiddingHistory.size() > learning ){ 
 
 for(Contractor c: get_Main().allContractors){ 
  
  if( get_Main().projects.get(i).interestedContractors.contains(c) == true 
&& c != this )  
  competitors.add(c); 
 } 
 
 // Determining Mean & Variance of previous bid prices   








  for(int n = 0; n < biddingHistory.size() -1 ; n++){ 
  
   if( this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n) != infinity && 
c.bidPriceHistory.get(n) != infinity ){ 
   this.commonBiddingHistory.add( n ); 
   sum += c.bidPriceHistory.get(n)/this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n); 
   } 
  } 
   
  if( this.commonBiddingHistory.size() < 1 ) 
  mean = 1.1; 
  else 
  mean = sum/this.commonBiddingHistory.size(); 
   
  sum=0; 
  for(int n = 0; n < biddingHistory.size() -1 ; n++){ 
   
   if( this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n) != infinity && 
c.bidPriceHistory.get(n) != infinity ){ 
   sum += 
sqr( (c.bidPriceHistory.get(n)/this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n)) - mean ); 
   } 
  } 
   
  if( this.commonBiddingHistory.size() < 1 ) 
  variance = 0.04;   
  else 






 double factor=1; 
 double expectedProfit = 1; 
 double optimalProfit = 0; 
 
 // Determining the optimalMarkUp when there is enough historical data  
 while ( factor <= 1.3 ){ 
 double probOfWin = 1; 
  
  for( int m=0; m < competitors.size(); m++ ){ 
  double x = 0; 
  x = (factor - means.get(m)) / ( sqrt(variances.get(m)) ) ;  
  probOfWin = ( 1 - get_Main().Q(x) ) * probOfWin ;  
  } 
   
  expectedProfit = probOfWin * (factor-1) * estimatedCost; 
  
  if(expectedProfit >= optimalProfit){ 
  optimalProfit = expectedProfit; 
  optimalMarkup = factor; 
  } 
    





return optimalMarkup;  
} 
 





Appendix 3 - Algorithm of Fine (the lowest-bid) markup function in Chapter 4 
1- Find the lowest bid in all previous projects of the contractor  
Place the related codes here!  
2- Calculate the bid-to-cost ratio for all the previous projects  
3- Determining the mean and variance of bid-to-cost ratios of the previous projects  
4- Find the probability of winning   
5- Find the optimal markup; the one that maximizes the expected profit. 
 
Appendix 4 - Java codes of Fine (the lowest-bid) markup function used in Chapter 4 






if( inBiddingHistory.size() > learning ){ 
 






  for(int n = 0; n < biddingHistory.size() -1 ; n++){ 
  
   if( this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n) != infinity ){ 
     
    sum += 
this.lowestPrice.get(n)/this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n); 
   } 
  } 
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  if( this.inBiddingHistory.size() < 2 ) 
  mean = 1.05; 
  else 
  mean = sum/this.inBiddingHistory.size(); 
   
  sum=0; 
  for(int n = 0; n < biddingHistory.size() -1 ; n++){ 
   
   if( this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n) != infinity && 
this.bidPriceHistory.get(n) != infinity ){ 
   sum += 
sqr( ( this.lowestPrice.get(n)/this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n) ) - mean ); 
   } 
  } 
   
  if( this.inBiddingHistory.size() < 2 ) 
  variance = 0.02;   
  else 




 double factor=1; 
 double expectedProfit = 1; 
 double optimalProfit = 0; 
 
 // Determining the optimalMarkUp when there is enough historical data  
 while ( factor <= 1.3 ){ 
 double probOfWin = 1; 
  
  double x = (factor - mean) / ( sqrt(variance) ) ;  
  probOfWin = ( 1 - get_Main().Q(x) ) * probOfWin ;  
   
   
  expectedProfit = probOfWin * (factor-1) * estimatedCost; 
  
  if(expectedProfit >= optimalProfit){ 
  optimalProfit = expectedProfit; 
  optimalMarkup = factor; 
  } 
    













Appendix 5 - Java codes of Friedman-Utility markup function used in Chapter 5 






if (get_Main().projects.get(i).complexity == 1) 
 estimatedCostCV = 0.05; 
else if (get_Main().projects.get(i).complexity == 2) 
 estimatedCostCV = 0.1; 
else 
 estimatedCostCV = 0.2; 
 
if( inBiddingHistory.size() > learning ){ 
 
 for(Contractor c: get_Main().allContractors){ 
  
  if( get_Main().projects.get(i).interestedContractors.contains(c) == true 
&& c != this )  
  competitors.add(c); 
 } 
 
 // Determining Mean & Variance of previous bid prices   






  for(int n = 0; n < biddingHistory.size() - 1 ; n++){ 
  
   if( this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n) != infinity && 
c.bidPriceHistory.get(n) != infinity ){ 
   this.commonBiddingHistory.add( n ); 
   sum += c.bidPriceHistory.get(n)/this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n); 
   } 
  } 
   
  if( this.commonBiddingHistory.size() < 1 ) 
  mean = 1.1; 
  else 
  mean = sum/this.commonBiddingHistory.size(); 
   
  sum=0; 
  for(int n = 0; n < biddingHistory.size() -1 ; n++){ 
   
   if( this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n) != infinity && 
c.bidPriceHistory.get(n) != infinity ){ 
   sum += 
sqr( (c.bidPriceHistory.get(n)/this.estimatedCostHistory.get(n)) - mean ); 
   } 
  } 
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  if( this.commonBiddingHistory.size() < 1 ) 
  variance = 0.04;   
  else 






 double factor=1; 
 double expectedUtility = 1; 
 double optimalUtility = 0; 
 
 // Determining the optimalMarkUp when there is enough historical data  
 while ( factor <= 1.5 ){ 
 double probOfWin = 1; 
  
  for( int m=0; m < competitors.size(); m++ ){ 
  double x = 0; 
  x = (factor - means.get(m)) / ( sqrt(variances.get(m)) ) ;  
  probOfWin = ( 1 - get_Main().Q(x) ) * probOfWin ;  
  } 
   
  expectedUtility = probOfWin*(1 -exp( -riskav* ((factor-1)*estimatedCost 
- 0.5*riskav* sqr(estimatedCostCV*estimatedCost) ) ) ); 
  
  if(expectedUtility >= optimalUtility){ 
  optimalUtility = expectedUtility; 
  optimalMarkup = factor; 
  } 
    











Appendix 6 - Java codes of multi-attribute markup function used in Chapter 6 
int learning = 0;  
competitors.clear(); 
double sum = 0; 
double average = 0; 
 




// Markup Decision: Three Additive Components 
 
 // 1- Competition Effect:  [5, 9] % 
 
 for(Contractor c: get_Main().allContractors){  
  if( get_Main().projects.get(i).interestedContractors.contains(c) == true 
&& c != this )  
  competitors.add(c); 
 } 
 
biddingCompetitivenessRank = 1 ;  
 
 for( Contractor c: competitors ){  
  if( biddingCompetitivenessTen > c.biddingCompetitivenessTen ){  
  sum += 1 ; 
  biddingCompetitivenessRank += 1 ; } 
 }   
  
 average = sum / competitors.size() ; 
 
 
 if (average < 0.2) 
 component1 = 0.09; 
 else if (average >= 0.2 && average < 0.4) 
 component1 = 0.08; 
 else if (average >= 0.4 && average < 0.6) 
 component1 = 0.07; 
 else if (average >= 0.6 && average < 0.8) 
 component1 = 0.06; 
 else if (average >= 0.8) 
 component1 = 0.05; 
 
 // 2- Need for work : [-4, 0] % 
  
 if (consideringNeedForWork == 0){ 




 else if (consideringNeedForWork == 1){ 
  
 financialStatus = workingCapital - initialWorkingCapital; 
 needForWork = 1 - currentWorkVolume/workInProgressLimit ; 
  
 if (financialStatus > 0){ 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.00125; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.0025; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 





 else { 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.0025; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.005; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 





 else if (consideringNeedForWork == 2){ 
  
 financialStatus = workingCapital - initialWorkingCapital; 
 needForWork = 1 - currentWorkVolume/workInProgressLimit ; 
  
 if (financialStatus > 0){ 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.0025; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.005; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.01; 
 } 
  
 else { 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.005; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.01; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 





 else if (consideringNeedForWork == 3){ 
  
 financialStatus = workingCapital - initialWorkingCapital; 
 needForWork = 1 - currentWorkVolume/workInProgressLimit ; 
  
 if (financialStatus > 0){ 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
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 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.00375; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.0075; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.015; 
 } 
  
 else { 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.0075; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.015; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 





 else if (consideringNeedForWork == 4){ 
  
 financialStatus = workingCapital - initialWorkingCapital; 
 needForWork = 1 - currentWorkVolume/workInProgressLimit ; 
  
 if (financialStatus > 0){ 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.005; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.01; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.02; 
 } 
  
 else { 
  
 if (needForWork < 0) 
 component2 = 0.00; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0 && needForWork < 0.3) 
 component2 = -0.01; 
 else if (needForWork >= 0.3 && needForWork < 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.02; 
 else if (needForWork > 0.6) 
 component2 = -0.04; 
 } 
 } 
   
  
   
 // 3- Risk Allowance : [0, 7] % 
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 // 0 means Slightly risk averse  
 // 1 means Moderately Risk Averse  
 // 2 means Extremely risk Averse  
  
 if (riskAttitude == 0){ 
 if (get_Main().projects.get(i).riskLevel == 0) 
 component3 = 0.00; 
 if (get_Main().projects.get(i).riskLevel == 1) 
 component3 = 0.02; 
 } 
  
 else if (riskAttitude == 1){ 
 if (get_Main().projects.get(i).riskLevel == 0) 
 component3 = 0.01; 
 if (get_Main().projects.get(i).riskLevel == 1) 
 component3 = 0.03; 
 } 
  
 else if (riskAttitude == 2){ 
 if (get_Main().projects.get(i).riskLevel == 0) 
 component3 = 0.02; 
 if (get_Main().projects.get(i).riskLevel == 1) 
 component3 = 0.04; 
 } 
    






Appendix 7 - Computation  
This appendix briefly explains the way the developed agent-based model performs computations 
in consecutive steps. Because the sheer amount of computations is very high, only one time unit 
of the simulation is broken down and interaction of computational components of the model is 
described. This appendix presents the time unit #10 of the simulation experiment in Chapter 5. In 
the experiment, there are nine contractors with different risk attitude (in other words, with different 
risk coefficient for the equation 5.4). The estimating accuracy and project management skills of 
all contractors are “Normal”. Project complexity is chosen randomly from low to high. The 
following are the steps the model takes to simulate the 11th bidding situation: 
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1- The 11th project (Project ID = 10) is generated. The estimated budget of the project is $100M. 
The estimated duration is 29 weeks. The complexity level of the project is low.  
2- The contractors observe the project and its attributes. They enter the bidding process.  
3- The contractors estimate the cost of the project using the following function: 
if (estimatingAccuracy == "Normal") 
 {estimatedCost = pert(0.90, 1.10, 1.00)*p.marketBudget; 
 }    
else if (estimatingAccuracy == "Improved") 
 {estimatedCost = pert(0.95, 1.05, 1.00)*p.marketBudget; 
 } 
 
The table below presents the estimated cost of the project for each contractor: 











4- The contractors determine their optimal markup using the equation 5.4 that combines Friedman 
Model and Utility Theory. First, a contractor, let’s say contractor 5, calculates the bid-cost estimate 
ratio for all common past project of the competitors. Let’s do this for one of the competitors of 
contractor 5, contractor 3. The table below presents the past cost estimates of contractor 5 and the 
past bid prices of contractor 3. Then it calculates the bid-cost ratio:  
Project # Cost Estimate of Contractor 5 Bid Price of Contractor 3 Bid-Cost Ratio 
1 105.507 96.846 0.918 
2 93.07 105.037 1.129 
3 102.435 111.757 1.091 
4 103.417 105.584 1.021 
5 97.878 116.626 1.192 
6 102.88 106.443 1.035 
7 103.116 101.397 0.983 
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8 104.563 111.323 1.065 
9 94.015 104.178 1.108 
10 97.507 114.65 1.176 
 
The table below presents the mean and variance of the bid-cost estimate ratio for contractor 5’s 
competitors: 
Competitor of Contractor 5 Mean of Bid-Cost Estimate Ratio Variance of Bid-Cost Estimate Ratio 
Contractor 1 1.118 0.025 
Contractor 2 1.08 0.003 
Contractor 3 1.072 0.007 
Contractor 4 1.103 0.016 
Contractor 6 1.142 0.038 
Contractor 7 1.143 0.018 
Contractor 8 1.2 0.049 
Contractor 9 1.178 0.039 
 
Using the above means and variances, contractor 5 generates a normal distribution of the bid-cost 
estimate ratio that characterizes the behavior of each competitor. The next step is to solve the 
optimization problem formulated as the equation 5.4 and find the optimal markup. The table below 
presents the optimal markup and bid price of all contractors: 
Contractor Optimal Markup Bid Price (M$) 
1 1.032 99.109 
2 1.036 98.471 
3 1.044 113.773 
4 1.038 106.719 
5 1.042 102.64 
6 1.045 104.008 
7 1.041 103.261 
8 1.042 101.347 




As the above table shows, the winner of the bidding is contractor 2. The interesting observation is 
the fact that the lowest markup has not won the bidding. The next step is to determine the actual 
cost and duration of the project for contractor 2.  
5- The actual cost of the project turns out to be $92.228M. Contractor 2 uses the following function 
to determine the actual cost given the complexity level of the project and its project management 
skill: 
if (complexity == 3) 
{ if (c.projectExecution == "Normal") 
 {actualCost = triangular(1.05,1.15,1.1)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
 } 
  else if (c.projectExecution == "Improved")  
    {actualCost = triangular(1.025,1.125,1.075)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
    } 
 } 
 
else if (complexity == 2) 
{ if (c.projectExecution == "Normal") 
 {actualCost = triangular(1.0,1.1,1.05)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
 } 
  else if (c.projectExecution == "Improved")  
    {actualCost = triangular(0.975,1.075,1.025)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
    } 
 } 
 
else if (complexity == 1) 
{ if (c.projectExecution == "Normal") 
 {actualCost = triangular(0.95,1.05,1.0)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
 } 
  else if (c.projectExecution == "Improved")  
    {actualCost = triangular(0.925,1.025,0.975)*c.estimatedCost*(1-c.GAPercentage); 
    } 
 } 
 
6- The actual duration of the project turns out to be 34 weeks (time units).  
The following is a screenshot of the model that presents the attributes and results related to the 
project 11 (ID = 10).  
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